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This thesis assesses the determinants of farmer participation in irrigation management 
and the impact of participation on irrigation quality and agricultural production in the Nam 
Thach Han irrigation system, Vietnam. Many governments have attempted to increase farmer 
participation in irrigation system management through participatory irrigation management 
(PIM). This approach aims to reduce government financial burdens, improve the quality of 
irrigation management, and in turn, enhance agricultural production. However, the results of 
PIM have been mixed and the factors affecting its success or failure remain a topic of much 
debate.  
Using survey data from 391 households of 11 agricultural cooperatives (ACs) in the 
Nam Thach Han irrigation system,  this study examines (i) the factors that influence farmer 
participation, (ii) the impact of collective action on irrigation quality (sufficiency and 
timeliness), and (iii) the impact of irrigation quality on rice farming technical efficiency, while 
controlling for environmental factors.  
Four main findings emerge from this thesis. We find that (i) institutional factors at the 
AC level such as inclusion in the PIM project, information transparency and democratic 
decision-making have a positive impact on participation, but sharing second-level canals 
between ACs reduces participation; (ii) higher participation rates are associated with a higher 
probability of receiving sufficient and timely irrigation; (iii) plots and households receiving 
sufficient water are more likely to attain higher levels of technical efficiency and; (iv) use of 
household-level data can provide approximately unbiased estimates of technical efficiency 
provided environmental factors are controlled for. 
This thesis provides several contributions to the literature. Participative approaches 
have been widely adopted in Vietnam but this is the first empirical study to use econometric 
models to examine the determinants of participation and the effect of collective action on 
irrigation quality. This is achieved using an improved set of participation indices, constructed 
using principal component analysis. This thesis also provides the first analysis of the effect of 
sufficient and timely irrigation on rice farming technical efficiency while controlling for plot-
specific environmental factors. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Irrigation provides 44% of global crop production from only 16% of the world’s 
cropped land (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012) and 2.4 billion people rely on irrigated 
agriculture for their food and livelihoods (Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management 
in Agriculture, 2007). However, irrigated agriculture consumed 70% of all water withdrawals 
in 2010 and this  is projected to increase by 5.5% by 2050 (Food and Agricultural Organization, 
2010, 2011). Countries that heavily rely on irrigation have been trying to ensure food security 
while limiting pressure on their water resources. The United Nations has promoted the view 
that more effective governance is the best way to tackle this issue and achieve sustainable 
management of water resources (United Nations World Water Assessment Programme, 2006, 
2012).  
Over the last four decades, many countries and international development organisations 
have attempted to improve irrigation water governance through Irrigation Management 
Transfer (IMT), Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM), Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
and market instruments. Amongst these, PIM, which promotes the involvement of local water 
users in all aspects and at all levels of irrigation management, has been the most widely adopted. 
PIM has greatly increased in popularity since the 1980s, when many developing countries were 
struggling to maintain large-scale irrigation systems after the vast expansion of irrigation 
infrastructure in the 1960s and 1970s (Barker & Molle, 2004). PIM aims to reduce state 
financial burdens and improve irrigation performance and agricultural production. It has been 
implemented in nearly 60 countries as a remedy for poor irrigation performance. Despite its 
widespread application, no clear consensus has been reached on the impacts of the PIM 
approach and conditions for success or failure (Araral, 2010; Meinzen-Dick, 1997; Senanayake, 
Mukherji, & Giordano, 2015). This remains a topic of much debate and contestation.  




In Vietnam, irrigation has played an important role in the development of the 
agricultural sector, which contributes 17% of gross domestic product (GDP) and employs 45% 
of the labour force (World Bank, 2019). With an abundant endowment of nearly 3,500 rivers1 
and plentiful rainfall of 2,000 mm per year, expansion of the irrigated area and improvements 
in water control were the main drivers that allowed Vietnam to switch from being a net rice 
importer to being the second-largest rice exporter. Irrigation also helped Vietnam to become 
the largest producer of black pepper, the second-largest coffee producer, and the third-largest 
aquaculture producer (Barker & Molle, 2004; World Bank, 2019). 
Irrigation has absorbed the majority of government spending on the agriculture sector 
over the last 60 years, accounting for between 50% and 70% of total agricultural expenditure 
in the 1990s (Barker & Molle, 2004) and 65% to 70% in 2009-2012 (Government of Vietnam 
& World Bank, 2017; Hoang, 2014). By 2018, Vietnam had 904 diversion structures each 
serving more than 200 hectares, 6,000 irrigation reservoirs, 13,000 large pumping stations and 
235,000 kilometres of canals. These well-developed irrigation systems provide water for 7.5 
million hectares (ha) of paddy land, 1.6 million ha of other crops, and 0.4 million ha of 
aquaculture (MARD, 2018 cited in World Bank, 2019).  
However, these irrigation systems operate at only 50% to 60% of their designed 
capacity. Around 1,500 small and medium-size dams and reservoirs need to be rehabilitated 
while only 26% of canal length is described by the World Bank as being “fully functional” 
(World Bank, 2019, p. 18). This poor performance is caused by low quality and/or incomplete 
construction, infrastructure deterioration, and poor management. Many of these issues can be 
traced back to the low level of government expenditure on operation and maintenance (less 
than 5% of the total government budget for irrigation sector), low farmer irrigation fees and 
significant levels of non-payment. In addition, Irrigation and Drainage Companies have limited 
                                                 
1 These rivers are of more than 10 kilometres in length. 




accountability to Water User Groups since they are now funded by the government (Barker, 
Claudia, Minh Tien, & Mark, 2004; Pham, 2013; Pham, 2004; Vietnam Academy for Water 
Resources, 2007; World Bank, 2019).  
In the 1990s, in line with a wave of global institutional reform, the Vietnamese 
government, with the support of international development agencies, started to modernise the 
irrigation sector using the concepts of Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) and 
Irrigation Management Transfer (Huynh & Tessier, 2020). The concept of PIM was introduced 
in Vietnam for the first time through the Irrigation and Flood Protection Rehabilitation Project 
funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1995 (Nguyen, 2011). In 1997, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) organised the first national workshop on PIM 
which was supported by the ADB,  the  World  Bank, and the  International  PIM Network 
(Benedikter & Waibel, 2013). Since that time, PIM and IMT have been increasingly included 
in policy documents. By 2013, 49 out of 63 provinces had issued policies to support PIM/IMT 
and nearly 30 provinces had adopted PIM/IMT with the establishment of 16,238 water user 
organisations (WUOs2) (MARD, 2013).  
Currently, PIM is usually adopted in new irrigation projects, especially those funded by 
international development agencies (Nguyen, 2008b; Tran, 2019). The 2017 Law on Hydraulic 
Works (Articles 50–52) provides for farmer participation in investing and managing small-
scale and on-farm irrigation infrastructure. Also, the irrigation strategy for Vietnam, developed 
with the assistance of the World Bank in 2017, proposed the idea of “devolving power and 
responsibility to farmer organisations to operate and maintain larger sections of the irrigation 
network and to pay the full costs of water service provision” (World Bank, 2019, p. 26). This 
again underlines the importance of the participatory approach to irrigation management. 
                                                 
2 WUOs in Vietnam have different names such as Water User Groups, Water User Associations, Agricultural 
Cooperatives, Irrigation Management Board 




1.2. Research problem and justification for this thesis  
PIM is expected to enhance irrigation performance3 by increasing the involvement of 
water users in irrigation management. However, in many cases, this approach has not led to  
high levels of farmer participation and improvements in irrigation performance. Participation 
is often limited to contribution of labour and money rather than participation in decision 
making such as planning irrigation schedules and designing canals (Department of Water 
Resource, 2008; Huynh & Tessier, 2019; Le, Huynh, Dinh, Nguyen, & Thao, 2015; Nguyen, 
2008b). Farmers are mainly passive spectators in design and monitoring with little opportunity 
to influence system design or operation (Huynh & Tessier, 2019). Water disputes between 
farmers continue to be a problem and WUO Management Boards do not have sufficient 
incentives to properly undertake their irrigation management duties (Department of Water 
Resource, 2008). A survey conducted across 15 provinces suggested that, in most cases, 
irrigation management models established under the PIM project could not expand or would 
stop working after the project finished (Nguyen, 2008b). This reality raises serious concerns 
for policymakers on the sustainability and impacts of the current PIM approach.  
Many researchers have investigated these issues. However, previous PIM related 
studies in Vietnam mostly focus on the external institutional factors that impact the 
establishment of WUOs and the degree of WUOs’ involvement in management processes. 
They also investigate the relationship between WUOs and the other stakeholders involved in 
irrigation management, from central to local level (Benedikter & Waibel, 2013; Evers & 
Benedikter, 2009; Fontenelle, 2001; Nguyen, 2008a, 2009; T. Pham, 2017; Pham, 2013; Tran, 
                                                 
3 Irrigation performance is defined here as including both irrigation system activities, such as attaining inputs and 
transforming inputs to outcomes; and the effects of those activities on the irrigation system itself and on the 
external environment. A more detailed definition and indicators of irrigation performance are presented in  section 
4.2.1. 




2019).  These studies mainly adopt qualitative and institutional analysis and do not analyse the 
determinants of farmer participation within their own local WUOs.  It needs to be emphasised 
that the involvement of farmers in WUOs is the initial step through which they can raise their 
voices and interact with other stakeholders in the higher levels of the irrigation bureaucracy as 
well as secure sustainability of WUOs. Therefore, there is value in examining farmer 
participation in the everday irrigation management activities of WUOs and investigating the 
direct link between farmer participation and the quality of irrigation they receive. 
Moreover, the question of whether participation contributes to the improvement of 
irrigation performance has only been investigated in a handful of previous studies  (T. T. T. 
Pham, 2017; Tran, Gupta, Babel, & Clemente, 2005; Tuan & Nagaki, 2004) and has not been 
properly answered. These authors evaluate the impact of PIM on irrigation performance at the 
scheme level or compare irrigation performance before and after or with and without the 
project. They do not directly investigate the correlation, if any, between farmer participation 
and irrigation performance. Unsustainable WUOs and the low level of farmer participation 
reported in previous PIM projects suggest that PIM may not be accompanied by higher levels 
of effective farmer participation and that the outcomes recorded in these projects may result 
from the infrastructure improvements which are generally included in PIM projects, rather than 
PIM itself. Therefore, the examination of the direct linkage between farmer participation and 
irrigation performance detailed in this thesis, is able to shed new light on the real impact of the 
participatory approach. 
Since the Vietnam government’s main target in developing irrigation systems is to 
increase rice production and improve food security, it is not surprising that some previous 
studies have investigated the linkages between PIM, irrigation and rice production. However, 
this thesis brings an additional perspective to investigating this relationship.  
First, scope for increasing rice production by increasing cultivated area or labour input 
in Vietnam is limited, due to increasing conversion of farmland to non-agricultural uses 




(Alcaide Garrido et al., 2011), a steady flow of labour away from agricultural activities 
(Kinghan & Newman, 2017) and increasing migration from rural to urban areas (Amare & 
Hohfeld, 2016; Narciso, 2017). These realities impose a requirement to focus on maximising 
output per unit of input under cultivation. Therefore, an examination of rice farming technical 
efficiency4 is more relevant than a simple focus on production.  
Second, irrigation can be considered as a service provided to farmers and one of several 
off-farm factors that may affect the efficiency of rice farming. Given that 96% of rice in 
Vietnam is grown under irrigation and that the quality of irrigation management is thought to 
be a limiting factor (World Bank, 2019), an evaluation of the impact of irrigation quality5 – the 
sufficiency and timeliness of irrigation - on rice farming technical efficiency is essential.  
Moreover, Vietnam is strongly impacted by climate change (Chen, McCarl, & Chang, 2012) 
and farmland is fragmented with small plot size (Markussen, Tarp, Thiep, & Tuan, 2016; Van 
Hung, MacAulay, & Marsh, 2007) thus creating much heterogeneity in local conditions. 
Therefore, plot-specific environmental factors will be taken into account and analysis of the 
impact of irrigation quality on technical efficiency at plot level will provide improved insight 
compared to farm-level analysis.    
 
 
                                                 
4 Technical efficiency can be defined as the ability of a decision-making unit to produce the maximum output 
from a given set of inputs and technology, or as the ability to use a minimum amount of input to generate a given 
amount of output. A more detailed definition of technical efficiency is presented in  section 5.2.1. 
5 Irrigation quality refers to both the sufficiency and the timeliness of the irrigation that farmers receive during 
the irrigation-rotation period. A more detailed explaination of sufficient and timely irrigation is presented in 4.3.2.  




1.3. Objectives and research questions 
This thesis describes the determinants of farmer participation in irrigation management 
and the impact of participation on irrigation quality and irrigated agricultural production in the 
Nam Thach Han irrigation system in Vietnam. Specifically, the analysis in this thesis is divided 
into three distinct objectives, each associated with one or more research questions. 
Objective 1: To describe and assess the factors affecting farmer participation in irrigation 
management 
Research questions: 
- What is the level and form of farmer participation in irrigation management? 
- What factors affect farmer participation?  
Objective 2: To assess the impact of collective action on irrigation quality 
Research question: 
- Is a higher proportion of farmers participating in collective action associated with 
more sufficient and timely irrigation (irrigation quality)?  
Objective 3: To assess the impact of irrigation quality on rice farming technical efficiency 
Research questions:  
- Is there a significant correlation between irrigation quality and technical efficiency 
(TE) in rice farming? 
- Is the impact of irrigation quality on technical efficiency under-estimated when we 
fail to control for environmental factors?  
- Does aggregate household-level data give the same estimates of TE as unaggregated 
plot-level data if we control for environmental factors? 
The linkage between research objectives is illustrated by the overall conceptual 
framework in Figure 1.1.  Two key concepts in this framework are farmer participation and 
irrigation performance. Irrigation performance is measured by the quality of the irrigation 




service provided to farmers and the rice farming technical efficiency that farmers attain. The 
conceptual framework starts from the first research objective which hypothesizes that three 
local contextual factors, including the characteristics of WUOs, the condition of irrigation 
systems, and the attributes of farmers and their farms, may impact on farmer participation. 
Then, the first objective connects with the second and the third one as we hypothesise that 
participation may explain variation in irrigation quality which in turn influences the technical 
efficiency of rice production. We estimate the relationship between farmer participation and 












Figure 1.1. Conceptual framework of the thesis 
1.4. Overview of this thesis  
This thesis describes the relationship between farmer participation and irrigation 
performance from the farmer perspective. It comprises three analytical chapters corresponding 
with three research objectives (Chapter 3, 4 and 5), this introduction (Chapter 1), a description 
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(Chapter 7). Each analytical chapter is deliberately formatted as an independent essay with 
research questions, literature review, analysis methods and results. As all three analytical 
chapters use the same survey data set; detailed information about the study site, data collection 
process and summary statistics for sample households and agricultural cooperatives (ACs) are 
presented separately in Chapter 2. In the three following chapters, the data sections do not 
include these full details, to avoid repetition. 
Chapter 2 aims to provide an overview of the socio-economic context of the study site 
in general and the sample households and ACs in particular. It uses summary statistics of 
secondary data collected from districts and agricultural cooperatives, and primary data 
collected from survey households. Chapter 3 investigates the level and dimensions of farmer 
participation by using principal component analysis, then the determinants of farmer 
participation are analysed using OLS regression and the institutional analysis framework 
developed by Ostrom (1994). Chapter 4 examines the linkage between collective action at the 
AC level and the irrigation quality received at the plot level. The logit model is used and the 
model specification is based on the institutional analysis framework developed by Tang (1992). 
Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis of rice farming technical efficiency and the impact of 
irrigation quality on technical efficiency using stochastic production frontier analysis with the 
one-step approach. Chapter 6 summarises the findings, draws some policy implications, 
summarises the contributions made by this thesis and offers suggestions for further research. 
Chapter 7 details some limitations of this thesis. 
  




Chapter2 - Study site and data collection 
2.1. Description of the study site 
2.1.1. Nam Thach Han irrigation system 
The Nam Thach Han irrigation system is located in Quang Tri province to the north of 
Vietnam’s Central Region as indicated in Figure 2.1 below. It is the largest irrigation system 
in the province and was built in 1978 to bring water from the Thach Han river. The system 
stretches through 14 communes in Trieu Phong district, 11 communes in Hai Lang district, and 
two wards in Quang Tri town. It consists of two dams, seven reservoirs and two spillways 
(CPIM, 2010). There are also 66 pump stations which supply or drain irrigation water. By 2017, 
the irrigation canal network included 16 kilometres of main canal, 69 km of first-level canals, 
278 km of second-level canals and 405 km of third-level canals. 95% of the main and first-
level canals have been lined but only 55% of second-level and 18% of third-level canals 
(NTHIME, 2017a).  
According to data provided by the Nam Thach Han Irrigation Management Enterprise 
(NTHIME), the total irrigated area increased from 14,074 ha in 2009 to 15,519 ha in 2017.  The 
average volume of water supplied per hectare, measured at the head of the first level canals, 
was around 11,300 m3 in the Winter-Spring season and 10,800 m3 in the Summer-Autumn 
season (NTHIME, 2017b, 2017c). However, according to the NTH Director, 30-40% of water 
is lost before it reaches agricultural cooperatives (ACs hereafter); a situation which is typical 
of irrigation systems in Vietnam (Nguyen, Dao, Nguyen, & Ha, 2018). He also reported that 
this volume of water is generally enough for farmers to achieve good yields in the Winter-
Spring season, but water shortage in some irrigation rotations is common in the Summer-
Autumn season. The capacity of the Nam Thach Han (NTH) system has been gradually 
increased through several infrastructure upgrades and improvements in irrigation management. 





Source: Asian Development Bank (2013) 
Figure 2. 1. Map showing the six provinces included in the CRWR project 




Between 2009 and 2017, around 70% of the irrigated area was served by gravity 
irrigation, with the remaining 30% being served by pumps. Rice is the dominant crop making 
up 93% of the total irrigated area in 2017, although the non-rice irrigated area almost doubled 
from 264 ha in 2009 to 441 ha in 2017 (NTHIME, 2017b).  
The Irrigation and Drainage Management Company of Quang Tri province is in charge 
of the overall management of all large and medium irrigation infrastructure in Quang Tri and 
the NTH irrigation system is one of them. One of its sub-units, NTHIME, has direct 
responsibility for operation, maintenance and management of the NTH irrigation system. 
NTHIME manages the headworks, main canals, first-level canals and second-level canals 
which serve several ACs, where the total irrigated area is larger than 100 ha. NTHIME assigns 
management responsibility for other second and third-level canals, to 114 ACs (CPIM, 2010). 
The Nam Thach Han irrigation system was selected as the study site because it is located 
in the Central Coast region, the third-largest rice production region, with 1.2 million hectares 
(16%) of the national area of rice cultivated (GSO, 2018). Moreover, this region is one of the two 
poorest regions in Vietnam with the highest proportion of rural households involved in 
agricultural production (83%) (Liu, Barrett, Pham, & Violette, 2020) and it has been highly 
affected by climate change and natural disasters (Beck, 2017). Importantly, Participatory 
Irrigation Management (PIM) was introduced and adopted in the Nam Thach Han scheme under 
the Central Region Water Resource (CRWR) Project funded by ADB from 2007 - 2012.  
In the CRWR project, six medium-sized irrigation systems in six coastal provinces 
(Thanh Hoa, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue, Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh) were 
selected as subproject areas. The location of these subproject areas is highlighted in yellow in 
Figure 2.1 (above) with the NTH irrigation system being located in the province numbered 30.  
The CRWR project aimed to increase agricultural production and reduce poverty 
through a user-oriented service approach that emphasised farmer participation in irrigation 
water management. Project activities can be categorised under two headings: improvements to 




the irrigation management system, and irrigation and drainage infrastructure improvements 
(ADB, 2013).  
Improvements to the irrigation management system included:  
(i) establishment of financially viable irrigation management companies with user-
oriented irrigation services,  
(ii) strengthening participatory irrigation management through the formation of 
water user groups (WUGs) and water user associations (WUAs6) on the basis 
of hydraulic boundaries;  
(iii) developing on-farm irrigation infrastructure, and  
(iv) operationalising a project performance management system.  
In order to strengthen water user participation (ii above) three main activities were 
carried out:  
a. forming or strengthening WUGs and WUAs with written charters and irrigation rules;  
b. enhancing stakeholders’ awareness of PIM; and 
c. improving the capacity of WUG staff in business plan development and 
irrigation operation and maintenance (CPIM, 2012).  
Since these activities focus on the PIM approach and this thesis focuses on farmer 
participation in irrigation management, so the CRWR subproject in Nam Thach Han irrigation 
system is referred as the PIM project hereafter in this thesis.  Fifty two out of the 114 ACs in 
the Nam Thach Han irrigation system received PIM project support to increase farmer 
participation and improve in-field canal systems. Specifically, 387 people, including executive 
board members, water deliverers7 and farmer representatives attended training courses; 223 
third-level canals were partially lined, of which 127 canals were lined by ACs included in the 
                                                 
6 WUAs are formed from groups of WUGs which share second-level canals. 
7  Members of irrigation teams who deliver water to farmer plots and operate and maintain AC irrigation 
infrastructure.  




project (MARD, 2012); one new WUG and four WUAs were established and 47 pre-existing 
ACs updated their charters and irrigation rules based on the WUG model (CPIM, 2012). 
After the end of the PIM project, funding for WUAs ceased and coordination of water 
delivery between ACs was left to informal arrangements between ACs. Also, after the 
promulgation of the Agricultural Cooperative Law in 2012, each AC generated its own charters 
and rules in line with the new law, but they did not include the specific rules covering irrigation 
that had been developed under the PIM project. As a result, in 2017 when the data for this study 
was collected, WUAs had ceased to exist and the irrigation rules developed under the PIM 
project were no longer used. 
A map of the Nam Thach Han irrigation system is included in Figure 2.2. The main 
canal derives water from the headworks on the Nam Thach Han river and delivers water to six 
first-level canals. Four first-level canals (N2A, N2B, N4, and N6) mainly serve agricultural 
areas in Hai Lang district while two first-level main canals (N1 and N3) deliver water mainly 
to Trieu Phong district. Nearly all of the WUGs (also called agricultural cooperatives in our 
study site) and WUAs established under the PIM project are located along either first-level 
canals (N1, N3, N4, and N6) or the middle and tail section of the main canal. Eleven red dots 
indicate the locations of sample ACs in this study. 





                                                                                                                                 (Source: NTHIME) 
Figure 2. 2. General layout of Nam Thach Han irrigation system   




2.1.2. Some characteristics of Hai Lang and Trieu Phong districts 
Hai Lang and Trieu Phong districts are located in the south of Quang Tri province. Hai 
Lang covers a total area of 425 km2 while Trieu Phong stretches over a smaller area (353 km2). 
Both districts have diverse terrain, sloping from the west to the east. This creates three natural 
geographical regions: the coast, the plains and the hills8. Eleven of the 19 communes in Hai 
Lang and 14 of the 18 communes in Trieu Phong are served by the NTH system. These irrigated 
areas in Hai Lang and Trieu Phong districts respectively make up 32% and 65% of the total 
area irrigated by the NTH system.  
The climate in these districts is characterised by hot, dry southwest winds, storms and 
heavy rainfall as the province is located in the tropical monsoon zone. There are two distinct 
seasons; the rainy season is characterised by heavy rainfall and strong winds lasting from 
September to January while the dry season with low rainfall and hot dry winds extends from 
March to August (Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, 2003).    
Selected socio-economic indicators for Hai Lang and Trieu Phong districts are set out 
in Table 2.1. It can be seen that the total population in 2016 was around 177,000 (Hai Lang 
~85,000, Trieu Phong ~92,000) with population densities of 199 and 260 people/km2. These 
districts are predominantly rural with these residents accounting for 96% of the population. 
Around 80% (78% Hai Lang, 82% Trieu Phong) of the labour force (15 to 64-year olds) work 





                                                 
8 Hills between the mountains and plains, 50 to 250 meters above sea level. 




Table 2. 1. Socio-economic indicators for Hai Lang and Trieu Phong districts (2016) 
Indicator Hai Lang Trieu Phong 
1. Population  84,839 91,990 
     Females (%) 50.6 51.0 
     Rural residents (%) 96.4 95.5 
2. Population density (per km2) 199 260 
3. Workforce (15 - 64 yrs old) 43,626 48,597 
      Agr’, Aqua’ & Forest sector (%) 78.1 81.9 
4. Total production value (million USD9) 105.8 85.5 
      Agriculture (%) 57.8 63.9 
      Aquaculture (%) 10.7 13.9 
      Forestry (%) 6.1 5.9 
      Industry & services (%) 25.3 16.2 
5. Cultivated area (ha) 11,879.8 16,730.5 
     Rice cultivated area (%) 62.3 67.7 
6. Total area (ha) 42,479.6 35,336.1 
 Agriculture (%) 83.5 79.7 
                Crops  (%) 33.5 38.5 
                Forestry (%) 64.8 59.1 
                Aquaculture  (%) 1.6 2.2 
 Non-agricultural land  (%) 12.7 17.0 
 Unused land  (%) 3.7 3.3 
7. Average Rice yield (t/ha) 6.2 5.5 
      Winter-Spring yield (t/ha) 6.3 5.6 
      Summer-Autumn yield (t/ha) 6.1 5.4 
8. Percentage of poor households10 (%) 8.6 12.7 
(Source: Statistics Office of Hai Lang district; Statistics Office of Trieu Phong district, 2016) 
 
The total value of production in Hai Lang was around USD 106 million in 2016, 
equivalent to USD 1,250 per head. Primary production (agriculture, forestry & fisheries) 
contributed 75% of the total value of production, with the remainder coming from the industry, 
handicraft, construction and service sectors. Trieu Phong has a slightly larger population but 
production was valued at only USD 86 million (USD 930 per head) with 84% coming from the 
primary sector.  
Agricultural land comprises 84% of Hai Lang and 80% of Trieu Phong districts. Rice 
is the dominant crop accounting for two-thirds of the cultivated area. The average rice yield in 
                                                 
9 USD values are based on an exchange rate of USD 1 = VND 22,700 (2017)  
10 Poor households are those whose income per capita is less than US$ 31 per month  




Hai Lang was 6.2 t/ha in 2016, the highest in Quang Tri province (up from 5.6 t/ha in 2012). 
Rice yields in Trieu Phong were lower than in Hai Lang but also increased slightly from 5 t/ha 
in 2012 to 5.5 t/ha in 2016. The proportion of poor households in Hai Lang district is 8.6% 
while 12.7% of Trieu Phong households were categorised as poor in 2016.  
2.2. Research design and data collection 
2.2.1. Research design 
To address targeted research objectives, I needed to design a data collection procedure 
and a sample that would capture spatial and temporal heterogeneity in farmer participation, 
irrigation quality, agricultural production and institutional aspects of ACs. After reviewing the 
available data, it became clear that it would not be possible to retrieve sufficient information 
from 5 years before when the PIM project finished. As a result, I decided that the most suitable 
approach would be to use cross-sectional data to compare key variables at household, plot and 
AC level, between areas included and not included under the PIM project. 
In developing the sample design for this thesis, the main objective was to achieve a 
representative sample. The main theme of this study is farmer participation and irrigation 
performance. Moreover, it is widely known that different locations along irrigation canals 
experience different water accessibility conditions, associated with different levels of irrigation 
performance. The PIM project followed a participative approach to irrigation management 
which was expected to lead to increased levels of farmer participation, irrigation quality, and 
agricultural production. Therefore, sample design for this study includes observations for 
farmers who were involved as well as those not involved in the project, at different locations 
in the NTH irrigation system. 
I used the multi-stage stratified random selection method. In the first stage, I randomly 
selected ACs from different locations on the scheme and included both participating and non-
participating ACs (PIM ACs and non-PIM ACs hereafter).  In the second stage, I randomly 




selected households within each AC. A more detailed explanation of these two stages is 
provided in the following paragraphs.  
In the first stage, as Hai Lang and Trieu Phong districts account for 97% of the area of 
the Nam Thach Han irrigation system, I only selected ACs from these two districts. Moreover, 
as nearly all PIM ACs are located along either first-level canals (N1, N3, N4, and N6) or in the 
middle and tail sections of the main canal, I limited the sample to these canals and sections. As 
a result, I randomly selected 3 ACs from the head, 4 ACs from the middle, and 4 ACs from the 
tail sections of these first canals. Five of the 11 ACs selected were included in the PIM project. 
Four of the selected ACs are in Hai Lang, and 7 are in Trieu Phong district, which is in 
proportion with the share of irrigated area in these districts.  
Household surveys run with limited budgets commonly adopt a minimum sub-sample 
size of around thirty since this is generally large enough for the central limit theorem to hold, 
thus ensuring that the distribution of the sample means is approximately normally distributed. 
Therefore, in the second stage of sampling, an interview of 40 households for each sub-sample 
was planned, which after allowing for ‘wastage’, would give a minimum sample of 35 
households in each AC. Every fifth household was selected from the AC register of members, 
however, some households were not willing to participate and some completed questionnaires 
were excluded due to doubts about the reliability of data. As a result, the actual eligible 
households included in our study ranged from 30 to 40 households in each AC. 
Ideally, sampling would have been proportional to the number of ACs in the system 
and the number of households in each AC. However proportional sampling was not possible 
because of the skewed distribution of ACs in different parts of the system and the wide range 
in the number of households in each AC. There were also practical difficulties in achieving the 
planned sub-sample size in some ACs. In the analysis, I control for these issues using sample 
weights. 




The number of total ACs, sampled ACs and sampled households by location are 
presented in Table 2.2. A total of 391 households were surveyed, of which 182 households 
were from PIM ACs, and 209 households were from non-PIM ACs.  
Table 2. 2. Total number of ACs, sample ACs and sample households 













Head 20 2 64 21 1 34 
Middle 12 2 76 16 2 71 
Tail 14 2 69 15 2 77 
TOTAL 46 6 209 52 5 182 
 
2.2.2. Questionnaire design 
Two separate questionnaires were designed: a structured household questionnaire and 
a semi-structured questionnaire for collecting information from sample ACs. In addition, a list 
of secondary data that would be collected from ACs and NTHIME was developed. The main 
contents of these questionnaires and the list of secondary data are reported in Table 2.3.  




(AC questionnaire and secondary data) 
NTHIME 
(Secondary data) 
 Basic demography 
 Input and output of rice 
production & plot 
characteristics  
 Irrigation quality 
 Farmer participation 
 Farmer attitude toward ACs 
 Household income 
 
 AC staff (number, experience 
and education) 
 Irrigation rules 
 Institution for participatory 
approach 
 Farmer participation 
 Plot locations  
 Irrigated area 
 Irrigation infrastructure 
 AC expenditure & revenue 
 Irrigated area 
 Irrigation map of the 
NTH irrigation 
system 
 Details of irrigation 
infrastructure  
The household questionnaire comprises five sections. The first section focuses on the 
characteristics of household members, housing and land. The second section covers 
information related to rice production, including the characteristics of rice plots, rice 
production inputs and outputs, contact with extension services, and irrigation quality. The third 




section concentrates on the involvement of farmers in irrigation management.  Questions 
related to farmer perception of ACs are in the fourth section. The final section explores the 
sources of household income. The questionnaire is included in Appendix 1. 
The AC questionnaire was used to collect general information about ACs and their staff 
as detailed in Table 2.3 (above) and to cross-check information collected from households. It 
includes questions on the number and qualification of staff, irrigation rules, rule compliance, 
institution for farmer participation, farmer participation and accountability mechanisms.  The 
AC questionnaire is included in Appendix 2 
Secondary data including AC parameters (eg. area, population and number of 
members), AC irrigated areas, AC irrigation infrastructure, AC expenditure and revenue were 
collected from sampled ACs while irrigated areas, irrigation infrastructure and maps of NTH 
irrigation systems were collected from NTHIME. Secondary data collected from NTHIME was 
used to supplement and cross-check the data collected from ACs.   
2.2.3. Pretest and field visit  
Draft questionnaires and details of the proposed sample selection procedure were 
reviewed by representatives of the Agricultural & Rural Development Department in Hai Lang 
and Trieu Phong districts and the Director of the Nam Thach Han Irrigation & Drainage 
Enterprise. They provided useful field-level insights into rice diseases, infestations and 
sufficiency of irrigation which enabled the questionnaire to be improved.  
Eleven enumerators experienced in rice production and with a good knowledge of local 
communities were recruited and trained in data collection using the household questionnaire. 
Then, I did a pilot survey to pre-test the appropriateness of the household questionnaire. We 
chose three ACs located separately in the head, middle and tail section and two out of three 
ACs that were included in the PIM project. Four households in each ACs were interviewed.  




Information provided by farmers included in the pre-test, about the locations of their 
plots and distances to water intake points in the pilot survey, proved to be inconsistent. So I 
decided to collect this information from the leaders of irrigation teams, who supervise water 
delivery to household plots. Some questions which used technical terms were modified to make 
them easier for respondents to understand. The order of sections was also changed slightly to 
improve the logical sequence of subjects covered in the interview.  
2.2.4. Data collection 
The household survey was conducted from January to March 2018 with the support of 
eleven enumerators. Over the survey period, I travelled the area to supervise the enumerators and 
also directly interviewed 5-10 households in each AC and so was able to gain a good understanding 
of conditions in each AC. I also interviewed the directors and leaders of irrigation teams in all 
selected ACs. I also contacted the Agricultural and Rural Development Departments and Statistics 
Offices in Hai Lang and Trieu Phong districts to collect secondary data on the socio-economic 
status of these districts. Secondary data, including irrigation maps, irrigated areas, infrastructure, 
and AC business and financial status, were collected from NTHIME and ACs.   
2.2.5. Data processing and sample weights 
Data processing 
Data collected in the household survey was entered, cleaned and analysed using Stata 
16. Frequency runs were used to detect data entry errors and missing values while graph means 
such as boxplots and histograms were used to detect outliers. Data entry errors were corrected 
by referring back to the questionnaires. Using the 1.5 interquartile range rule, I detected outliers 
and omitted them from analyses. Missing values were replaced by the mean value of other 
observations in the same cluster.    
 
 




Sample weights  
As noted in section 2.2.1. (above), the number of sample ACs and households is not 
proportional to population which may cause biased estimation. To mitigate this issue, the 
sample weight formulae proposed by Deaton (1997) was adopted in this thesis to estimate the 
weight of each household before data analysis. This approach is outlined below. 
Suppose there are N clusters (the total number of ACs in each section in the NTH 
irrigation system) in the population and n clusters (sample ACs) have been selected. The 
number of sample households is denoted as mc for cluster c. 
𝜋𝑐 denotes the probability of selection for cluster c in the first stage, and 𝜋𝑖𝑐 for the 
probability of household i being selected in the second stage, given that c has been selected in 
the first stage. The unconditional probability that household i in cluster c is selected in a 
stratified two-stage sampling procedure is 𝜋𝑐 ∗ 𝜋𝑖𝑐. 
ℎ𝑐 is the number of population clusters represented by cluster c, and ℎ𝑖𝑐 is the number 
of cluster c households represented by households i in cluster c. The overall inflation factor, 
which reports the number of households in the population represented by household i, is the 
product of hc and hic. 
𝑤𝑖 = ℎ𝑐 ∗ ℎ𝑖𝑐 =
1
(𝜋𝑐∗𝜋𝑖𝑐∗𝑚𝑐∗𝑛)















    (2) 
Where 𝑤𝑖
𝑠  denotes the normalised weighting of household i. The total normalised 
weightings of all sampled household are standardised to sum to unity. 




2.3. Descriptive statistics of sampled households and agricultural 
cooperatives 
This section provides some descriptive statistics of sampled households and ACs. 
National data are also integrated into the analysis in order to compare the study site with other 
rural areas in Vietnam. PIM and non-PIM households are also compared to explore differences 
and similarities between these groups.  
2.3.1. Household endowments  
Human resources  
Table 2.4 shows some demographic characteristics of household members. Each 
sample household has 4.4 members on average. This is the same as the average household size 
in Quang Tri province in 2016 (ADB, 2020) but slightly higher than the average rural 
household size measured at the national level (4.2 members) in 2016 (Diem & Van Hoang, 
2018).  
Table 2. 4.  Demographic characteristics of household members 
 Sample  PIM  Non-PIM  P-value 
Household size (#) 4.42 100% 4.48 100% 4.37 100% 0.43 
      Working-age (15-64 yr old) 3.40 77% 3.45 77% 3.37 77% 0.58 
      Children (<15 yrs old) 0.64 14% 0.66 15% 0.62 14% 0.61 
      Elder (> 64 yrs old) 0.38 9% 0.37 8% 0.38 9% 0.89 
Years of education (age>18) 9.58  9.74  9.44  0.25 








      Farming 1.32 52% 1.09 41% 1.52 63% 0.00*** 
      Off-farm labour 0.11 4% 0.19 7% 0.04 2% 0.00*** 
      Wage employment 0.30 12% 0.41 15% 0.22 9% 0.00*** 
      Self-employed  0.38 15% 0.62 23% 0.18 8% 0.00*** 
      Student or jobless 0.42 17% 0.38 14% 0.46 19% 0.26 
Subtotal (excluding migrants) 2.54 100% 2.69 100% 2.42 100%  
Migrated a 0.84  0.74  0.93  0.04** 
Note: P-values refer to the difference between PIM and non-PIM; *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a People who are listed as belonging to the household and have migrated outside the area to work. 
On average, 77% of household members are of working age. Children (under 15 years 
old) made up 14% and elders the remaining 9%. Working-age people who do not migrate 




account for 58% of the total population in the sample. Only 40% of survey households have 
any children while 27% of households have at least one elder.   
Permanent and seasonal migrants (who live and work outside the local area) are 
included as household members if they are listed in household registration books. These 
migrants may provide remittances to support the household. In our sample, 53% of households 
have at least one member who has migrated. This proportion is much higher than the average 
national proportion (20%) in 2014 (Narciso, 2017). In a study by the General Statistics Office 
of Vietnam (2019), the Central Coast region is one of two regions with the lowest population 
growth rate. The out-migration flow is identified as the main cause of this situation.  
Farming remains an important source of employment and income with 52% of total 
household effective labour11 or 30% of total household members being engaged in this activity. 
At the national level, Liu et al. (2020) document the transformation of the rural labour force to 
the extent that in 2016, full-time farmers who work at least 35 hours per week account for only 
9% of household members while those engaged in off-farm work account for 53% of household 
members. Data from the household survey demonstrates that households in the study site are 
more dependent on the agricultural sector than the national average.  
Data from the survey also shows the extent to which farmers are involved in off-farm 
work. Of the respondents who reported their main job as farming, 37% also do off-farm jobs 
as hired labour (16%), waged labour (5%) or are self-employed (16%). Twenty-five percent of 
the main farmers12 in each household consider farming to be their secondary occupation, 13% 
work as hired labourers, 7% run their own business, and 5% work as wage labourers.  
Figure 2.3 shows the age groups of sample farmers and those whose main job is outside 
farming (non-farmers). On average, sample farmers are 50 years old, much older than non-
                                                 
11 Those who are in the working age bracket and who do not migrate. 
12 Those who spend more time on farming than other household members. 




farmers (37 years old). These differences are very marked in the 18-30 age group and for those 
above 46. Only 3% of farmers are between 18 and 30, compared to 35% of non-farmers. At the 
other end of the age scale, 77% of farmers are between 46 and 64, compared to only 27% of 
non-farmers. This pattern is consistent with the general pattern of the ageing labour force in 
Vietnam. Specifically, Liu et al. (2020) show that at the national level, ageing in farm labour 
is more severe than in the overall labour force. The share of younger farmers (less than 50 years 
old) decreased by 15% (from 75% to 60%) in comparison with an 8% reduction (from 81% to 
73%) for the total labour force from 2007 to 2016.  
 
Figure 2. 3. Age distribution of farmers and non-farmers  
Figure 2.4 compares the education of sample farmers, versus those engaged in other 
occupations (non-farmers) at different ages. Those whose main occupation is farming had 
received an average of 8.2 years of formal education versus 11.2 years for those working off-
farm. Only 2% of those engaged in farming had a college or university education while 28% 
of those working off-farm had completed tertiary level education.  
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Statistical t-tests on the differences between mean values in PIM and non-PIM 
households (Table 2.4) suggest no significant difference for household size and age distribution 
but the labour force and migration variables are statistically different at the 5% level. The number 
of farmers is 40% higher in non-PIM households while the number of members that are self-
employed is three times higher in PIM households. Non-PIM households also have a higher 
number of migrants. Moreover, the comparison between farmers and non-farmers indicates 
statistically significant differences between these groups in terms of age and education.  
Natural capital 
Land is a critical natural capital endowment for farming. Sample households own an 
average of 8.3 saos (0.42 ha). They rent out 0.4 saos and rent-in 3 saos, giving an average 
cultivated area of 10.9 saos (0.55 ha). Thirty-two percent of respondents rent and 8% rent land 
out as shown in Table  2.5. These figures are similar to the national average for area cultivated 
(0.6 ha) with 7% rented in and 11% rented out in 2016 (Ayerst, Brandt, & Restuccia, 2020). 
Nationally, the share of rural households involved in renting land in or out is reported to have 
increased from 28% in 2006 to 34% in 2014 (Markussen, 2017).   
Table 2. 5. Area of land owned and rented per households  
(Unit: Sao) 
 Total PIM Non-PIM P-value  
Land ownership     
    Owned 8.34 7.70 8.89 0.02** 
    Rented out  0.40 0.18 0.59 0.01*** 
    Rented in  3.03 2.58 3.41 0.21 
Land use     
    Rice 9.43 8.32 10.40 0.01*** 
        Number of rice plots  3.2 2.9 3.5 0.00*** 
    Other crops 1.17 1.48 0.91 0.01*** 
    Forestry 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.880 
    Aquaculture 0.26 0.22 0.29 0.710 
Note: 1 sao = 500 m2 = 0.05 ha; P-values refer to the difference between PIM and non-PIM; *** p<0.01. 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In our sample, rice land accounts for 86% of the cultivated area. Sixty-five percent of 
households have between one and three plots, while 35% have between 4 and 9 plots, giving an 




average of 3.2 plots per household. The smallest plot recorded was only 150 m2 while the largest 
plot was 12.5 saos (0.63 hectares). Nationally, rural households cultivated an average of 4.7 plots 
in 2010 (Markussen et al., 2016). Land consolidation has led to a reduction in the number of plots 
per household; from 5.8 in 2006 to 4.1 in 2014 (Markussen, 2017). Land consolidation has also 
been achieved in Quang Tri province, details are provided in Chapter 3.   
A comparison of PIM and non-PIM households reveals that PIM households own less 
rice land and fewer plots, but they own more land cultivated with other crops.  
Physical capital 
Quality of housing is a useful indicator of household welfare. Several indicators of housing 
quality are summarised in Table 2.6. The average house size of sampled households is 94 m2. The 
majority of households live in houses constructed using permanent materials (85% with concrete 
walls, 91% with concrete floors and 89% with either tile or concrete roofs). Twenty-two percent of 
households do all their cooking using gas or electricity, 41% of households have tap water piped 
to their houses and 87% of households have toilets with septic tanks (flush or squat toilets). 
Table 2. 6. Housing and facilities of sampled households 
 Total PIM Non-PIM P-value 
House size (m2) 93.5 106.3 82.5 0.00*** 
House construction 
     Concrete walls (%) 85.4 84.6 86.1 
0.67 
     Concrete floor (%)  91.3 90.0 92.3 0.42 
     Tile or concrete roof (%)      88.5 87.3 89.5 0.50 
Cooking energy     
      Open fire, coal or kerosene (%) 5.9 8.2 3.8 0.06*** 
      Gas or Electricity (%) 22.3 28.6 16.7 0.00*** 
      Mixed (%) 71.4 62.6 78.9 0.00*** 
Water & Sanitation     
      Piped water to house (%)  41.2 39.6 42.6 0.54 
      Toilet with septic tank (%) 87.4 84.1 90.4 0.06* 
Poor households13 (%) 5.6 3.8 8.1 0.02** 
Note: P-values refer to the difference between PIM and non-PIM; *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                 
13 Poor households are those whose income per capita is less than US$ 31 per month. 




Statistical tests for the difference between PIM and non-PIM households indicate that 
PIM households have a larger average house size and a higher proportion of households 
cooking with gas or electricity. They also own more toilets with septic tanks. Overall, 6% of 
households are officially classified as being poor; 3% for PIM and 8% for non-PIM households. 
Social capital 
The size and quality of household social networks are reflected in their participation in 
local organisations and groups as well as by their network of friends. Social network indicators 
for PIM and non-PIM households are summarised in Table 2.7. Local groups can be 
categorised into three types: political groups, mass organisations and voluntary groups. 
Political groups include the Communist Party and the Fatherland Front while the main mass 
organisations are the Farmers Union, Women’s Union, Youth Union, and the Veterans Union. 
Voluntary groups refer to all other groups in which members participate voluntarily. In our 
sample, 93% of households are members of at least one mass organisation, 30% participate in 
voluntary groups,  and only 11% are members of any political group. P-values reveal no 
significant differences in these variables between PIM and non-PIM households. However, 
PIM households appear to have significantly more close friends and can approach more people 
to seek financial help. 
Table 2. 7. Household memberships of local socio-economic groups and network 
 Total PIM Non-PIM P-value  
Number of groups (#) 2.34 2.27 2.43 0.21 
      HHs joining political groups (%) 11 8 14 0.23 
      HHs joining mass organisations (%) 93  93 94 0.35 
      HHs joining voluntary groups (%) 30 30 31 0.46 
Number of close friends (#) 8.12 9.75 7.13 0.00*** 
Number of contacts willing to lend money (#) 2.86 2.96 2.81 0.00*** 
Note: P-values refer to the difference between PIM and non-PIM; *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Findings from the household survey are similar to those by Markussen (2017) for the 
Central Coast region in Vietnam in 2014. He found that 11% of households were Party 
members and that households joined an average of 1.4 mass organisations and 0.4 voluntary 




groups in 2014. Slightly over 90% of households had at least one contact being able to provide 
financial assistance in an emergency. 
Solidarity and cooperation amongst households contribute to the social capital of 
communities and individual households. Table 2.8 summarises information from respondents 
on mutual assistance, conflict and participation. Three-quarters of farmers reported that they 
are very likely to support each other when an individual faces difficulties and only 3% did not 
agree with this statement. A quarter of households report occasional conflicts between 
households. They also report that farmers can usually resolve conflicts themselves or through 
the intervention of local groups. Three-quarters of households reported that they participated 
in at least one form of collective action. Communal authorities and groups encourage collective 
action to consolidate relationships amongst households and to strengthen the impact of these 
groups. Typically, collective action involves removing litter and vegetation along the sides of 
community roads, planting trees, controlling rats, or building houses for the poor.  
Table 2. 8. Mutual assistance, conflict and participation  
(% of households participating) 
 Total PIM Non-PIM P-value 
Mutual assistance    0.76 
       Very unlikely 1 1 1  
       Somewhat unlikely 2 2 3  
       Somewhat likely 23 23 23  
       Very likely 74 75 74  
Conflict frequency     0.97 
       Rare  51 50 51  
       Never 24 24 24  
       Sometimes 25 25 25  
Participation in community collective action 76 80 72 0.01*** 
Removing litter & vegetation along community roads 88 90 87 0.28 
       Planting trees in public places 37 54 23 0.00*** 
       Rat control 73 74 72 0.76 
       Building houses for poor households  16 17 14 0.47 
Note: P-values refer to the difference between PIM and non-PIM; *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




2.3.2. Household income 
The sample household income14 averaged USD 3,525, equivalent to USD 1,087 per 
capita (see Table 2.9). This is similar to the average for Quang Tri province in 2017 (ADB, 
2020). Farming activities (including cropping, animal husbandry, aquaculture and forestry) 
account for 41% of the total income, with rice farming contributing around half of this. Off-
farm activities including labouring, waged employment and self-employment contribute 50% 
of the total income, with the remaining 8% coming from pensions and remittances.  
Table 2. 9. Total income and structure of income  
 Total PIM Non-PIM P-value 
Household income (USD) 3,524.4 3,880.8 3,216.4 0.00*** 
Per capita income (USD) 1,086.8 1,126.4 1,051.6 0.28 
Income sources     
      Rice farming (%)  21.1 16.6 24.9 0.00*** 
     All farming (%) 40.8 39.6 47.1 0.01*** 
      Off-farm income (%) 50.1 52.4 44.3 0.01*** 
      Pension and remittances (%) 8.3 8.0 8.6 0.72 
Note: P-values refer to the difference between PIM and non-PIM; *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
PIM households have significantly higher household income than non-PIM households, 
however, there is no difference in mean per capita income between these two groups. Rice farming 
contributes a significantly higher proportion of non-PIM household income while off-farm income 
accounts for a significantly higher share of PIM household income. These differences may be 
linked to the larger area of land owned by non-PIM households (Table 2.5 above).   
Liu et al. (2020) report on a marked decline in the share of agricultural income among 
rural households in Vietnam. They found that the median share of agricultural income fell from 
46.5% in 2002 to 19.7% in 2016, while the median share of wage income increased 
dramatically from 7.6% to 34.5%. In comparison with national data, households in the study 
site seem to be more dependent on farming than rural households nationwide. 
                                                 
14 This applies only to account members who have not migrated. Incomes earned by permanent migrants are not 
included in the total household income; only the remittance from these migrants are taken into account. 




2.3.3. Agricultural cooperatives and their services 
According to current Vietnam Cooperative law (2012), “a cooperative is defined as a 
collective economic organization with co-owners and legal entity status, established 
voluntarily by at least 7 members who cooperate with and assist one another in production, 
business or job creation activities to meet their common needs on the basis of autonomy, self-
responsibility, equity and democracy in management of the cooperative” (Vietnam Law and 
Legal Forum, 2012, pp. 43-44)  
Agricultural cooperatives (ACs) are autonomous and jointly-owned farmer 
organisations which are formed by the voluntary participation of farmers and which aim to 
meet their members’ common needs.   
By 2018, Vietnam had around 11,000 ACs. Most ACs concentrate on the provision of 
inputs and services (as detailed below), while around 20% buy, process and sell agricultural 
products. There are also more than 65,000 farmer cooperation groups throughout Vietnam. These 
cooperation groups mainly focus on particular agricultural activities such as irrigation 
management, technology transfer and knowledge dissemination on specific crops or livestock 
(Tran & Le 2019).  
In the Nam Thach Han irrigation system, the area covered by each AC is based on 
administrative rather than hydraulic boundaries. Ninety-five percent of ACs serve single 
villages, six ACs cover several villages, and one AC serves a whole commune. In our sampled 
ACs, one AC serves a commune, one covers two villages and the rest serve single villages. 
Five out of eleven sample ACs share hydraulic boundaries15 with adjacent ACs.   
Table 2.10 provides some key information for sample ACs. They have an average of 
around 290 members and serve an average population of around 1,400. ACs have the function 
of supporting or providing services for farm households and provide around 7 different services 
                                                 
15 ACs share secondary-level canals with adjacent ACs. 




on average. Most concentrate on the provision of basic services, including irrigation, plant 
protection, land preparation, veterinary service, agricultural input supply, and agricultural 
extension. Four ACs have expanded into other activities including rice milling, construction, 
provision of credit and agricultural product sales. 
Table 2. 10. General information for sample agricultural cooperatives in 2017 
 All ACs PIM ACs Non-PIM ACs 
Size and services    
Member households 292.6  406.8  197.5  
Population in AC area (people) 1,443.4  2,256.4  765.8  
Services provided (#)  7.3  8.4  6.3  
Cultivated and irrigated land    
Total agricultural area (ha) 210.8  287.2 147.1 
     Rice (%) 52.8 49.3 58.5 
Total irrigated area (ha) 117.2 149.8 90.1 
     Irrigated rice area (%) 93.7 92.8 94.4 
AC staff  8.3 9.2 7.4 
     Leader education (yrs in school) 11.3 11.8 10.8 
     Leader experience (yrs in post) 9.9 7.8 11.7 
     Number of water deliverers (#) 6.3 9.0 4.0 
     Water deliverer experience (yrs in post) 8.3 10.1 6.8 
Financial status    
Total capital (USD) 108,196 167,948 58,388 
Fixed assets (USD) 90,420         141,548 47,872 
Current assets (USD) 17,776 26,400 10,516 
       Receivable from farmers (USD) 8,360 13,244 4,268 
Total revenue (USD) 40,964 68,112 18,348 
       Irrigation service revenue (%) 33.6 26.5 40.5 
Total profit (USD) 3,300 4,136 2,596 
       Irrigation service profit (%) 26.4 29.5 24.9 
 
Sample ACs had an average of 211 hectares of agricultural land, including land for 
crops, aquaculture and forestry.  Rice land accounts for nearly 53% of all agricultural land. The 
irrigation system provides water for an average of 117 ha of crops and aquaculture, with 94% 
of this land used for the cultivation of rice.  
Of the 11 leaders of our sampled ACs, only one graduated from university, seven 
finished high school (up to year 12) and three completed secondary school (up to year 9). On 




average, they had been in their current position for 10 years. AC irrigation teams had an average 
of 6 staff with 8 years of experience.      
The accounting value of total AC capital is USD 108,196 on average. Fixed assets take 
into account 83% of total capital but most are tied up in office building and irrigation 
infrastructure while current assets only contribute to 17% of total capital. It is noted that the 
average current assets include receivables from members (member debts).  The mean of AC 
member debts is USD 8,360 which is more than twice the mean of AC total profit in 2017. A 
low share of current assets and a high level of farmer debt create financial difficulties for ACs 
in running business activities. Amongst the services provided by ACs, irrigation contributes to 
34% of AC revenue and 26% of AC profit. For most ACs, irrigation service is the main source 
of income.   
2.3.4. Summary of descriptive statistics  
Farming, especially rice cultivation, is an important activity for households in the NTH 
irrigation system. Farming is the main occupation of 51% of the resident labour force and 
contributes 41% of the total household income. However, farmers are predominantly older and 
have less education compared to those who are mainly engaged in other occupations. The 
resident labour force is reduced by seasonal and permanent migration of household members. 
Half of all sample households have members who have migrated to other areas in search of 
work.  
Our sample households mainly live in houses built using permanent materials, although 
77% still use open fires, kerosene or coal for cooking to some extent. Fifty-nine percent do not 
have tap water piped into their houses, 13% do not have toilets with septic tanks, and 6% are 
categorised as being poor. Ninety percent of households are members of at least one local 
group; either a political group, a mass organisation, or a voluntary group, and 76% participate 
in community collective action.  




There are no significant differences between PIM and non-PIM households in terms of 
household size, social capital and total income. However, PIM households have less land and 
allocate a lower share of their labour to farming.  
ACs support farming by providing services to their members. Most ACs provide basic 
services like irrigation, input supply and technical consulting services. Provision and delivery 
of irrigation is an important service in most ACs, accounting for one-third of AC total revenue 
and a quarter of total profit, on average. AC operations are limited by their financial situation 
and often have a low share of current assets and high farmer debts.  




Chapter 3 - Factors affecting farmer participation in 
irrigation management 
3.1. Introduction  
Governments around the world are struggling to shoulder the financial burden of 
operating and maintaining irrigation systems, leading to gradual deterioration of irrigation 
performance over time. As a response to this problem, there have been many attempts to 
increase farmer participation in irrigation system management. It is hoped that encouraging the 
involvement of farmers in managing irrigation systems will reduce government financial 
burdens, improve the quality of irrigation management, and in turn, enhance agricultural 
production. 
These expected outcomes of increasing farmer participation in irrigation management 
may come about in different ways. First, farmers have some advantages over government 
agencies since they have a direct interest in the performance, cost efficiency, and sustainability 
of irrigation management (Vermillion, 1997). They also offer an on-the-ground presence, and 
they are knowledgeable about fellow irrigators (Groenfeldt & Sun, 1997). Second, the 
involvement of farmers in design, construction and maintenance processes may result in more 
useful designs, cost savings and construction knowledge for later operations and repairs. Third, 
and perhaps the most important benefit, is that farmer participation can help the government to 
offload some of the financial burden (Groenfeldt & Sun, 1997; Vermillion, 1997). Fourth, the 
establishment of Water User Organizations (WUOs) can help solve conflicts in water allocation 
and enhance the connection between government agency personnel and WUO leadership 
(Groenfeldt & Sun, 1997; Peter, 2004). 
Different models of encouraging farmer participation have been adopted in different 
countries. The degree of farmer participation and devolution varies from encouraging users' 
joint involvement in management (e.g. Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM)) to those 




that assign full authority and management responsibility to users groups (e.g. Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT)). However, it cannot be assumed that when the state devolves 
management responsibilities, farmers will automatically be willing or able to take on the roles 
that they have been assigned. An international review of 230 examples of PIM/IMT by 
Senanayake et al. (2015) found negative or negligible impacts on farmer participation in half 
of all cases. Oxfam UK funded a survey across 15 provinces in Vietnam to assess the 
implementation of PIM. In most cases, irrigation management models established under PIM 
projects could not expand or be dropped after the project finished (Nguyen, 2008b). Some 
studies point out that farmers’ involvement in irrigation management did not go beyond 
contributing labour and paying on-farm irrigation fees16 (Department of Water Resource, 2008; 
Huynh & Tessier, 2019; Le et al., 2015; Pham, 2013). Therefore, identifying factors that create 
incentives for farmer participation is necessary to develop appropriate programs and effective 
implementation of PIM and IMT. This chapter describes research to address this issue with an 
empirical study of the Central Region Water Resource (CRWR) project in Quang Tri province 
of Vietnam. 
This study contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, it provides an empirical 
study from Vietnam using econometric models of data from a household survey. Previous 
studies in Vietnam have mostly focused on institutional factors that shape the establishment of 
WUOs, the degree of WUO involvement in management processes and the interaction between 
WUOs and the other stakeholders in irrigation management (Benedikter & Waibel, 2013; Evers 
& Benedikter, 2009; Nguyen, 2008a, 2009; T. Pham, 2017; Pham, 2013; Tran, 2019). These 
studies place less emphasis on analysing the determinants of farmer participation in irrigation 
management within their own local WUOs. Qualitative and institutional analysis is the main 
                                                 
16 Since 2008, when the circular regarding irrigation fee exemption (Decree 154/2007/NĐ-CP and then Decree 
115/2008/ND-CP ) was adopted nationally, farmers no longer have to pay irrigation fees for NTHIME but they 
still have to pay for irrigation services provided by ACs. This fee is called an on-farm irrigation fee.  




approach adopted by scholars researching this issue. This study differs from other studies in 
Vietnam by using quantitative analysis to measure the intensity of farmer participation and 
econometric models to identify factors affecting their behaviour. Moreover, this study goes 
beyond institutional analysis and examines the other factors which drive the internal motivation 
for farmer participation, such as the attributes of water users and the condition of water resource.  
Secondly, we use information on farmer participation in numerous irrigation 
management activities to generate participation indices using a modified version of principal 
component analysis. This contrasts with previous studies which mostly focus on selected 
activities. For example, Sharaunga and Mudhara (2018) and Nakano and Otsuka (2011) focus 
only on whether farmers choose to participate in irrigation infrastructure maintenance. Miao, 
Heijman, Zhu, and Lu (2015) and Araral (2009) measure farmer participation by whether they 
pay irrigation fees or whether they contribute labour to construct and maintain irrigation 
facilities. Although these studies offer valuable insights, participation should be understood as 
a process rather than a single choice or activity. Therefore, it should be measured by a number 
of activities related to different aspects and levels of participation. A few studies have tried to 
create participation indices based on several different activities, but there are some 
shortcomings in their methods. Specifically, Arun, Singh, Kumar, and Kumar (2012) used the 
subjective opinions of 15 specialists to assign weights for 20 individual activities which were 
then added together to generate a single participation index. A problem with this approach is 
that the index is subjective and more likely to be biased if the small group of specialists cannot 
represent the opinion of the whole population. Khalkheili and Zamani (2008) apply equal 
weights to generate a participation score from eight indicators which reflect farmer 
participation in irrigation management. However, it is widely recognised that participation 
activities are not of equal importance. To overcome these limitations, a handful of studies on 
forest management (Akamani & Hall, 2015; Coulibaly-Lingani, Savadogo, Tigabu, & Oden, 
2011; Dolisca, Carter, McDaniel, Shannon, & Jolly, 2006; Lise, 2000) and one study on 




irrigation management (Muchara, Ortmann, Wale, & Mudhara, 2014) investigate resource user 
participation by using either factor analysis or principal component analysis. These methods 
can be used to estimate synthesised participation indices objectively from a number of activities 
since the weight of individual activities is estimated based on their contribution to explaining 
variance in the data. By using principal component analysis to estimate participation indices, 
this study not only fills a  gap in empirical work to date but also proposes a modified way to 
use this method. Details of this modification will be described in section 3.4.2.  
Thirdly, this study uses farmer perspectives of different aspects of the institution to 
explain variation in farmer participation. Some previous studies assess the institution for 
participatory irrigation management via the establishment of WUOs (Araral, 2009; Meinzen-
Dick, Raju, & Gulati, 2002) or via the promulgation of a set of rules or a policy (Coulibaly-
Lingani et al., 2011; McCarthy, Dutilly-Diané, & Drabo, 2004). These institutional changes 
are clear and easy to recognise. However, these indicators of institutional change may involve 
measurement errors if WUOs only exist on paper or if there is a lack of compliance with the 
rules. To circumvent such errors, this study uses farmer evaluations of institutional structures 
including democracy in decision making and information transparency. These indicators are 
somewhat subjective but we argue that farmers' assessments of their irrigation institutions 
should inform their behaviour more strongly than any other indicators of the situation. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant literature 
and builds on this to set out a conceptual framework and research hypothesis in section 3.3. 
Section 3.4 describes the data and methods used to analyse the data. Analysis results and 
discussion are then presented in section 3.5 before section 3.6 offers some conclusions. 




3.2. Literature review  
Irrigation systems are a well-studied example of a common pool resource (CPR). They 
include an asset (physical infrastructure) that needs to be managed and they provide a stream 
of benefits (distribution of water) that require management. Restricting individuals’ access to 
water is sometimes difficult (non-excludability), but the use of water by each person reduces 
the quantity of available water for others (rivalry). As such, individual users who access water 
have an incentive to free-ride and withdraw more than the optimal quantity. Therefore, 
irrigation systems often struggle with resources being overused and a shortage of contributions 
for operation and maintenance. This tragedy was explained by Hardin (1968) and is well known 
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  
Those outcomes of CPRs as a whole and irrigation systems, in particular, have posed a 
question around which management mechanisms are the most appropriate to address this 
dilemma. In an effort to find proper management for CPRs, four different approaches have 
been tried over the last half-century: IMT, PIM, water market and Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP). The combination of PIM/IMT has so far been the most commonly applied model.  
The World Bank’s descriptive term Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) is well-
known and has been widely used in the public irrigation sector. PIM represents the participation 
of water users in all aspects and at all governance levels of irrigation management. These 
aspects include planning, design, construction, financing, decision making, setting rules, 
operation and maintenance, monitoring and evaluation of the irrigation system. All levels 
include the full physical boundary of the irrigation system (from headwork to on-farm canal), 
up to the policy level (Groenfeldt & Svendsen, 2000). 
The interrelated concept, Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), is often used 
interchangeably with PIM but they are different. IMT refers to the process of passing irrigation 
management functions from a public agency or state government to the private sector or to 




local organisations (Garces-Restrepo, Vermillion, & Muoz, 2007; Groenfeldt & Svendsen, 
2000). While IMT focuses on replacements of the government role in irrigation management 
by farmers, PIM serves to strengthen the linkage between farmers and government by 
enhancing farmer involvement in government management. These concepts refer to the co-
management stage when farmers and the government share responsibilities before a final 
transfer of responsibility takes place (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). In general, the main theme 
of the IMT/PIM is the participation of water users in managing resources. 
In parallel with the proliferation of participatory approaches in CPR management in 
general, and irrigation management in particular,  numerous studies have investigated the 
question of which factors impact on the participation of resource users. Considerable debate 
exists amongst scholars on the factors that facilitate the involvement of people in managing 
irrigation systems. Dozens of factors have been discussed in the literature, commonly grouped 
into three categories: (i) condition of CPR; (ii) characteristics of resource users; and (ii) 
institution and governance structure. However, some disagreement exists on the direction, 
magnitude and significance of these factors.  
(i) Condition of CPR 
Scarcity of resources: It is widely agreed among scholars that water scarcity is one of 
the most important factors affecting farmer incentives to engage in irrigation management 
(Bardhan, 2000; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). The location (head/middle/tail) of households or 
WUOs in irrigation systems has commonly been used as a proxy indicator of water scarcity 
(Fujiie, Hayami, & Kikuchi, 2005; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002; Nagrah, Chaudhry, & Giordano, 
2016). Other studies employ irrigation intensity (Araral, 2009) or use the number of days that 
farmers cannot access irrigation water (Muchara et al., 2014) as indicators of water scarcity. 
An inverted U-shaped relationship between water scarcity and farmer participation has been 
frequently found. Fujiie et al. (2005), for example, found that in the Philippines, when water is 
uniformly abundant or varies greatly between the head and tail, farmers are less likely to join 




in collective actions to manage irrigation systems.  Similarly, water users in upper sections of 
irrigation systems in India, with better access to water, are less likely to engage in meetings 
than those in middle and lower sections (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). On the other hand, Nagrah 
et al. (2016) found that watercourse communities in the tail reaches participated in maintenance 
and voting more frequently than those in the upstream reaches. Water shortages motivated 
these farmers to participate more in order to improve their access to the resource. Muchara et 
al. (2014) also showed that farmers with a high number of days without water access per week 
participated more in irrigation management. Araral (2009) pointed out that crop intensity (a proxy 
measure of water scarcity) had an inverted U-shaped relationship with the level of free-riding (a 
measure of participation on contribution). 
Availability of alternative or/and supplementary resources: There are opposing 
arguments on the direction of the effect of alternative or supplementary water resource on 
participation. On one hand, Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) and Nagrah et al. (2016) found that 
farmers with private access to groundwater tend to be uninvolved in collective actions. A 
reason for this may be that accessing groundwater enables farmers to be less dependent on 
surface irrigation, thus reducing the need to invest in collective action. On the other hand, Latif 
(2007) showed that private access to groundwater improved the incentive for collective action 
in managing irrigation systems.   
(ii) Characteristics of resource users 
Gender of household heads: Household heads have an important role in household 
decision making, thus many scholars have investigated whether the gender of the household 
heads explains farmer behaviour toward irrigation management. Researchers have found that 
women generally struggle to engage in collective action. Heavy housework commitments and 
social norms hinder the involvement of women in the collective action of communities 
(Nuggehalli & Prokopy, 2009). Dolisca et al. (2006) and Jana, Lise, and Ahmed (2014) found 
that female farmers tended to be more active in contributing labours and making decisions 




while males were more involved in sharing benefits from collecting non-timber products and 
managing the forest.  
Age of household heads: According to Sharaunga and Mudhara (2018), older household 
heads are more likely to participate in agricultural projects because of the lower opportunity 
cost of their time compared to younger people. Dolisca et al. (2006) point out that different age 
groups are interested in different forms of collective action. Specifically, younger farmers in 
Haiti are willing to contribute their labour in forestry activities and participate in decision 
making while older farmers are more interested in collecting forest resources.   
Education and training: Farmer adoption of new technology and management practices 
is generally associated with their knowledge and level of education. Dolisca et al. (2006) 
pointed out that higher literacy levels encourage farmers to take part in community action 
groups. Lestari, Kotani, and Kakinaka (2015) show that highly educated household heads had 
more inclined to participate at a higher level. When investigating the relationship between 
different household members, education and participation, Lise (2000) found that participation 
increases when the average education level of households decreases and the education of the 
respondent increases. Conversely, Khalkheili and Zamani (2008) found a negative correlation 
between educational background and farmer participation in collective action. A possible 
explanation for this is that low education levels may prevent households from obtaining off-
farm jobs, thus they tend to concentrate on farm activities including irrigation. 
Household livelihood: Farmers whose livelihoods mainly are reliant on irrigated 
agriculture would be expected to invest more heavily in activities to secure agricultural 
production than those less dependent on irrigated farming. An empirical study by Muchara et al. 
(2014) indicates that the level of income generated from irrigated farming motivates farmers to 
engage in irrigation activities. Dependence on natural-resource-based incomes is also associated 
with farmer participation in collective action outside the irrigation sector (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 
2003; Dolisca et al., 2006; Lise, 2000). Moreover, Mendoza (cited in Khalkheili & Zamani, 2008) 




determined that farmers are not likely to be interested in participation when they have a family-
owned business and spend more time on off-farm work. An interesting study by Vandersypen et 
al. (2008) in Mali indicates that economic and institutional reforms compel farmers to be away 
from their plots to pursue non-agricultural employment and consider rice farming as a secondary 
occupation. Only half of these part-time farmers undertook water management while the 
remainder used waged labourers -- who have little incentive to engage in collective action --  to 
carry out irrigation.  
Farm size and irrigated area: Arun et al. (2012) found that households with bigger 
farms are more likely to put more effort into ensuring reliable water supply to their farm. 
Muchara et al. (2014) also showed a positive relationship between household irrigated land 
area and collective participation in irrigation management.  
(iii) Institutions and governance structure 
Institutions and governance structure are identified as important factors affecting 
collective action in a well-known paper by Ostrom (1990). The impact of institutions and 
governance structure was explored through different aspects, including the control of farmers 
in organisations; the existence of governance policies or operational rules that provide a legal 
framework for participation; and the capacity of the leader or authority.  
Reform of institutions or the governance structures for water management has been 
emphasised in many theoretical and empirical studies as a critical driver of farmer participation. 
Research by Araral (2009) finds that collective action is more likely to be undertaken in irrigation 
systems that are under the effective control of WUGs. Moreover, the existence of external impacts, 
such as government policies, create a good environment for cooperative behaviour. Fujiie et al. 
(2005) show that the provision of a special incentive from the National Irrigation Administration 
to Irrigation Associations in the Philippines led to a higher degree of cooperation in irrigation 
associations. Coulibaly-Lingani et al. (2011) indicate that the adequacy of government policy has 
a positive and significant impact on the involvement of farmers.  




Several scholars have focused on the relationship between farmer perceptions of 
institutions/governance structures and their engagement with collective action. Khalkheili and 
Zamani (2008) found that farmer attitudes toward PIM and the personnel of water management 
and service-related organisations affected their participation decisions. Similarly, Muchara et al. 
(2014) found that farmers who perceive irrigation committees as effective are more likely to 
participate in irrigation management. Moreover, enforcement of working rules to solve conflicts 
between water users and the frequency of water management meetings had a positive effect on 
farmer participation.  
The role of leaders in organising collective action to manage irrigation systems is evident. 
A study by Nagrah et al. (2016) found that the education level of leaders was positively associated 
with the proportion of farmers who pay water fees, vote in elections, and attend meetings. Fujiie et 
al. (2005) indicate that a higher quality of staff in local water management agencies accelerates 
cooperation in irrigation associations. However, although Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) suggest that 
the capacity and influence of leaders do impact on the establishment of formal associations of water 
users, that alone is not significant in explaining farmer participation in maintenance and lobbying 
activities. 
In general, considerable debate exists between scholars on the factors that facilitate the 
involvement of people in managing irrigation systems. Scholars disagree on the direction, 
magnitude and significance of these factors. The variety of results in the literature reflects the 
different contexts in which studies have been conducted and the different ways in which farmer 
participation and its determinants are measured. Some studies focus on separate activities such 
as labour contribution, fee payment, and making decisions, while others synthesise groups of 
activities to estimate participation. However, the importance of certain determinants of farmer 
participation -- the existence of institutions supporting the involvement of water users, the 
capability of leaders, the condition of the water resource, and the dependence on irrigated 
farming -- are beyond dispute.  




3.3. Conceptual framework and research hypotheses 
The preceding literature review suggests that collective actions in managing CPR are 
determined by three main factors: the condition of the CPR; the characteristics of resource users; 
and the institutional and governance structure. This fits with the relationship between “Context” 
and “Action arena” in Ostrom’s well-known institutional analysis and development framework 
(Ostrom, 1990). Some scholars (Araral, 2009; Coulibaly-Lingani et al., 2011; Muchara et al., 
2014) have adopted Ostrom and her coauthor’s approach (1994) to build a conceptual framework 
of the factors that influence collective action outcomes in managing common-pool resources. We 
build on these approaches to develop a conceptual framework for analysing collective irrigation 
















Adapted from Ostrom et al. (1994) and Araral (2009) 






Characteristics of water users 
 Age, gender, education 
 Social network 






Characteristics of good 
 Water scarcity 




 PIM  
 Capacity of the leader 
 Democracy in decision making 
 Transparency of information 
 
Internal context 




This framework suggests that farmer participation in irrigation management is driven by 
incentives which in turn are defined by the context that they face.  Incentives refer to direct and 
indirect benefits that farmers or groups receive when taking part in collective action (eg. more 
timely water supply, better social networks and higher social prestige). The internal context that 
farmers face includes (i) the characteristics of the irrigation system, (ii) the attributes of farmers 
who use the irrigation system and (iii) institutional characteristics of local water management 
organisations. Both internal factors and farmer incentives are governed by external factors such as 
the legal framework and the market for crops. Reversely, internal factors combined with external 
factors create incentives for farmers to become involved in irrigation management. 
All households in our study site are under a common legal framework or, in other 
words, the same external environment. Therefore, we concentrate on internal factors only and 
propose three sets of hypotheses related to the institutional factors of agricultural cooperatives, 
water resource characteristics, and water user characteristics. 
(H1) Water user hypotheses 
(H1a)  Households with a higher level of land fragmentation participate more in 
irrigation management.  
When households have plots scattered in different areas and which are distant from home, 
they are more inclined to spend more time to take care of their plots in comparison with others. Thus, 
they tend to be more active in irrigation management to secure irrigation water for their plots. 
(H1b) Farmers with a higher level of “social networks” participate in irrigation 
management more than other farmers. 
A farmer’s social network is an aspect of social capital which is found to have a strong 
connection with participation in collective actions (Bisung, Elliott, Schuster-Wallace, Karanja, 
& Bernard, 2014; Miao et al., 2015). The social network is measured by the number of 
organisations that farmers are members of. Farmers with broader social networks tend to be 
more active in community activities because of their awareness of the ensuing benefits that 




come and their sense of responsibility toward collective actions. Therefore, we hypothesise that 
farmers with a broader social network are more likely to participate in irrigation management.  
(H1c) Farmers who are more dependent on rice farming are more active in irrigation 
management. 
Water is an important input for rice farming and strongly impacts on rice yield. Therefore, 
farmers more reliant on rice farming tend to be more concerned about water issues to secure their 
income. We expect that these farmers will be more active in irrigation management.    
(H2) Institutional hypotheses:  
(H2a)  Farmers in Agricultural Cooperatives (ACs) included in the PIM project are 
more likely to participate in irrigation management than farmers in other ACs.  
A PIM project may affect farmers' perceptions of, and behaviours toward, collective 
actions of irrigation management at large. Therefore, we predict that farmers living in PIM 
ACs will actively participate in irrigation management to a greater degree than other farmers.  
 (H2b) Farmers who have a positive perception of the AC institution for participation 
are more likely to participate than other farmers. 
Farmer perceptions of the AC institution may explain their behaviour towards collective 
action. Two dimensions of AC institutions are used to investigate this relationship: information 
transparency and democracy in decision-making. Information transparency refers to the extent 
to which farmers can access information on irrigation schedules, maintenance schedules, 
financial contributions, AC funds and expenditure, and sanctions.  Democracy in decision-
making is measured by whether farmers believe they have a strong impact on AC decisions.  
This hypothesis based on field-level observation that farmers are more likely to believe 
that they can strongly influence decision-making when they think that this process has not been 
captured by elites. As long as this is the case, they will believe that their participation may 
provide benefits, this in turn creates an incentive for their participation. We, therefore, test the 




hypothesis that when farmers believe that they have a strong impact on AC decisions, they are 
more likely to be involved in irrigation management activities. 
Transparency is the core element of second-generation institutional reforms (Kaufmann & 
Bellver, 2008). De Stefano, Hernández-Mora, López-Gunn, Willaarts, and Zorrilla-Miras (2012) 
argue that information transparency can facilitate participation and collective action by stakeholders 
in water governance. They explain that transparency refers to stakeholders’ accessibility to necessary 
information which allows them to make informed contributions to decision-making, the first step on 
the public participation ladder17 (De Stefano et al., 2012). Therefore, we expect that information 
transparency within ACs also creates a good environment for farmer participation.   
(H2c) Farmers with a positive perception of the capacity of AC leaders and irrigators 
are more likely to participate in irrigation management than other farmers. 
The quality of leaders is evaluated by education level, while the quality of irrigators is 
measured by fairness in water allocation. When farmers think that the leader and irrigators have 
good capability and responsibility, they will have more trust in the effectiveness of collective 
actions and thus will participate more in irrigation management. 
(H3) Water resource condition hypotheses:  
(H3a) Farmers using supplementary water sources, such as pumps and/or boreholes, 
participate in irrigation management less than other farmers. 
The existence of supplementary water sources, such as boreholes or pumps, means that 
farmers are not entirely reliant on the surface irrigation system. Therefore, we expect that 
farmers with supplementary water sources will be less committed to collective actions. 
(H3b) Farmers in ACs located further from water sources are more likely to participate 
in irrigation management than farmers in ACs closer to water sources. 
                                                 
17 The higher steps in the public participation ladder are consultation and active involvement. 




The location of ACs along canals may impact water availability. Theoretically, water is 
normally plentiful in the head and scarce in the tail. Thus, we expect that farmers in the middle and 
the tail sections will be more involved in irrigation management than those in the head.  
(H3c) Farmers in ACs sharing hydraulic boundaries with adjacent ACs are less likely 
to be involved in the activities of ACs. 
One important principle for the success of WUGs is that they are organised within the 
hydraulic boundaries of irrigation schemes (World Bank, 2003). With this principle, members 
of WUGs are clearly defined. Therefore, it is easier for WUGs to call for engagement and 
coordination when members are clear about who they need to cooperate with. Such an 
arrangement helps to reduce disputes between ACs and farmers.  
In Nam Thach Han irrigation system, most ACs are served exclusively by one or more 
second-level canal(s) while some ACs have to share second-level canals; we refer to this as 
‘shared hydraulic boundaries’. We contend that the sharing of hydraulic boundaries (sharing 
second-level canals) hinders collective action in irrigation management. 




3.4. Data and methods 
3.4.1. Data 
This chapter makes use of data from the household survey. The household survey comprised 
seven sections, this chapter derives information from several of these sections. Specifically, Section 
3, which focuses on the involvement of farmers in irrigation management, provides information to 
estimate farmer participation. Some information related to ACs is derived from Section 4 where 
farmers were asked to evaluate different aspects of these institutions. Information on household and 
farm characteristics are extracted from Section 1 and Section 5. The sample size for the data used in 
this chapter is 391 households of which 182 households were from ACs included in the PIM project 
and 209 households were located in non-PIM ACs. As detailed in Chapter 2, sample weights are used 
to reduce sampling bias.  
3.4.2. Principal component analysis to derive farmer participation indices  
This section will start by outlining the main arguments supporting the use of principal 
component analysis (PCA) and then describe the general procedure for generating composite 
indices. Finally, a modified procedure for computing farmer participation indices for this study 
will be presented.  
Why use principal component analysis? 
Farmers can participate in irrigation management in different ways. We recorded farmer 
participation using a list of twelve key activities.  These vary from contributing labour and funds 
for operation and maintenance, attending meetings and getting involved in the decision-making 
process, to monitoring infrastructure, water delivery and maintenance. Farmers were asked about 
the frequency of their participation in the activities over the last five years since the PIM project 
finished. A four-point Likert scale from 1 to 4, corresponding with participation never, rarely, 
sometimes or always, was used to measure the frequency of farmer participation. We then 
developed indices of participation based on the frequency of participation in these activities. A 




simple summation of participation frequency, to report the total number of activities in which 
farmers participate, is not suitable since many activities are clustered or mutually correlated. For 
example, farmers who participate in meetings are more likely to engage in water-related 
discussion than those who do not attend meetings. Farmers who often monitor water delivery are 
more likely to report damages to irrigation infrastructure or illegal water withdrawal. Therefore, 
we needed to apply an appropriate technique to reduce the number of participation variables.   
Theoretically, there are two methods to reduce a group of correlated variables to a smaller 
set of components that account for the variance of the original variables. They are Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and Factor Analysis (FA). PCA examines the variance in observed 
variables in terms of linear combinations of original data. It aims to find optimal ways of deriving 
a smaller number of components by combining variables. On the other hand, FA explores the 
structure underlying such variables and measures scores of latent factors. Given that the objective 
is to generate participation indices representing the variation of a large number of activities in which 
farmers participate, PCA is a more appropriate method for this study.  
Generation of a composite index using PCA 
The objective of PCA is to find a way to condense information about Q original 
variables x1, x2,… xQ into M uncorrelated indices or principal components PC1, PC2,… PCM 
(M<Q) with a minimum loss of information. PCA results are derived from using the correlation 
matrix, or its standardised form – the covariance matrix. In this study, the correlation matrix is 
used to avoid the undue influence of variables with large variance on the principal components 
(Saisana & Tarantola, 2002). The procedure of PCA can be illustrated as follows: 
In the first step, Q principal components are generated as a combination of the original 
Q variables. Such situations could be represented as: 
𝑃𝐶1 = 𝛽11𝑥1 + 𝛽12𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽1𝑄𝑥𝑄     
𝑃𝐶2 = 𝛽21𝑥1 + 𝛽22𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽2𝑄𝑥𝑄  
                                                                      ⁝ 




𝑃𝐶𝑄 = 𝛽𝑄1𝑥1 + 𝛽𝑄2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑄𝑄𝑥𝑄 
where PCi is a set of Q principal components that are individually regressed against Q 
original variables xj; and βij are weights/loadings for the i
th principal component and the jth 
variable. 
The loadings (βij) for each principal component are given by the eigenvectors of the 
correlation matrix of original variables. The variance (λi) for each principal component is given 
by the eigenvalue of the corresponding eigenvector.  
In the second step, the first M principal components that preserve the majority of 
variance of original variables are selected.  As a rule of thumb, principal components are chosen 
only if eigenvalues are greater than one, the contribution of each principal component to the 
explanation of overall variance is more than 10% (Joint Research Centre-European 
Commission, 2008). Applying this rule of thumb, we retain M components as follows:  
𝑃𝐶1 = 𝛽11𝑥1 + 𝛽12𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽1𝑄𝑥𝑄     
                                                                             ⁝ 
𝑃𝐶𝑀 = 𝛽𝑀1𝑥1 + 𝛽𝑀2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑀𝑄𝑥𝑄 
 
Where PC1, …, PCM are retained, principal components with eigenvalues greater than 1, M<Q 
and M can be as small as 1. In each retained principal component, a group of variables having 
higher loadings which reveal the underlying structure of the data set are called dominant 
variables. In other words, based on the magnitude and pattern of loadings in retained principal 
components, we can cluster variables into sub-sets, and the retained principal components are 
interpreted and named as different dimensions of the data set.  
Finally, the PC score of each retained component is calculated as the sum of all Q 
original variables weighted by loadings in eigenvectors. Depending on the measurement unit 
of original variables, the value of PC score can range from -∞ to + ∞. An observation with a 
higher value of a PC score means that it has a higher level of an index than other observations. 




These PC scores can be normalised for the convenience of analysis and interpretation. This  PC 
score will be referred to as a composite index in the following sections. 
Procedure to compute Participation Index by PCA 
First, we want to generate a composite index of overall participation to measure the 
overall level of farmer participation. Therefore, I use PCA to extract the first component from 
all original variables and denote the PC score from this component as the overall participation 
index.  
Second, we want to estimate some sub-indices of farmer participation representing 
different forms of participation. PCA enables the detection of underlying structures of 
correlated variables which reflect different dimensions of farmer participation. Certain studies 
have developed several participation indices by using PCA to extract several first components 
(Coulibaly-Lingani et al., 2011; Miao et al., 2015). However, if we use PCA to directly extract 
indices from several first components, the PC scores will take into account the loadings of all 
original variables. As we do not want the overlap between the extracted indices, we apply two 
rounds of PCA.  
In the first round, PCA is used to extract groups of original variables presenting 
different dimensions of farmer participation. In the second round, PCA is applied one more 
time on a sub-set of original variables. Only the first principal components explaining the 
largest proportion of variance is retained to generate a composite index of a particular 
dimension of farmer participation in irrigation management. 
3.4.3. Regression analysis to determine factors affecting farmer participation 
The retained participation indices from PCA for individual sampled households were 
used as dependent variables in OLS regression models to evaluate the associations between 
participation indicators and their determinants (including institutional factors, water resource 
factors and water user characteristics). The empirical model was developed as follows: 




𝑃𝐼i = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑙
𝑙




+ 𝑖   
where PIi is the participation index of household i
th, watuser is farmer and household-
related variables, inst is the institutional-related variable, and watcond refers to variables 
related to water resource conditions. α0, αl, αj , αk are the parameters to estimate, and ε is the 
error term. 
The first group of variables (watuser) include main farmer’s age, main farmer’s 
education, average education of household members, number of rice plots, share of rice 
farming income, and social network. In Asian countries where several generations live in one 
house, the oldest male person in a family is normally head of the household. However, their 
age and health may prevent them from being fully involved in farming activities and making 
decisions on farming activities. Therefore, this study uses information provided by ‘main 
farmers’ who are defined as the person who devotes the greatest time in farming activities in 
his or her family. We do not include the total area of rice cultivated in the model because this 
variable is strongly correlated with number of rice plots. Moreover, plots are normally located 
in different parts of the irrigation system. Therefore, number of rice plots both reflect farm size 
and the scatter of rice land. Social network is an index based on the number of local groups that 
household members join, the number of executive positions they hold, and the number of close 
friends they have.  
The institutional variables (inst) include PIM, information transparency, farmer 
influence in AC decisions, qualification of AC leader, and fairness of water deliverers. PIM is 
a dummy variable to distinguish households in PIM ACs (PIM=1) and those in non-PIM ACs 
(PIM=0). Information transparency is an index measuring the accessibility of AC information. 
We use PCA to generate this index from farmer evaluations of the availability of irrigation 
service information, including the irrigation schedule, maintenance schedule, farmer 
contributions, AC revenue and expenditure, and fines for farmers who violated rules.    




The third group of variables (rescond) consists of locations of ACs along canals, AC 
hydraulic boundary conditions, and household irrigation indicators. ACs located in the head 
and tail of first-level canals are coded as First head and First tail respectively while those in 
the middle of first-level canals are bases cases. Moreover, two variables, Main middle & First 
head and Main tail & First tail, distinguish ACs located in these extreme locations. The former 
indicates ACs located in the middle of the main canal and head of the first-level canals which 
is the most favourable location amongst sampled ACs. The latter represents the most 
disadvantaged location as it is at the tail of the main canal and the tail of the first-level canal. 
Two other dummy variables, namely involvement in water dispute and using supplement 
irrigation water, are indicators of household irrigation issues. 
Sample weights and robust standard errors were adopted to obtain more precise results. 
Moreover, post estimation tests were done to test the model specification, including 
multicollinearity, normality of residuals, and residual heteroscedasticity.  
3.5. Results and discussion 
3.5.1. Selected descriptive statistics for sampled households 
This section will provide some descriptive statistics for sample households, including 
a comparison between households included and not included in the PIM project. Table 3.1 
shows that on average, main farmers are around 53 years old and have 8.3 years of formal 
education. No differences in age and education are identified between PIM and non-PIM main 
farmers. However, non-PIM households seem to be more dependent on rice farming with a 
higher contribution of rice farming in total household income (25% vs. 17%) and a higher 
number of rice plots (3.5 plots vs. 2.9 plots). Non-PIM households seem to have weaker social 
networks, having a markedly lower average social network index score (-0.21 vs. +0.24).  
 














Water user characteristics     
Main farmer’s age (year) 53.4 53.8 53.1 0.49 
Main farmer’s education (yrs in school)  8.3 8.3 8.4 0.61 
Average education of other members (yrs in school) 9.4 9.5 92. 0.28 
Number of rice plots (plot) 3.2 2.9 3.5 0.00*** 
Share of rice farming income  0.21 0.17 0.25 0.00*** 
Institutional factors     
Information transparency in AC (index) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.96 
Farmer strongly influence on AC decisions (1=Yes; 0=No) 39.9 33.5 45.5 0.02** 
Adequate qualification of AC leaders (1=Yes; 0=No) 60.6 64.8 56.9 0.11 
Fairness of water deliverers (1=Yes; 0=No) 72.4 78.0 67.5 0.02** 
Irrigation variables     
Using supplement irrigation water (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.52 0.68 0.39 0.00*** 
Involvement in water disputes (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.55 
First head (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.25 0.19 0.31 0.01*** 
First tail (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.37 0.42 0.33 0.06** 
Main middle & First head (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.09 0.00 0.16 0.00*** 
Main tail & First tail (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.15 
Shared hydraulic boundary (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.43 0.38 0.47 0.07* 
Note: *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
The majority of farmers have a positive impression of the quality of AC leaders and 
water deliverers. Moreover, more than one-third of respondents reported the strong influence 
of farmers on AC decisions. More than half of households reported that information related to 
the irrigation service is always available while less than 10% of households claimed this was 
difficult to access. A t-test and pair-wise test of the difference in farmer perception towards the 
AC institution and AC personnel shows significant differences between households inside and 
outside the PIM project, with PIM households less likely to believe that they can strongly 
influence AC decisions. 
Five out of eleven ACs installed pump stations to supply water to areas that often suffer 
water shortages in the Summer-Autumn season or where NTHIME cannot provide irrigation. 
Moreover, some households have installed private pumps or boreholes. Therefore, more than 
half of the sample use supplementary water sources as well as gravity-based irrigation. 68% of 
households in PIM ACs are using supplementary water, while only 38% use these sources in 




non-PIM ACs. This reflects the difficulties in accessing gravity-based irrigation in PIM ACs. 
Sixteen percent of the interviewed households reported that they experienced water disputes 
during the last 12 months. This data on the incidence of water disputes provides additional 
information on water accessibility for sample households.  
The sample does not include an equal number of PIM and non-PIM ACs at each 
location, so it is not surprising that the proportion of PIM/non-PIM households vary at different 
locations. PIM households are concentrated more in the tail end of canals than non-PIM 
households (42%  vs. 33%) while non-PIM households account for a higher proportion in the 
head (31% vs. 19%). Moreover, the proportion of households under ACs with shared hydraulic 
boundary is 43%. 
3.5.2. Frequency of farmer participation in irrigation management activities  
The intensity of farmer involvement in 12 activities related to irrigation management 
was recorded using a 4-point Likert scale and is summarised in Table 3.2. The most commonly 
reported activity is attendance at meetings related to water management issues. The general 
meeting is the most important meeting and is held once a year; most farmers (78%) always 
attend, while 60% report that they participate regularly in other irrigation-related meetings 
during the rice-growing seasons. However, simply attending meetings does not necessarily 
mean that farmers can affect decision making. 28% of farmers reported that they often join in 
the discussion at meetings and 21% raised water-related issues in the meeting.  
Fund contribution is another activity that attracts engagement from a considerable 
proportion of farmers. Over a quarter of farmers (29%) reported that they did not contribute money 
while 40% always contributed. Since the promulgation of Decree 115, which exempted farmers 
from water charges, farmers do not have to pay irrigation fees to Nam Thach Han IME but they 
still have to pay on-farm irrigation fees to ACs. However, the on-farm irrigation fee is relatively 
low and insufficient to cover the cost of regular maintenance and repairs. ACs cannot set on-farm 




irrigation fees higher than the ceiling level set by the Provincial People’s Committee. Therefore, 
apart from on-farm irrigation fees, ACs sometimes call for extra monetary contributions for 
irregular operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. This may include costs for constructing or lining 
third-level canals, or for urgent circumstances, such as droughts or floods, when extra funds are 
needed to operate pump stations or to repair flood protection dykes. 
Table 3.2. Frequency of farmer participation in activities related to irrigation management 
No. Variable Level of participation (%) 
Never & rarely Sometimes Always 
1 Labour contribution for regular maintenance 77.0 14.1 8.9 
2 Labour contribution for irregular maintenance  78.0 15.9 6.1 
3 Fund contribution for irregular O&M cost  28.6 31.2 40.2 
4 Attendance in General Meeting 4.9 17.7 77.5 
5 Attendance in water-related meeting 7.4 33.0 59.6 
6 Discussing irrigation-related issues in meetings 26.3 46.0 27.6 
7 Raising irrigation-related issues in meetings 35.8 43.2 21.0 
8 Enquiry about AC's expenditure and revenue 55.2 26.3 18.4 
9 Reporting illegal water withdrawal 70.1 21.5 8.4 
10 Reporting damage and leaking 66.2 17.1 16.6 
11 Monitoring water delivery 73.4 12.0 14.6 
12 Monitoring repair/maintenance 77.0 16.4 6.7 
Reporting on-farm irrigation issues is a good way to help ACs recognise and solve irrigation 
problems on time and efficiently. Most farmers (98%) directly contacted representatives of the 
Executive Board's member of ACs or the irrigation team's members when they faced irrigation-related 
problems in their plots. However, a low ratio of farmers reported that they often informed ACs about 
illegal behaviour, such as illegal water withdrawal (8%). There are several possible explanations for 
these low percentages:  the low incidence of these issues, the avoidance of potentially souring 
relationships with other farmers in the community, or a general lack of concern about these issues.  
Labour contribution is a relatively uncommon participation activity. The low reward for 
contributing labour and the availability of more profitable work may explain why few farmers 
provide their labour for irrigation maintenance tasks. More than half of all farmers never 
participate and only 9%  always provide labour for regular maintenance and 6% for irregular 




maintenance.  Moreover, only two out of 11 ACs require compulsory labour contributions for canal 
dredging. Normally, there is at least one irrigation team that is paid and which specialises in 
delivering water and cleaning and repairing canals and other structures in the irrigation system. 
Moreover, ACs encourage participation of farmers and local socio-political groups (e.g. Women’s 
Union, Farmer’s Union, Youth’s Union) in dredging some canals via tenders. For unexpected 
situations, such as broken canal dykes, flood and droughts, ACs call for emergency voluntary 
labour contributions to protect irrigation systems or dredge irrigation and drainage canals.  
In general, the level of participation in irrigation management is not homogenous amongst 
farmers. Attending meetings is the most common practice while labour contribution and monitoring-
related activities are generally undertaken by only a minority of farmers. The information on farmer 
participation in the above twelve activities is used as an input in PCA to generate participation indices.  
3.5.3. Participation indices with PCA 
The composite index of overall participation is estimated by extracting the first 
component from twelve activities related to irrigation management by PCA. The first 
component explains 41% of the variance in the data set. The loading for individual activities 
of the first component is present in Table 3.3. It can be seen that activities related to monitoring 
have a higher loading which indicates the dominant role of these activities in explaining data 
variation. Some activities, such as attending the general meeting and enquiring about the AC's 
financial information, have the lowest loading. 
The Bartlett Test of Sphericity shows that we can reject the null hypothesis that the original 
variables are uncorrelated at the 0.01 level of significance. Moreover, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy is 0.81 and the KMO value of all individual variables is 
greater than 0.6. The result of these tests suggests that the data is appropriate for PCA. The PC score 
generated from the first component of 12 variables is called the composite participation index. 
 




Table 3. 3. PCA loading for composite participation index 
Variable Overall participation 
Labour contribution for regular maintenance  0.24 
Labour contribution for irregular maintenance  0.23 
Fund contribution for irregular O&M cost   0.24 
Attendance in General Meeting 0.20 
Attendance in water-related meetings 0.27 
Discussing irrigation-related issues in meetings  0.28 
Raising irrigation-related issues in meetings 0.28 
Enquiry about AC's expenditure and revenue 0.15 
Reporting illegal water withdrawal 0.37 
Reporting damage and leaking 0.37 
Monitoring water delivery 0.36 
Monitoring maintenance 0.37 
Eigenvalue 4.70 
Percentage of variance explained 39.20 
  Moreover, we are also interested in different dimensions of participation, thus we 
explore clusters of these activities. To examine whether twelve participation indicators 
(activities) are clustering into several groups, the first round of PCA with varimax rotation was 
conducted for all twelve participation indicators. Only components with eigenvalues greater 
than one and a percentage of variance over 10% were considered. As a result, we retain the 
three first principal components as shown in Table 3.4. 
Table 3. 4. PCA loading for retained components  
Variable Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
Labour contribution for regular maintenance  0.07 0.03 0.50 
Labour contribution for irregular maintenance  0.08 -0.04 0.55 
Fund contribution for irregular O&M cost   0.06 0.12 0.38 
Attendance in General Meeting -0.12 0.40 0.20 
Attendance in water-related meetings -0.09 0.49 0.18 
Discussing irrigation-related issues in meetings  0.04 0.53 -0.13 
Raising irrigation-related issues in meetings 0.07 0.50 -0.14 
Enquiry about AC’s expenditure and revenue 0.26 0.17 -0.41 
Reporting illegal water withdrawal 0.42 0.09 -0.01 
Reporting damage and leaking 0.46 -0.01 0.06 
Monitoring water delivery 0.48 -0.06 0.07 
Monitoring maintenance 0.52 -0.03 0.01 
Eigenvalue 4.70 1.63 1.29 
Percentage of variance explained 39.20 13.57 10.76 




Table 3.4 shows loadings of original variables in each principal component, the 
eigenvalue, as well as the proportion of variance explained by each component. Any original 
variables with loadings greater than |0.2| are considered as dominating variables that explain 
most of the variance in the original variables, and which strongly correlate with other variables, 
contributing to a principal component. In component 1, five variables are dominant and all 
concentrate on monitoring activities. Component 2 reveals cross-correlation between variables 
associated with farmer involvement in making decisions while variables mainly focusing on 
input mobilisation for maintenance are dominant in component 3. Although enquiry about AC's 
expenditure and revenue has a high loading in both component 1 and 3, we decide to group it 
in component 1 due to the similarity of this activity with other dominant activities in component 
1 and due to its positive sign as well. 
PCA, then, is applied one more time for each cluster of original variables, namely 
Participation in monitoring, Participation in decision making and Participation in input 
contribution. The result of the second round of PCA is presented in Table 3.5.  
Table 3. 5. PCA loading for activities in three dimensions of irrigation management 
Variable Par. in 
monitoring 
Par. in decision 
making 
Par. in input 
mobilization 
Labour contribution for regular maintenance  
  
0.63 
Labour contribution for irregular maintenance  
  
0.63 
Fund contribution for irregular O&M cost   
  
0.46 
















Enquiry about AC's expenditure and revenue 0.21 
  
Reporting illegal water withdrawal 0.47 
  
Reporting damage and leaking 0.49 
  
Participation in monitoring water delivery 0.49 
  
Participation in monitoring maintenance 0.51 
  
Eigenvalue 3.18 2.24 1.19 
Percentage of variance explained 63.66 56.03 64.75 
 




The Bartlett and KMO Test for individual clusters of variables all satisfied the 
assumptions that original variables are correlated and the sampling size is adequate, with p-
values lower than 0.01 and KMO values equal or greater than 0.5. Thus, the adoption of PCA 
for clusters of variables is appropriate. The principal scores generated from the first 
components of three clusters of variables are called participation indices in monitoring, 
decision-making, and input contribution respectively. 
3.5.4. Determinants of farmer participation 
This section will analyse the results of the OLS regression of factors affecting farmer 
participation. The results of the multiple regressions are presented in Table 3.6 with a summary 
of findings relating to each hypothesis in Table 3.7. Moreover, the post estimation test indicates 
that the model specification is appropriate. The individual and overall VIF value of all 
independent variables are lower than 10. This means multi-collinearity does not exist between 
independent variables. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality on the residuals from the 
regression models shows that all models, except model 3 (factors affecting farmer participation 
in decision making), do not violate the normality assumption. However, with a sample size of 
over 200 households, the central limit theorem ensures that the residual distribution approximates 
normality. Heteroscedasticity in residuals is managed by the robust standard error.   
 
















Main farmer’s age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Main farmer’s education 0.05*** 0.04** 0.04* 0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Average education of HH’s members 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of rice plots 0.10*** 0.05 0.15*** 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Share of rice farming income 0.26 0.49 0.12 -0.28 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.39) (0.31) 
Social networks 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
PIM   0.32* 0.11 0.40*** 0.39*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) 
Information transparency in AC  0.12* 0.15** 0.10 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Farmer influence on AC decisions 
 
0.23* 0.01 0.47*** 0.18 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15) 
Adequate qualification of AC leader  0.44*** 0.47*** 0.28** 0.22* 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.11) (0.13) 
Fairness of water deliverers 
 
-0.11 -0.28* 0.07 0.15 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) 
Using supplementary irrigation water 
 
-0.20 -0.13 -0.12 -0.29** 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) 
Involved in water disputes 
 
0.22 0.12 0.20 0.28* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15) 
First head 
 
1.39*** 1.35*** 1.29*** 0.38** 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
First tail  1.77*** 1.81*** 0.83*** 1.26*** 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) 
Main middle & First head 0.37* 0.02 0.11 1.19*** 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.19) 
Main tail & First tail -0.70*** -0.79*** -0.12 -0.70*** 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) 
Sharing hydraulic boundary -0.67*** -0.46*** -0.70*** -0.58*** 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) 
Intercept -3.01*** -2.38*** -2.75*** -2.02*** 
 (0.47) (0.48) (0.51) (0.44) 
R2adj 0.46 0.41 0.27 0.44 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses 








 Overall  Monitoring Decision Contribution 
H1a. Land fragment + + + + NS 
H1b. Social network + NS NS NS NS 
H1c. Dependence on rice farming + NS NS NS NS 
H2a. PIM + + NS + + 
H2b. Positive perception of AC 
institution for participation 
+ + + + NS 
H2c. Positive perception of AC 
personnel 
+ + +/- + + 
H3a. Supplementary water sources - NS NS NS - 
H3b. Distance from water sources + U U U U 
H3c. Sharing a hydraulic boundary - - - - - 
Note: + (-) means significantly positive (negative) effects, NS means not significant, U means a U-
shape relationship 
 
We found that water resource conditions at AC level have strong effects on farmer 
participation. Notably, the location of ACs along canals is significantly associated with 
differences in the level of farmer participation. Contrary to hypothesis H3b, farmers located in 
the head of first level canals had significantly higher participation indices than farmers in the 
middle section. A similar situation was reported by Reddy and Reddy (2005) who found that 
farmers in the head participated more in contribution than those in the middle and tail reaches. 
However, in line with hypothesis H3b, we also find that farmers in the tail of first-level canals 
are more likely to engage in all forms of collective action in comparison with households in 
the middle section.  Specifically, farmers in the tail section have mean participation index 
scores that are 1.8, 1.8, 0.8 and 1.3 standard deviations higher for overall participation, 
monitoring, decision-making and input contribution respectively, compared to farmers in the 
middle section. Inequality in water allocation, namely water abundance in the middle section 
alongside shortages in the tail-end section, could be considered as a driver for farmer 
behaviour. This result is consistent with the finding in Sharaunga and Mudhara (2018) that 
farmers who have plots located in the tail of canals are more likely to participate in irrigation 




maintenance than those located in the middle. These results indicate that farmer participation 
in the middle section is worse than in the head and tail sections. 
For the two extreme locations, we observed opposite behaviours. Households located 
closest to the headwork (Main middle & First head) are more likely to have higher indices in 
terms of overall participation and input contribution. Compulsory labour requirements applied 
in the AC to which these households belong may explain this difference. In contrast, farmers 
belonging to ACs located farthest from the headwork (Main tail & First tail) are significantly 
less likely to take part in all forms of participation. This result is consistent with the empirical 
findings of Bardhan (1993), Uphoff, Wickramasinghe, and Wijayaratna (1990) and Araral 
(2009). These authors indicate that extreme scarcity of water resources do not create incentives 
for cooperation between water users. Overall, the relationship between AC location and 
participation appears to take a U shape distribution, with farmers at the head and tail 
participating more than farmers in the middle. In addition, we note that farmers closest to the 
headwork participate more and farmers at the extreme tail participate less. 
Sharing hydraulic boundaries seem to be an obstacle for cooperation amongst farmers. 
Farmers in ACs with shared second-level canals are less likely to participate in all forms of 
irrigation management activities. Leaders of these ACs reported that their ACs have to share 
responsibilities for cleaning shared second-level canals with adjacent ACs. While ACs in the tail 
of second-level canals put more effort into maintaining canals and monitoring water delivery along 
shared canals, ACs in the head are less likely to devote resources to these activities. Some 
households withdraw water illegally without fear of being punished by adjacent ACs due to sharing 
of second-level canals. All of these factors may reduce farmer incentives to join in irrigation 
management in these ACs.    
While water resource issues at AC level explain variation in farmer participation in 
nearly all dimensions,  at the household level, availability of supplementary water tends to 
reduce input contributions while involvement in water disputes is associated with higher input 




contribution. In the study site, supplementary water sources include water from AC pump 
stations or private mobile pumps and boreholes. These water sources are generally closer to 
farm plots and more reliable than gravity-based water provided jointly by NTHIME and ACs. 
Therefore, it is understandable that farmers with access to these sources tend to have less 
incentive to devote time and money to help manage AC irrigation canals. Our results are in line 
with those reported by Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) and Nagrah et al. (2016).  
 Farmers reported that water-related disputes mainly originate from sharing the same 
water intake point and drainage outlet. These plots are irrigated by water flowing from 
neighbouring plots and drained by flowing onto low altitude plots and so have to use the same 
irrigation schedule. However, sometimes farmers do not follow the crop calendar 
recommended by ACs, as they may be planting different rice varieties or simply busy with 
other work. Thus, their plots need a different irrigation schedule. Moreover, a small plot size 
prevents the development of separate irrigation and drainage canals for every plot. As a result, 
farmers may withdraw water from upstream neighbouring plots and drain water to downstream 
neighbouring plots in a way which is harmful to adjacent plots.   
Nearly all AC institutional factors have a positive impact on the overall participation of 
farmers while particular institutional aspects are strongly associated with specific forms of 
participation. Specifically, farmers in PIM ACs have participation indices in decision-making 
and input contribution that are 0.4 and 0.39 standard deviation higher than those from non-PIM 
ACs. In other words, they are more likely to be involved in decision-making and input 
contribution. Farmers in PIM ACs had a chance to learn about the concept of PIM and were 
encouraged to engage in project activities, especially in decision making, including discussions 
about irrigation issues such as operational rules, construction, and canal rehabilitation. 
Moreover, AC staff and some representatives of the Women’s Union, and the Farmer’s Union 
in PIM AC participated in several training courses related to the PIM model and operation and 




maintenance of the irrigation system. These factors may explain the positive impact of the PIM 
project on farmer participation. 
The impact of farmer perceptions of ACs in terms of institutions and personnel significantly 
correlate with farmer participation. Farmers with a higher evaluation of AC information 
transparency are more likely to engage in monitoring activities and farmers who believe that 
farmers have a strong influence on AC decisions are more likely to be actively involved in decision 
making. Moreover, when farmers think that the AC leaders have adequate qualifications, they are 
more likely to join in all forms of collective action. In contrast, farmers who believe that water 
deliverers are fair are less likely to monitor the irrigation service. Water deliverers directly operate 
the irrigation facility and deliver and allocate water to individual plots. Therefore, it is 
understandable that farmers pay less attention to monitoring the water delivery service if they trust 
the fairness of water deliverers.   
The regression models show that households with more cultivated plots are 
significantly more likely to engage in irrigation management, especially monitoring and 
decision making. By 2015, the number of plots in Quang Tri province fell by 70% (Dinh, 2015) 
after the promulgation of official dispatch number 1176/UBND by the People’s Committee of 
Quang Tri province about land consolidation on 7th July 2003. The People’s Committee 
selected one AC to do a land consolidation pilot. After the success of that model, the land 
consolidation campaign was replicated in many ACs. In several ACs, land consolidation has 
allowed  ACs to undertake large field models in which all plots in that field cultivate only one 
variety of rice, apply one crop calendar, and keep to standardised cultivation practices. 
However, due to the varied and difficult characteristics of rice plots, some ACs have not 
completed the land consolidation process. Currently, each household still has approximately 
three plots in three different locations on average. 
Some other household characteristics, including the age and education of the main 
farmers, are significantly associated with variations in farmer participation. Specifically, 




different participation indices significantly increase 0.02 to 0.05 standard deviation for each 
year increase in the age and education of the main farmers.  Our Spearman tests showed a 
significant positive relationship between the main farmers' age and total days spent on rice 
farming and a significant negative relationship between age and total days spent on off-farm 
jobs. Younger farmers seem to be busier with off-farm jobs while older farmers spend more 
time on rice farming. Therefore, older farmers can devote more time than younger farmers to 
irrigation management.  
Overall, most of the independent variables included in the model have contributed to 
an improved understanding of the variance in farmer participation. The variables explain 46% 
of the variation in overall farmer participation, 41% for participation in monitoring, 27% for 
participation in decision making, and 44% for participation in input contribution.  
3.6. Conclusions 
PIM approaches have been implemented in Vietnam to improve the management of 
surface irrigation systems and reduce dependence on the government budget. For this approach 
to be a success, we need to thoroughly understand the factors that accelerate as well as constrain 
farmer participation in managing local irrigation systems. 
Our study of the Nam Thach Han irrigation system shows that attending meetings is the most 
common form of participation with 78% of farmers always attending the annual general meeting 
while 60% attend other irrigation-related meetings. 74% report that they always (28%) or sometimes 
(46%) join in the discussions at these meetings. 40% of farmers always contribute money for irregular 
maintenance and construction work while 31% sometimes contribute. The proportion of farmers who 
contribute their time for maintenance work (sometimes/always) is less than 25% of which only 9% 
of farmers always engage in this activity. Between 7% and 17% of farmers always actively take part 
in the different monitoring activities while 60% to 77% rarely, if ever, participate.  




The descriptive statistics for farmer participation show a similar trend in the variance 
of farmer participation in different groups of activities (contribution, decision making and 
monitoring). That result is confirmed by the result of the PCA which divides participation 
activities into three clusters and which generates participation indices reflecting the level of 
participation in these three dimensions.  
Experience with the PIM project seems to have a positive impact on farmer participation 
in general and in decision-making and input contribution in particular. A higher farmer evaluation 
of information transparency and democratic decision-making tends to increase their involvement 
in monitoring and decision making. Moreover, if they believe their leaders are sufficiently qualified 
they are more likely to participate in different forms of combined action.  
Farmers in ACs located at the tail of first level canals, which normally faces insufficient 
water, have an incentive for collective action. However, farmers located furthest from the 
headworks participate less. These farmers may face extreme water scarcity and may feel that 
they have nothing to gain from participation in irrigation management. We also found that 
when several ACs share second level canals and supplementary water resources are available, 
farmer participation in irrigation management is significantly reduced.   
Although internal household characteristics such as age, education level of main 
farmers and the number of plots positively correlate with participation intensity, the magnitude 
of these effects is relatively small.  
These findings suggest that the integration of PIM in irrigation projects can be a good 
way to accelerate farmer engagement in irrigation management. The quality of AC staff, 
especially leaders, needs to be emphasised in terms of its importance in affecting farmer 
participation. The education and knowledge of leaders can be built up through training courses. 
Along with these courses, finding and developing capacity for the next generation of leaders is 
another useful strategy to increase the sustainability of ACs. The results also suggest that 
reform in the governance of ACs toward transparency in information and democracy in 




decision-making can create fertile ground for the involvement of farmers in AC activities and 
irrigation management. Improving cooperation between ACs or re-establishing ACs based on 
hydraulic boundaries may also facilitate participation and improve irrigation management.  
The analysis and results described in this chapter contribute to the literature by 
providing a case study based on survey data from Vietnam; generating composite participation 
indices for different groups of activities; and using farmer evaluations to measure specific 
institutional aspects of WUGs (Agricultural Cooperatives in the context of the study site). 
However, this study also has some limitations mainly due to lack of accurate measurements of 
the volume of water distributed to individual households. 
  




Chapter 4 - The impact of collective action on the 
sufficiency and timeliness of irrigation 
4.1. Introduction 
According to the institutional analysis framework developed by Tang (1992), farmer 
interaction to solve collective action problems is an important determinant of irrigation 
performance in community and government-managed systems. These patterns of interaction 
are affected by the incentives faced by farmers, which in turn are defined by institutional 
arrangements, irrigation system physical factors, and the socio-economic characteristics of 
farmers. Institutional arrangements refer to three different levels of rules including 
constitutional rules, collective choice rules, and operational rules (Ostrom et al., 1994; Tang, 
1992). These rules guide the actions taken by farmers, which include constitutional actions, 
collective choice actions, and operational actions, all of which Ostrom et al. (1994) subsumed 
under the general heading of collective action. Based on this framework, scholars have 
investigated the determinants of collective action as well as the relationship between 
institutional arrangement and irrigation performance.  
The literature in this field mainly focusses on the relationship between the existence of 
water user organisations or sets of irrigation management rules and irrigation performance 
(Abdelhadi, Adam, Hassan, & Hata, 2004; Bastakoti, Shivakoti, & Lebel, 2010; Bhatta, Ishida, 
Taniguchi, & Sharma, 2006; Huang, 2014; Samad, 2002; Wang et al., 2007). But while 
collective action carried out by the members of these organisations has a direct impact on 
irrigation performance, only a few studies focus on the impact of these actions on irrigation 
management (Mushtaq, Dawe, Lin, & Moya, 2007; Vandersypen, Verbist, Keita, Raes, & 
Jamin, 2009). Given that the irrigation rules set up under the PIM project are no longer used, it 
is particularly important to assess whether a higher intensity of collective action can lead to 
improved irrigation performance. 




This chapter seeks to assess whether a higher intensity of collective action in irrigation 
management increases the probability that farmers will receive sufficient and timely irrigation 
for rice farming. To answer this research question, we use survey data collected from 355 
households and 777 plots receiving gravity-based irrigation in the Nam Thach Han irrigation 
scheme. The sufficiency and timeliness of irrigation, referred to here as ‘irrigation quality’ is 
assessed at the plot level while collective actions are measured at AC level. A logit model is 
used to estimate the impact of collective action on the sufficiency and timeliness of irrigation. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The literature review and research 
hypotheses are presented in section 4.2. Then, in section 4.3, we briefly describe the data and 
explain the economic models, measurement of variables, and descriptive statistics. An analysis 
of our results and discussion are presented in section 4.4, followed by conclusions in section 4.5. 
4.2. Literature review 
4.2.1. Irrigation performance including farmer perspectives  
Irrigation performance has been defined variously in journal articles over the last forty 
years. Lenton (1986) referred to the level of attaining designed objectives, while Abernethy 
(1989) added further detail to the definition by stating that objectives are measured using 
several indicators for the achievement of system goals. Small and Svendsen (1990) broadened 
the concept by including both operational aspects (input acquisition and transformation from 
inputs to outcomes) and impact (the effects of operational activities on the irrigation system 
and external environment). Murray-Rust and Snellen (1993) suggested that operational and 
strategic performance should be included based on the business assessment approach of Ansoff 
(1979, as cited in Murray-Rust & Snellen, 1993). Accordingly, they use operational 
performance to refer to the degree of fulfilment of targets while strategic performance is the 
procedure by which resources are utilised to produce outputs. Additionally, they also 




emphasised changes in performance expectations over time. Gorantiwar and Smout (2005, p. 
3) also identified temporal aspects of irrigation performance as they claimed that irrigation 
performance is “the extent to which land and water resources in the irrigation schemes planned 
for allocation to different users and their spatial and temporal distribution in [sic] planning and 
operation stage follow the objectives of the irrigation scheme”. Generally, the differences in 
these definitions originate from two drivers: the scope of ‘the system’, and target audiences 
who may be concerned with different aspects of performance.  
For the scope of ‘the system’, Small & Svendsen (1992) illustrate the irrigation system 
as a subsystem nested within a broader set of agroeconomic and socioeconomic systems. 
Specifically, the irrigation system is the core system, which is nested within the irrigated 
agriculture system, the agricultural economic system, the rural economic system, and finally, 
the socio-economic system. The final output from a smaller system serves as an input into a 
broader system.  
Generally, the definitions proposed by Lenton (1986) and Abernethy (1989) are general 
and can apply to any system, while the definition by Small and Svendsen (1990) emphasises 
internal irrigation system performance and its linkage to other systems. In contrast, the 
definition by Gorantiwar and Smout (2005) mainly concentrates on the irrigation system itself.  
Chambers (1988, cited in Bos, Burton, & Molden, 2005) attempts to link different 
audiences with their respective interests. While farmers are interested in adequate, convenient, 
timely water supply, irrigation engineers are concerned with water delivery efficiency from 
headworks to tertiary outlets. Agricultural economists focus on high and stable farm production 
and incomes, whereas political economists emphasise equitability of benefit distribution. The 
irrigation performance definitions by Small and Svendsen (1990) and by Murray-Rust and 
Snellen (1993) also highlight different aspects of irrigation performance to satisfy different 
audiences.  




These differences in approach to defining irrigation performance lead to differences in 
selection of irrigation performance indicators in the literature. Indicators initially focused 
merely on water utilisation efficiency, including conveyance efficiency, distribution efficiency, 
and field application efficiency (Bos & Nugteren, 1990) as they focus only on the irrigation 
system itself. Some authors (Malhotra, Raheja, & Seckler, 1984; Seckler, Sampath, & Raheja, 
1988) even suggest a single key indicator in order to easily assess the irrigation system. The 
shortlist of indicators reported in earlier works has gradually evolved into a comprehensive list 
of indicators, covering water delivery and utilisation, agricultural production, economics, 
socio-economics, human welfare, and the environment (Bos et al., 2005; Gorantiwar & Smout, 
2005; Small & Svendsen, 1990).  
Although researchers have different approaches to defining irrigation performance and 
have developed different groups of performance indicators, most agree that the assessment of 
irrigation performance needs to include two main domains: water delivery and agricultural 
productivity. The former domain commonly refers to the adequacy, equity, timeliness and 
reliability of water delivery, while the latter domain is frequently associated with crop yields, 
cropping intensities and water productivity.  
In this thesis, we choose to use the definition by Small & Svendsen (1990, 1992) as the 
core definition of irrigation performance. Accordingly, indicators of irrigation performance are 
categorized into three types – internal process, system outcomes and system impacts. Process 
indicators present the transformation of inputs into intermediate outputs, whereas output 
indicators refer to the final outputs of the system. Impact indicators of irrigation performance 
include the effects that irrigation has on the broader systems such as the irrigation agriculture 
system and the rural economic system. Chapter 4 will focus on output indicators relating to 
water delivery, specifically sufficiency and timeliness. These indicators are direct outputs of 
the irrigation system and farmers are interested in these indicators. These two indicators are 
referred to as irrigation quality in this thesis since they represent the quality of irrigation service 




provided to farmers. In chapter 5, we will focus on the impact indicators, specifically the 
technical efficiency of rice farming, delving into the connection between the irrigation system 
and the irrigated agricultural system. 
In research by Bos, Murray-Rust, Merrey, Johnson, and Snellen (1994), the sufficiency 
of irrigation is defined as the ratio of the actual volume of water allocated to an area unit, over 
the volume of water demanded by that area, during an irrigation rotation or a crop season. The 
timeliness of irrigation refers to the predictability of the length of the rotation and the length of 
the interval between rotations. However, it is not feasible to estimate these two indicators in 
many Asian developing countries because of the lack of water measurement structures to 
measure water flow, duration, and timing at plot level. The main alternatives adopted in many 
previous studies are to directly assess the opinion of farmers on the sufficiency and timeliness 
of irrigation. For example, Sam‐Amoah and Gowing (2001) and Ghosh, Singh, and Kundu 
(2005) used fuzzy set theory to analyse the linguistic responses of farmers regarding 
tractability, timing, convenience and predictability of irrigation service. Aheeyar and Smith 
(1999) and Gunchinmaa and Yakubov (2010) used proxy flow data reported by farmers to 
create delivery performance indicators. Pasaribu and Routray (2005) and Vandersypen et al. 
(2009) used Likert scales to investigate farmer opinions on adequacy, timeliness, flexibility, 
equity and ease of irrigation.   
Building on the existing literature, this study will use information provided by farmers 
on the sufficiency and timeliness of irrigation, to measure irrigation performance in the study 
area. Although data based on farmer perceptions have some shortcomings for the assessment 
of irrigation performance, it synthesises various types of information, including objective data 
and subjective observation (Saleth & Dinar, 2004). Importantly, the absence of water 
measurement structures at agricultural cooperatives (ACs) and plot level, does not allow us to 
use volumetric measurements of water delivery. Therefore using data reported by farmers is 
reasonable and the only feasible approach in this study. 




4.2.2. Determinants of irrigation performance 
There has been a wealth of theoretical and empirical studies dedicated to irrigation 
performance assessment as well as its determinants. According to the institutional analysis 
framework developed by Tang (1992), there are three groups of factors that may impact on 
collective action. They are (i) institutional arrangements, (ii) irrigation system physical factors, 
and (iii) the socio-economic characteristics of farmers. Similarly, Subramanian, Jagannathan, 
and Meinzen-Dick (1997) developed a conceptual framework of factors impacting irrigation 
performance. They placed water user groups and water user associations at the centre of their 
framework and hypothesised that these groups directly impact irrigation performance. Other 
factors including (i) physical and technical aspects of irrigation; (ii) the social and economic 
context; and (iii) government and irrigation agencies both regulate water user groups and 
irrigation systems. Building on these conceptual frameworks, we categorize the literature into 
three groups of factors as follows. 
Institutions and governance factors  
Many studies of the relationship between institutions and irrigation performance 
emphasise the establishment of farmer entities, such as water user groups (WUGs) or water user 
associations (WUAs) and the adoption of irrigation management transfer (IMT) or participatory 
irrigation management (PIM). Some authors have compared irrigation performance before and 
after institutional reform (Samad, 2002; Samad & Vermillion, 1999) while others have compared 
the irrigation performance of schemes under farmer organisation against those under government 
control (Bastakoti et al., 2010; Bhatta et al., 2006; Huang, 2014; Wang et al., 2007). Other 
researchers have compared the irrigation services that members and non-members of water user 
associations receive. Some positive associations between institution and irrigation performance 
have been reported. Specifically, the establishment of water user groups has been found to 
increase the effectiveness and equity of irrigation delivery (Gunchinmaa & Yakubov, 2010), and 




members of water user associations have been found to receive more reliable water supplies than 
non-members (Arun et al., 2012). Farmer-managed irrigation systems out-perform state-
managed irrigation systems in some aspects (Bhatta et al., 2006; Lam, 1998), and have better 
performance than irrigation systems managed by private providers (Huang, 2014).  
However, not all institutional reforms lead to better outcomes. Samad and Vermillion 
(1999) found that management transfer only brings about significant effects on agricultural 
productivity when accompanied by irrigation system rehabilitation. Wang et al. (2007) claimed 
that institutional reform policies do not significantly increase water use efficiency unless they 
include specific incentives to save water. Furthermore, a review by Samad (2002) revealed no 
discernible evidence of the impact of water user associations on irrigation services and 
agricultural production in Indonesia, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka.  
A few studies pay attention to the impact of particular forms of participation on 
irrigation performance. Vandersypen et al. (2009) showed that coordination in water allocation 
increased irrigation efficiency and reduced irrigation problems.  A study by Miruri and 
Wanjohi (2017) in Kenya pointed out that community participation in project development is 
associated with better irrigation performance. In contrast, Mushtaq et al. (2007) showed that a 
higher frequency of collective action to maintain small reservoirs is not significantly associated 
with better irrigation during periods of water shortage. 
Irrigation system physical factors  
Despite the important role of institutions in mediating irrigation performance, it has been 
recently suggested that the persistent focus on institutional aspects has overshadowed the important 
role of technical aspects and the socio-economic context in producing irrigation outcomes 
(Anderies, Janssen, & Schlager, 2016; Epstein, Vogt, Mincey, Cox, & Fischer, 2013; Vogt, 
Epstein, Mincey, Fischer, & McCord, 2015). Interconnections among technological, 
environmental, social, economic, and institutional processes are important in any irrigation 




systems. Irrigation system physical factors can be divided into those related to the biophysical 
environment and the built infrastructure. The former refers to the hydrological patterns and 
topographical features of the irrigated area while the latter relates to the irrigation infrastructure, 
such as reservoirs, weirs, and canals. The role of physical factors was underlined in a study by 
McCord, Dell'Angelo, Gower, Caylor, and Evans (2017). Their analysis revealed that 
heterogeneity of water delivery outcomes was strongly connected with physical and biophysical 
factors but not with institutional factors. Distance to water sources, elevation gradients between 
water sources and intakes, and the number of distribution lines were significantly associated with 
irrigation outcomes. The association between physical, technical factors and variability in irrigation 
supply and drainage in irrigation schemes was also revealed in a study by Borgia, García-Bolaños, 
and Mateos (2012). Farmers located in the head reaches of schemes had an advantage which 
impacted the adequacy of their water supply (Bruns, 2007; Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2016). Powered 
irrigation methods, such as electric and diesel pumps, are more likely to be associated with 
irrigation adequacy than conventional gravity irrigation (Sinyolo, Mudhara, & Wale, 2014). 
Although physical factors are salient determinants of irrigation performance, focusing on 
infrastructure development alone leads to failure in irrigation intervention. Infrastructure 
development and strong institutions should work hand-in-hand to secure the sustainable 
development of irrigation that provides water security (Cook & Bakker, 2012; Grey & Sadoff, 
2007).  
Farmer and farming factors 
Farmer attributes may also affect irrigation performance to some extent. Knowledge of 
water management practices and agricultural cultivation techniques can help farmers to 
enhance water use efficiency and subsequently improve irrigation adequacy (Allouche, 2016; 
van Koppen, Tapela, & Mapedza, 2018). In contrast, water disputes between farmers have been 
found to have a negative influence on irrigation adequacy (Dirwai, Senzanje, & Mudhara, 




2019). Degree of dependency on common water resources may also be an important 
determinant of the effectiveness of common property management. Users tend to have a 
stronger commitment to resource management if it is important for their survival. Mushtaq et 
al. (2007) showed that the dependency of households on the irrigation system to secure their 
livelihood has a positive connection with irrigation frequency and the quality of maintenance 
tasks.  
4.2.3. Research hypotheses     
Based on the literature review and conditions at the study site, we test two hypotheses: 
(H1) Farmer participation in collective action related to irrigation management leads to 
improvements in irrigation quality (the sufficiency and timeliness of irrigation)   
‘Collective action’ refers to actions taken by a group to attain members’ shared interests. 
When a small proportion of members engage in collective action, their interests may represent a 
small part of all members’ interests, thus the outcome of their collective action may satisfy only a 
small proportion of members. But when a large proportion of members participate in collective 
action, the outcome of their actions is more likely to satisfy the majority of members. Previous 
empirical studies show that farmers are mainly concerned with the adequacy and timeliness of 
irrigation. Therefore, we assess the hypothesis that when more farmers participate in collective 
action, the probability that plots receive sufficient and timely water supply is increased.  
(H2) Irrigation quality in ACs included in the PIM project is better than Irrigation quality in 
ACs not included in the project 
The research detailed in this chapter is also designed to allow an assessment of the 
impact of the PIM project. The PIM project was intended to improve the performance of ACs 
through the following activities: 
1. forming and strengthening WUGs with written institutions and irrigation rules; 




2. establishing WUAs, to coordinate irrigation delivery between WUGs sharing 
hydraulic boundaries;  
3. training to improve the capacity of irrigators and executive board members in 
business plan development and irrigation operation and maintenance;  
4. training for farmers to enhance awareness of PIM; and  
5. improving irrigation delivery by partly lining some third-level canals.  
These interventions were intended to encourage more participative irrigation 
management thus improving operation and maintenance and contributing to the project target 
of increasing agricultural production and reducing poverty. Accordingly, ACs included in the 
project were expected to have better irrigation quality (sufficient and timely irrigation in 
particular) compared to non-project ACs. 
However, in 2017 when the data for this study was collected, WUAs had ceased to exist 
and the irrigation rules developed under the PIM project were no longer used. After the end of 
the PIM project, funding for WUAs ceased and coordination of water delivery between ACs 
was left to informal arrangements between ACs. Leaders of PIM ACs also explained that after 
the promulgation of the Agricultural Cooperative Law in 2012, each AC generated its own 
charter and rules in line with the new law, but they did not include the specific rules covering 
irrigation that had been developed under the PIM project. 
Nevertheless, some other outcomes of the project remain such as rehabilitated irrigation 
infrastructure and AC staff trained in irrigation planning, irrigation operation and maintenance, 
financial management (Kolkma & Takahashi, 2017), and improved farmer awareness of 
participative irrigation management. Therefore, we may still find a positive impact of the 
project on water irrigation quality. 




4.3. Data and econometric methods  
4.3.1. Data 
The main dataset for this chapter comes from a randomly selected sample of 355 
households, farming 777 plots irrigated by gravity irrigation in 11 sampled ACs. As 70% of 
the irrigated area in the Nam Thach Han irrigation system receive gravity-based irrigation from 
the headwork, we decided to focus on the performance of gravity-based irrigation alone. This 
allowed us to avoid some of the heterogeneity in irrigation performance caused by different 
water sources and irrigation methods.  
While a wide range of information was collected through the household questionnaire, 
for this chapter, we use data from Section 3 (irrigation service), and Section 4 (participatory 
irrigation management), to measure irrigation performance and collective action. Some 
information related to household characteristics and plot characteristics is gathered from other 
sections of the questionnaire. In addition, information at the AC level relating to AC personnel, 
the area irrigated, and irrigation infrastructure, were collected from ACs. Information about 
plot locations along canals was collected from AC irrigation team leaders.  
4.3.2. Indicators of irrigation performance and collective actions 
Irrigation performance 
As explained in section 4.2.1, we use information reported by farmers about the 
adequacy and timeliness of irrigation to their plots to measure irrigation performance. To 
reduce measurement error caused by self-reporting, we focused on performance in the 
irrigation-rotation period and used a benchmark suggested by NTHIME staff and AC water 
deliverers to measure performance. We will describe the allocation of water by rotation in the 
Nam Thach Han irrigation system in the following paragraph to justify our choice of indicators. 




In the study site, there are two rice crops annually; the Winter-Summer season lasts 
from the beginning of January to the middle of May and the Summer-Autumn season from the 
end of May to the middle of September. Water is released daily to all first and second-level 
canals in the first 40 to 60 days of each crop season. After this period, water is supplied by 
rotation. Each rotation lasts for eight to ten days and each first-level canal receives water for 4 
to 5 consecutive days. In total, there are five to six irrigation rotations during a rice crop season.  
In the period of continuous irrigation, farmers rarely suffer water-related problems due 
to the abundance of water in the system and lower water demand in the early development of 
the rice plant. Therefore, we use irrigation rotations as reference points to ensure comparability 
between farmers’ self-reported information. Moreover, it is reported by NTHIME staff as well 
as by AC water deliverers that ideally, they have to deliver water to plots until water depth 
reaches around 7 to 10 cm in each rotation. Therefore, a rotation with sufficient irrigation is 
defined as the water level in a plot reaching at least 7 cm depth, while timely irrigation means 
that the plot receives water on planned dates. Farmers were asked to separately report the 
number of rotations with inadequate water and the number of rotations with untimely water 
during each crop season.  
Two dummy variables are used to measure irrigation performance at the plot level in 
the Summer-Autumn season since water shortage is not a common problem in the Winter-
Summer season (rainy season). The first one is sufficient irrigation and the second one is timely 
irrigation. Plots that did not suffer water shortage or delay in any rotation in the Summer-
Autumn season are categorised as having sufficient irrigation or timely irrigation, respectively. 
Collective action  
Since Mancur Olson (1965) published “The Logic of Collective Action”, the 
definitional core of the term ‘collective action’ has been identified as a common or shared 
interest amongst a group of people. It is thus more than ‘an action taken by a group of people’. 




Collective action is generally defined as “action taken by a group or organization in pursuit of 
members’ perceived shared interests” (Scott, 2014, p. 92).  
Based on this concept, we focus in this chapter on five specific activities that require 
cooperation amongst farmers to either construct, operate, or maintain irrigation systems in 
pursuit of better irrigation quality. These are labour contribution for maintenance, money 
contribution for irregular operation and maintenance costs, meeting attendance, participation 
in discussions at meetings, and water delivery monitoring. We measure collective action by 
aggregating information at the household level to estimate the proportion of farmers who 
participated in these actions in each AC in 2017.  
4.3.3. Economic models to assess determinants of irrigation performance 
Since our dependent variables (sufficient irrigation and timely irrigation) are dummy 
variables, we can use logit, probit, or linear probability models. In comparison with logit and 
probit models, linear probability models have several problems, including non-normality, the 
heteroscedastic variance of the disturbances, and nonfulfillment of the requirement that the 
estimated probability lies between 0 and 1 (Gujarati, 2009). Therefore, logit and probit models 
are generally preferable to linear probability. Chambers and Cox (1967) and Cakmakyapan and 
Goktas (2013) point out the similarities of the logit and the probit model and show that the logit 
model is better than the probit model for a large sample size (i.e. n=500).  Moreover, existing 
studies mostly use logit. Therefore, we choose to use the logit model to make it easier to 
compare our results with previous studies.  
The logit model is described as follows: 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝐸[𝑌 = 1|𝑋𝑖] =
1
1+𝑒−(𝛽1+𝛽2𝑋𝑖)
                                                               (1) 
where Pi stands for the probability of the i
th plot receiving sufficient or timely water; Y is water 
delivery performance at the plot level (sufficiency and timeliness), and Xi is explanatory 
variables. Equation (1) can be transformed as: 










                                                                                                                  (2) 
where Zi = β1 + β2Xi. Equation (2) represents what is known as the logistic distribution function. 
When Zi ranges from -∞ to +∞, Pi ranges between 0 and 1.  
From equation (2), the probability that a plot receives sufficient or timely irrigation is 
given by (1 – Pi) in equation (3), which can be written as: 
(1 − 𝑃𝑖) =
1
1+𝑒𝑍𝑖
                                                                                                                (3) 
Therefore, the odds ratio (Pi/(1-Pi)) – the ratio of the probability that a plot receives 
sufficient or timely irrigation to the probability that it receives insufficient or untimely 







= 𝑒𝑍𝑖                                                                                                       (4) 
If we take the natural logarithm of equation (4), we obtain the following result: 
𝐿𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑖
1−𝑃𝑖
) = 𝑍𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖                                                                                          (5) 
L is called the logit, and equation (5) is a logit model. When Pi ranges between 0 and 
1, the logit Li goes from -∞ to +∞. Li is linear in Xi but the probability Pi is nonlinear in Xi.  
We use the maximum-likelihood (ML) method to estimate the parameters. The slope 
coefficients estimated by the ML method measure the change in the estimated logit in 
responding to a unit change in the value of the regressors. The antilog of these coefficients 
presents the change in odds-ratio for a unit change in the value of regressors. Both these ways 
of interpreting coefficients are less practical and tangible. Therefore, we estimate the marginal 
effect of individual regressors to provide a more intuitive meaning.  
Based on the institutional analysis framework developed by Tang (1992), literature 
review and the context of the study site, we develop the empirical model used in this chapter 
as follows: 
𝐼𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑗𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑖𝑃𝐼𝑀 + 𝛽𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝑖                                                              (6) 




where Ii is irrigation quality (either the sufficiency of irrigation or timeliness of irrigation) for 
the ith plot, colact denotes a vector of collective action variables, PIM distinguishes ACs under 
the PIM project from other ACs, control stands for control variables, β is a vector of parameter 
estimates, and ε is the error term.  
 We include control variables representing different aspects (institution & governance, 
irrigation system physical factors and farming factors) which are measured at different levels 
(AC, household and plot levels) to take into account other drivers of irrigation quality, apart 
from collective action. These are the capacity of managers and staff (education and, for AC 
leaders, years in their post), infrastructure (irrigated area managed per water deliverer, irrigated 
area per kilometre of third-level canal), household farming practices and their social network, 
and physical and biophysical characteristics of farm plots (location, elevation, water retention 
capacity and plot size).   
4.3.4. Descriptive statistics  
Summary statistics for the variables included in equation (6) are presented in Table 4.1. 
It can be seen that 38% of plots ‘always’ received sufficient water and 68% of plots ‘always’ 
received water on time in the 2017 Summer-Autumn season. This implies that a considerable 
number of sampled plots faced water shortages and untimely irrigation, with 62% of plots 
experiencing at least one irrigation rotation with insufficient water and  32% experiencing 
delays. It is worth noting that nearly 18% of plots suffered water shortages and 6% suffered 










Table 4. 1. Summary statistics of response and explanatory variables 
Variables Mean Std. Min Max 
1. Response variables (plot level, n=777)     
Sufficient irrigation 0.38 0.48 0.0 1.0 
Timely irrigation 0.68 0.47 0.0 1.0 
2. Explanatory variables     
AC level  (n=11)     
Collective labour contribution (%) 22.4 29.6 0.0 81.1 
Collective money contribution (%) 39.6 28.2 10.0 86.5 
Collective meeting attendance (%) 77.5 19.2 39.5 100.0 
Collective meeting discussion (%) 27.0 15.4 10.8 60.0 
Collective water delivery monitoring (%) 14.5 22.5 0.0 78.4 
PIM (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Leader years in position 9.9 6.8 1.0 26.0 
Leader education level (years in school) 11.3 1.8 8.0 14.0 
Area per water deliverer (ha/person) 19.1 5.9 11.5 31.3 
Area per km third-level canal (hectare/km) 18.9 10.9 5.4 36.8 
Household level (n=355)     
Number of water conservation practices 2.1 1.0 0.0 4.0 
HH person-days for rice farming (day/sao) 5.6 1.7 2.0 11.0 
HH social network (index)  0.0 1.0 -1.6 4.8 
Plot level (n=777)     
Distance from plot to second-level canal (100 m) 2.9 3.3 0.0 15.0 
Distance from second to first-level canal (100 m) 8.5 7.4 0.0 26.0 
Distance from first to main canal (100 m) 55.6 33.5 0.0 110.0 
Low-lying plot (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 
High-lying plot (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Plot area (sao) 2.9 2.1 0.3 15.0 
Level of water retention (1=Low, 2=Medium; 3=High) 2.1 0.6 1.0 3.0 
Note: 1 sao = 500 m2 
The proportion of farmers contributing labour for regular and irregular irrigation 
maintenance is 22% on average. However, this proportion varies widely from zero to 81% 
across ACs since only two ACs require compulsory labour contribution for canal dredging 
while others use money collected from farmers to pay for dredging to be carried out, based on 
tenders submitted by local farmers. For unexpected situations, such as broken canals, broken 
dykes and droughts, ACs call for emergency voluntary labour contribution to protect irrigation 
systems or dredge canals.   Nearly 40% of farmers contributed money, in addition to the on-
farm irrigation fee, to line third-level canals, or to repair irrigation canals or operate pumps in 
urgent situations, such as floods or droughts. As annual general meetings require a quorum as 
laid down in the rules of the AC, the proportion of farmers attending these meetings is high 




(78%). On average, 27% of farmers reported that they join in water-related discussions in these 
meetings. Although water is delivered along third-level canals by water deliverers and ACs do 
not organise collective monitoring of water delivery, around 15% of farmers monitor this 
process themselves to try and ensure water supply for their plots. If they discover any problems, 
they can inform the water deliverer or the AC Management Board.  
According to the general rules of ACs, leaders are elected for a 5-year term. Over 60% 
of leaders have been in their posts for more than two terms and one leader has been in his post 
for six terms. On average, AC leaders have been in their posts for nearly 10 years and have 
11.3 years of formal education, higher than the average education level of farmers in the study 
site (7.7 years in school).  
Area per water deliverer indicates the workload of water deliverers. It is the ratio of the 
total irrigated area over the number of water deliverers in an AC. In our sample, this indicator 
varies widely from 11.5 to 31.3 hectares per water deliverer. Moreover, area per kilometre of 
third-level canal is the ratio between the total irrigated area and the total length of third-level 
canals. It is a reverse ratio of the intensity of on-farm irrigation canals. When third level canals 
supply water to a large area, the probability that plots receive enough water or timely water 
may be reduced.   
Water conservation practices measure the number of practices that farmers use to 
reduce water loss. The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) recommends four main 
practices to improve plot water retention: 1) constructing field canals to and from plots; 2) 
preparing land and creating a hardpan; 3) levelling the plot and 4) constructing bunds and 
repairing any cracks or holes. On average, sample households applied two practices with land 
preparation being the most common.  
HH person-days for rice farming refers to the number of days that farmers spend 
preparing land, planting, weeding, fertilising, spraying pesticides, visiting plots, and 
harvesting. The average time that farmers spend on rice farming is around 5.6 person-days per 




sao. The distribution of this variable is symmetric with 60% of households spending from 4 to 
7 person-days per sao, 20% using less than 4 person-days and 20% using more than 7 person-
days. This variable does not include ploughing and harvesting, which are generally carried out 
by paid contractors. 
Household social network is an index generated using principal component analysis, 
thus its mean approximates zero and its standard deviation is close to one18. The index value is 
based on the number of local groups that household members join, the number of executive 
positions they hold, and the number of close friends they have. Farmers reported that when 
they have water-related problems, they seek help from leaders, water deliverers, and their 
friends. Therefore, households with stronger social networks may be able to gain support more 
easily, thus, leading to receiving a better irrigation quality.   
Three variables describe the distance of plots from the water source – Distance from 
plot to second-level canal, Distance from second to first-level canal, and Distance from first to 
main canal. Measurement of these distances is illustrated in Figure 4.1, for example, distance 
from a plot to a second-level canal is given by a + b. Plots which are further from canals are 








Figure 4. 1. Diagram of canals and the distance from plots to intake points 
                                                 




































a + b: distance from plot to second-level canal 
c: distance from second to first-level canal 
d: distance from first to main canal 




In all ACs, plots are categorised into three groups in terms of their elevation; described as 
high, medium or low. Farmers prefer medium elevation plots because they are less likely to face as 
many water shortages as high-lying plots and they are less likely than low-lying plots to suffer 
waterlogging. In our sample, 27% of plots are ‘low’ and 16% are ‘high’. Moreover, farmers rank 
the water retention capacity of their plot into three levels – low, medium and high. Plots with high 
water retention capacity suffer lower levels of water loss and so are more likely to receive sufficient 
irrigation.  
4.4. Result and discussion 
4.4.1. Irrigation performance within and across agricultural cooperatives  
In this section, we aim to assess whether there are any obvious patterns in the timeliness 
and sufficiency of irrigation within and across ACs, corresponding to relative plot locations along 
AC canals (head, middle and tail). Figure 4.2 shows the proportion of plots receiving sufficient 
irrigation while Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of plots receiving timely irrigation. The 
average proportion of plots receiving sufficient irrigation varies widely (from 9% in Xuan 
Duong to 78% in An Luu). The share of plots receiving timely irrigation falls within a smaller 
range; from 44% (Tram Ly) to 97% (Ba Du). The share of plots with sufficient irrigation seems 
to vary considerably between the head, middle and tail in most ACs while the share with timely 
irrigation seems to be more similar. However,  the results of chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests 
suggest that the correlation between irrigation performance and plot location is statistically 
significant in only four ACs for irrigation adequacy and in three ACs for irrigation timeliness. 
In these ACs, irrigation performance is likely to be better in the head and worse in the tail 
section. 





Figure 4. 2. Proportion of plots receiving sufficient irrigation by plot location and by AC 
  
Figure 4. 3. Proportion of plots receiving timely irrigation by plot location and by AC 
Comparison amongst ACs shows that An Luu, Vinh Lai, Kim Long and Ba Du have a 
high percentage of plots with sufficient and timely irrigation. Location advantage (at the head 
of a first-level canal) and flatter fields may explain the high level of irrigation sufficiency in 
An Luu. Other possible factors include high frequency of contribution of labour and money 
(Ba Du and Kim Long) and young, active, more qualified leaders (Kim Long and Vinh Lai). 
Noticeably, a very small percentage of plots in the tail section of Van Tuong and Duy Hoa 
receive enough water. Unlined third-level canals and a higher level of unpaid fees are some 
challenges for these ACs. Only 9 - 18% of sampled plots in Xuan Duong, Huu Nien A and Trieu 
Thuan received enough water.  These plots share second-level canals with adjacent ACs and are 








































































































Generally, irrigation quality varies within ACs as well as between ACs, and clear patterns 
are hard to discern. Differences in the physical condition of rice plots, irrigation canals, AC 
management factors, and the degree of farmer engagement in irrigation management may explain 
some of these variations. Therefore, to evaluate irrigation performance at plot level, we need to 
take into account all of these factors. In the next section, we will use econometric models to identify 
the determinants of the sufficiency and timeliness of irrigation, focusing on the impact of collective 
action.  
4.4.2. The impact of collective action on the sufficiency and timeliness of irrigation 
Results from a logit regression to estimate the impact of collective action on the 
sufficiency and timeliness of irrigation are detailed in Table 4.2. Restricted models (column 1 
and 3) are used to test the impact of collective action and the PIM project on irrigation adequacy 
and timeliness,  while full models (column 2 and 4) include control variables at AC, household, 
and plot level. The full models have higher chi-square values and higher proportions of 
correctly classified cases than the restricted models. Moreover, the likelihood ratio tests 
comparing the restricted and full models are significant, which suggests that the full models 
are a significant improvement on the restricted model. Results from the Hosmer–Lemeshow 








Table 4. 2. Logit estimation results for factors influencing sufficient and timely irrigation 
VARIABLES Sufficient irrigation (MEM) Timely irrigation (MEM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Collective labour contribution 0.01** 0.03* 0.01 0.06***  
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Collective money contribution 0.03*** 0.08*** -0.03*** 0.04*  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Collective meeting attendance 0.01** 0.02 0.02*** 0.04***  
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Collective meeting discussion -0.00 0.09 0.05*** 0.07  
(0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07) 
Collective water delivery monitoring -0.06*** -0.05 0.03** -0.04  
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) 
PIM 0.28 -0.31 -0.96*** -0.97**  
(0.21) (0.50) (0.21) (0.49) 
Leader years in post  
 
-0.25***  -0.35***   
(0.05)  (0.05) 
Leader education level 
 
1.29***  1.10***   
(0.42)  (0.37) 
Area per water deliverer 
 
-0.18***  -0.13***   
(0.03)  (0.03) 
Area per km of third-level canal   -0.25**  -0.22** 
  (0.11)  (0.10) 
HH social network  
 
0.13  -0.08   
(0.10)  (0.11) 
Water conservation practices 
 
-0.11  0.04   
(0.11)  (0.11) 
HH person-days for rice farming 
 
0.10  0.04   
(0.07)  (0.06) 
Distance from plot to 2nd-level canal  -0.07**  -0.01 
  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Distance from 2nd to 1st-level canal 
 
-0.02  -0.00   
(0.03)  (0.02) 
Distance from 1st to main canal 
 
-0.07***  -0.06**   
(0.02)  (0.02) 
Low-lying plot  -0.00  0.38* 
  (0.24)  (0.23) 
High-lying plot 
 
-0.61**  0.21 
 
 
(0.28)  (0.26) 
Plot area 
 
0.03  -0.01 
 
 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
Level of water retention  
(Medium vs. Low) 
 
0.36    
(0.28)   
Level of water retention  
(High vs. Low) 
 0.74**   
 (0.34)   
Constant -1.86*** -7.22* -0.68* -4.77 
 (0.36) (3.88) (0.37) (3.30) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.13 
Log likelihood -481.4 -420.9 -460.8 -427.6 
Chi square test 66.78 187.9 55.99 122.5 
Correctly classified (%) 65.77 72.72 65.89 70.53 
Hosmer–Lemeshow test (Pro > chi2) 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.48 
Notes: MEM - Marginal effects at the means; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 




When looking at the restricted models (1 & 3), most collective action in irrigation 
management is significantly correlated with irrigation sufficiency and timeliness. However, the 
direction of correlation is not constant among the different forms of collective action. While 
labour contribution, monetary contribution, and meeting attendance increase the probability of 
sufficient irrigation, the proportion of farmers engaging in monitoring water delivery have a 
negative association with irrigation adequacy. Similarly, an increase in input contribution is 
associated with a lower probability of timely irrigation while the intensity of farmer 
involvement in discussion and monitoring water delivery is positively correlated with the 
incidence of irrigation timeliness. The PIM project is not significantly correlated with irrigation 
adequacy but is negatively associated with irrigation timeliness.  
A possible reason for the inconsistent impact direction of collective action in restricted 
models may be omitted variables. McCord et al. (2017) suggest that all other factors that could 
correlate with irrigation performance should be included to avoid spurious correlation, which 
might happen if we only focus on collective action and overlook other factors. Therefore, we 
develop full models (2 and 4) to control for other related factors and compare the restricted and 
full models.  
We can see the change in impact direction and magnitude of impact between collective 
action and irrigation quality when comparing models 1 and 3 with models 2 and 4. Model 2 
shows that water delivery monitoring is not significantly correlated with sufficient irrigation 
while increasing the proportion of farmers contributing labour and money significantly 
improves irrigation sufficiency. In model 4, a higher proportion of farmers contributing labour 
and money increases the probability of irrigation timeliness, while a higher proportion of 
farmers engaging in meeting discussions and water delivery monitoring is no longer 
significantly associated with timely irrigation.  
We also find that the magnitude of impact is higher in the full models. In model 2, a 
1% increase in the number of farmers contributing money is associated with an 8% increase in 




the probability that plots receive enough water, while a one-unit increase in labour contribution 
leads to a 3% increase in irrigation sufficiency. In model 1, these figures are only 2% and 1% 
respectively. Similarly, a 1% increase in the proportion of farmers contributing labour or 
money or attending meetings enhances the probability that plots receive water in a timely 
manner by 6%, 4%, and 4% respectively in model 4, and by 1%, 3% and 2% in model 3. Based 
on these findings, it appears that the restricted model under-estimates the impact of collective 
action on irrigation adequacy and irrigation timeliness. 
Overall, these results suggest that input mobilisation in the form of labour and monetary 
contributions are associated with improved irrigation adequacy and timeliness. However, 
according to AC leaders, farmers are increasingly busy with off-farm jobs and less dependent 
on farming so ACs have been finding it difficult to mobilise labour and monetary contributions. 
Our survey data shows that 25% of main farmers considered farming to be their secondary job. 
Farmers, on average, devoted 24% of their working hours to non-farm employment and 35% 
of farmers engaged in off-farm jobs.  
Moreover, the level of the on-farm irrigation fee in ACs is quite low, from 22 to 66 
USD/ha/season and is only enough for ACs to pay for basic operation and maintenance tasks. 
They cannot increase these fees because farmers are not willing to pay more. According to our 
survey data, 76% of interviewed farmers were not willing to pay more for irrigation, 20% were 
willing to pay an extra 2.2 to 8.8 USD/ha/season, and less than 4% of farmers were willing to 
pay an extra 13.2 to 22 USD/ha/season. Currently, the majority of sampled ACs do not put money 
aside to cover infrastructure depreciation, so they do not have funds for major repairs or upgrades. 
When ACs need to undertake major repairs or line third level canals, they have to call for farmer 
contributions or wait for a government grant.  
Although the PIM project was finished 5 years ago, the project was expected to result 
in a continuing positive impact on irrigation performance. However, we did not find a 
significant positive correlation between PIM and the adequacy of irrigation to household plots. 




Notably, we found that plots in ACs included in the project had less timely irrigation. We note 
that this could be related to the fact that ACs with water-related problems were more likely to 
be selected for inclusion in the PIM project.  
Some control variables, such as the characteristics of AC personnel and on-farm canal 
and plot characteristics, are correlated with the quality of irrigation service. Number of years 
in post and the education level of AC leaders have a significant effect on irrigation adequacy 
and timeliness, but these two factors have opposite effects. While an increase in the educational 
level of leaders significantly increases the probability of irrigation adequacy and timeliness, 
the number of years that leaders stay in their position has a negative impact. This may reflect 
the fact that leaders who stay in their position for many years may be less dynamic in managing 
irrigation than the younger generation of leaders who normally have a higher education level.  
We find that an increase in the area served by each water deliverer or per kilometre of 
third-level canals is associated with a lower probability of sufficient and timely irrigation. 
These larger areas may indicate a shortage of labour in irrigation teams and the low density of 
third level canals, which again originates from budget constraints faced by most ACs. 
Plot characteristics including location, elevation, and water retention capacity are 
significantly correlated with irrigation performance. More specifically, plots which are further 
from the second-level canals and the main canal are less likely to receive sufficient and timely 
irrigation. Water loss due to seepage is a common problem in surface irrigation systems. Water 
losses increase when it is delivered over a long distance and this may also lead to delays in 
irrigation. The construction and condition of canals may be also relevant as 87% of third-level 
canals in the Nam Thach Han irrigation system are earth lined. We also find that high-lying 
plots are 61% less likely to receive sufficient irrigation compared to medium-lying plots, while 
low-lying plots are 38% more likely to get water on time. Farmers are 75% more likely to 
report that plots with high water retention capacity receive enough water, compared to plots 
with low water retention capacity.    




4.5. Conclusions  
Surface irrigation schemes are complex systems and their ability to supply sufficient 
and timely irrigation relies on a wide range of factors. This study emphasises the relationship 
between collective action and irrigation quality while taking into account the impact of physical 
and management factors at AC, household, and plot level.  
We find that irrigation problems commonly occur in the Summer-Autumn season when 
only one-third of plots received enough water and two-thirds received water on time in all 
irrigation rotations. When we compare the proportion of plots receiving sufficient and timely 
irrigation by plot location, we find heterogeneity in irrigation quality within and across ACs.  
The results of the full logit models suggest a significant correlation between collective 
action and irrigation. A higher percentage of farmers contributing labour or money is associated 
with a higher probability of plots receiving sufficient and timely irrigation. In addition, higher 
levels of farmer attendance at meetings is positively associated with more timely irrigation. 
However, plots located in PIM ACs are not likely to receive more timely irrigation than those 
in non-PIM ACs, perhaps because the ACs selected for inclusion in the PIM project were more 
likely to suffer from water shortages. Analysis of restricted models suggests that failing to 
control for managerial and physical factors may lead to underestimation of the impact of 
collective actions on irrigation quality.  
The full models also suggest a correlation between some managerial and physical 
factors and irrigation quality. Specifically, more educated leaders are associated with a higher 
probability of attaining sufficient and timely irrigation while AC leaders who have been in their 
posts for longer are associated with a lower probability. An increase in the irrigated area 
managed by each water deliverer or which is served by third-level canals reduces the 
probability that plots receive sufficient and timely irrigation. The incidence of sufficient and 
timely irrigation is likely to decrease as plots are further away from intake points. In 




comparison with medium-lying plots, high-lying plots are less likely to receive adequate 
irrigation while low-lying plots are more likely to be irrigated on schedule.  
Some policy implications can be drawn from these findings. It is suggested that ACs 
should continue their efforts to involve farmers in irrigation management and contribution of 
labour and money to enhance their capacity to satisfy water demand. Fostering knowledge and 
capacity for leaders as well as other management staff and encouraging the involvement of 
young and knowledgeable persons in management positions in ACs are some solutions that 
need to be considered.  
This study provides important empirical results on the linkage between collective action 
and irrigation performance. However, it also has some limitations mainly due to constraints 
around data collection and the lack of quantitative data on irrigation performance. First, it uses 
farmers self-reported information rather than physical measures of irrigation performance. 
Second, it has not been possible to control for possible reverse causality between collective 
action and irrigation performance as described by Agrawal (2001) and Anderies et al. (2016). 
Third, the robustness of the relationship between collective action at AC level and irrigation 
quality at the plot level was limited by the relatively small number of ACs that could be 
included in our study. 
  




Chapter 5  - The impact of irrigation on rice farming technical 
efficiency controlling for plot-specific environmental conditions 
5.1. Introduction 
In Vietnam, rice production plays a critical role in providing food security as well as 
rural employment. It accounts for 90% of national grain output and 88% of the area cultivated 
with grains (GSO, 2018). The total value of rice produced was around 12.5 billion U.S dollars 
in 2018, equivalent to one-third of the total value of agricultural production and 5.1% of the 
GDP19. The national Socio-Economic Development Strategy for the period 2011–2020 targets 
agricultural modernisation as a means of improving agricultural productivity, farm incomes 
and national food security. However, there is limited room for increasing production by 
increasing cultivated areas or through labour inputs. The government capped the total area of 
rice at 3.8 million ha in the 2020 Agricultural Master Plan (Jakob & Khemka, 2017). From 
2001 to 2010, over one million hectares of farmland were converted to non-agricultural uses 
(Alcaide Garrido et al., 2011). A steady diversification of rural households away from 
agricultural activities (Kinghan & Newman, 2017) and increasing migration from rural to urban 
areas (Amare & Hohfeld, 2016; Narciso, 2017) have led to a shortage of farm labour. 
Moreover, technology adoption in rice production in Vietnam seems to be low, as is often the 
case for farmers in developing countries (D’Souza & Mishra, 2018). An expansion of 
production scale or an outward shift of production frontiers would be very difficult because of 
the scarcity of land and labour, and low technology adoption. As a result, production growth 
in the rice sector relies on increasing efficiency, particularly maximising output with a given 
level of input. Given the current situation, an examination of the technical efficiency (TE 
                                                 
19  Calculation from FAO data (http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home) and World Bank Vietnam data 
(https://data.worldbank.org/country/vietnam?locale=vi) 




hereafter) of rice farming and its determinants in Vietnam should increase our understanding 
of this vital sector and assist with the development of appropriate policies to increase the TE 
of rice farming. 
Irrigation has been treated as either a rice production input (Varghese, Veettil, 
Speelman, Buysse, & Van Huylenbroeck, 2013; Watto & Mugera, 2014b) or an environmental 
factor impacting on rice output (Fuwa, Edmonds, & Banik, 2007; Sherlund, Barrett, & Adesina, 
2002; Van Hoang & Yabe, 2012) or as an off-farm factor impacting on rice farming TE (Alam 
et al., 2012; Gebregziabher, Namara, & Holden, 2012; Gedara, Wilson, Pascoe, & Robinson, 
2012; Mekonnen, Siddiqi, & Ringler, 2016; Pedroso et al., 2018; Sharma, Pradhan, & Leung, 
2001; Yao & Shively, 2007). In developing countries like Vietnam, directly investigating the 
impact of irrigation on rice output at plot or household level is infeasible as plot and household 
water usage data is often unavailable. Moreover, it is not useful to consider irrigation simply 
as an environmental factor to distinguish irrigated versus rain-fed rice farming in Vietnam since 
96% of rice is irrigated (World Bank, 2019). However, in Vietnam, the quality of irrigation 
management is thought to be a limiting factor. The government aims to improve irrigation 
management by devolving power and responsibility to farmer organisations (World Bank, 
2019). As such, an evaluation of the impact of irrigation quality, specifically the sufficiency 
and timeliness of irrigation as a result of changes in irrigation management on rice farming TE 
is essential. 
Rice production in Vietnam is also impacted by a range of environmental factors. Chen 
et al. (2012) predict that Vietnam will be one of the rice-producing nations most severely 
affected by climate change. Rice farmers suffer from salinity intrusion and frequent floods and 
droughts (Nguyen, Renaud, Sebesvari, & Nguyen, 2019; Toan, 2014; Yuen et al., 2020). 
Moreover, fragmentation and small plot size are considered to be critical constraints for 
Vietnam rice farming (Markussen et al., 2016; Van Hung et al., 2007). Therefore, plot-specific 




environmental factors should be taken into account and analysing TE at plot level may provide 
more insight than farm-level analysis.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Previous studies have suggested 
various impacts of irrigation-related factors on TE. Some authors have indirectly evaluated the 
impact of irrigation quality on farming TE through farm location and quality of irrigation 
infrastructure (e.g.Alam et al., 2012; Gedara et al., 2012; Mekonnen et al., 2016; Yao & Shively, 
2007). Others have investigated related institutions such as the existence of water user associations 
(Gragasin, Maruyama, Marciano, Fujiie, & Kikuchi, 2005; Sharma et al., 2001) or farmer 
participation and cooperation in these associations (Arun et al., 2012; Gedara et al., 2012; Li & Li, 
2011). However, none of these studies directly examine the influence of irrigation quality -- 
specifically, sufficient and timely irrigation -- on TE. Moreover, they do not control for plot-
specific environmental factors when evaluating the impact of irrigation. This could cause 
estimation bias as indicated by Sherlund, Barrett, and Adesina (2002) and Fuwa, Edmonds, and 
Banik (2007). This study is an effort to fill these gaps by examining the extent to which irrigation 
quality is associated with TE in rice farming when environmental factors are controlled. In 
particular, to what extent is rice production likely to be more technically efficient when water is 
supplied in sufficient quantity and on time? As far as we know, no other studies compare plot-level 
TE and farm-level TE when controlling for environmental factors. 
To answer this research question, we sequentially investigate several sub-questions.  
Question 1: Is there a significant correlation between irrigation quality and TE in rice 
farming?  
Question 2: Is the impact of irrigation quality on technical inefficiency under-estimated 
when we fail to control for environmental factors?  
Question 3: Does aggregate household-level data give the same estimates of TE as 
unaggregated plot-level data if we control for environmental factors? 




The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 provides a review of the literature 
on technical efficiency, estimation approaches, and empirical studies of rice farming efficiency. 
This is followed by a discussion of the data and methodology in section 5.3. Summary statistics, 
analysis results and a discussion are presented in section 5.4. The final section summarises the 
findings and discusses policy implications, before outlining the limitations of this study and 
offering suggestions for future research.     
5.2. Literature review  
5.2.1. Technical efficiency and approaches to estimate technical efficiency 
In this section, we provide a brief conceptual framework of technical efficiency and a 
review of the measurement methods used in relation to it. We also point out the pros and cons of 
these approaches to justify the methodology that we use in the study described in this chapter.  
Concept and measurement of technical efficiency 
Modern concepts of efficiency and their computation were advanced in the seminal paper 
by Farrell (1957). In this paper, Farell identifies three types of efficiency: technical efficiency, 
price efficiency (allocation efficiency) and overall efficiency (economic efficiency). The basic 
idea underlying Farrell’s approach to measuring efficiency is illustrated in Figure 5.1.  
 
                                                            Source: Farrell (1957) 
Figure 5. 1. The measurement of technical and allocative efficiency 





Suppose there is a firm (A) that uses two inputs (x and y) to produce one output (m) 
under constant returns to scale. With these assumptions, we can draw the production function 
by a simple isoquant SS’. The isoquant illustrates the various combinations of the two inputs 
that are used to efficiently produce unit output. Point P represents the combination of two inputs 
that firm A uses to produce one unit of output. Point Q represents an efficient firm (B) using 
two inputs in the same ratio as at point P. Firm B produces the same output as firm A but it 
uses only a fraction OQ/OP as much of each input. In other words, Firm B produces OP/OQ 
times as much output from the same inputs. Therefore, the fraction OQ/OP is defined as the 
technical efficiency of firm A.  
Given the price of inputs, we can draw isocost line AA’ to measure allocative 
efficiency. The slope of the isocost line is equal to the ratio of the prices of the two inputs. The 
isocost AA’ is tangential to isoquant SS’ at Q’. Both Q and Q’ are at optimal technical 
efficiency but the cost of production at Q’ is a fraction OR/OQ of the cost at Q. The fraction 
OR/OQ is defined as the allocative efficiency of observed firm A. The firm producing at Q’ is 
at both optimal technical efficiency and optimal allocative efficiency. Its costs at Q’ is a fraction 
OR/OP of the cost at P. This ratio (OR/OP) is defined as the economic efficiency of firm A.   
From the example above, technical efficiency can be defined as the ability of a decision-
making unit to produce the maximum output from a given set of inputs and technology (output-
oriented), or as the ability to use a minimum amount of input to generate a given amount of 
output (input-oriented). Stated differently, technical inefficiency refers to the failure to obtain 
the maximum possible output with a given amount of input (or failure to use minimum input 
to create a certain level of output).  
Allocative efficiency is associated with a firm's ability to use inputs in optimal 
proportion with respect to input prices and marginal productivity. Economic efficiency is a 
combination of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. It refers to the capacity to 




produce a given level of output at minimum cost with a given level of technology. The 
estimation of these efficiency measures is useful. It provides indicators to compare across 
similar economic units, and further analysis of factors causing the variance of efficiencies 
generates meaningful policy implications for the enhancement of efficiencies. 
This study will focus on technical efficiency because, as argued by Schmidt and Lovell 
(1980) and Kalirajan and Shand (1992), technical efficiency and allocative efficiency are 
positively correlated and technical efficiency influences allocative efficiency but not vice versa. 
In other words, improving technical efficiency is generally a better way of enhancing allocative 
efficiency which results in improvements in economic efficiency. Moreover, Barrett (1997) 
comments that for smallholder agriculture where most decisions on the allocation of land, 
labour and livestock are not associated with market transactions, estimating allocative and 
economic efficiency with observed market prices could lead to incorrect estimates on the extent 
to which farmers misallocate inputs.   
Techniques for estimating technical efficiency 
Since Farrell’s paper, many production frontier models have been developed which can 
be classified into two approaches: parametric and non-parametric. Parametric frontiers can be 
separated into deterministic frontier and stochastic production frontier (SPF) approaches. The 
deterministic frontier method assumes that any deviation from the frontier is caused by 
inefficiency. In other words, all of the measurement error or other sources of stochastic 
variation in the dependent variable are embedded in the inefficiency estimate. As a result, 
inefficiency estimates may be biased due to the existence of outliers. On the other hand, SPF, 
which was initially proposed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van Den 
Broeck (1977), treats deviation from the production frontier as a combination of noise and 
inefficiency. It incorporates a two-sided error term and a one-sided component representing 
inefficiency, simultaneously. The two-sided error term captures measurement error as well as 




statistical noise, thus solving the noise problem that deterministic frontiers face. Moreover, in 
SPF, standard errors can be estimated and hypotheses tested. These tasks are problematic with 
deterministic frontier methods due to violation of maximum likelihood regularity conditions 
(Schmidt, 1976). Both deterministic frontier and stochastic frontier methods require a specific 
functional form and distribution for the inefficiency term. Moreover, they are only appropriate 
for single output technologies (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010; Hillier & Price, 2011). 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), initially proposed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes 
(1978), is the most commonly used non-parametric approach. It does not rely on a particular 
functional form and can be used to analyse production involving multiple outputs. However, 
the flexibility of DEA is accompanied by the major drawback that all deviations from the 
frontier are assumed to be caused by inefficiency with any noise due to measurement and 
sampling errors being ignored. This results in DEA being highly impacted by outliers (Bogetoft 
& Otto, 2010).  
The stochastic production frontier approach is adopted for this investigation for two 
main reasons. First, SPF solves the problem of measurement error and noise in estimate rice 
farming technical efficiency. This is important since rice yield data tends to include outliers 
caused by environmental factors such as weather and diseases and household survey data is 
always susceptible to measurement errors in data collection. Second, SPF is appropriate for the 
estimation of technical efficiency for the production of a single output using multiple inputs as 
is the case with rice farming.  
Apart from estimating TE, it is also important to identify the exogenous factors that 
drive variation in TE. These exogenous factors are neither production inputs nor outputs but 
can affect the efficiency of production. Previous researchers have often adopted a two-step 
approach to estimating sources of efficiency variation. In the first step, technical inefficiency 
scores are derived from an estimated stochastic production frontier without controlling for 
exogenous factors. Then, in the second step, the technical inefficiency scores are regressed on 




exogenous factors. However, the two-step approach has been criticised because it leads to 
biased parameter estimates (Battese & Coelli, 1995; Kumbhakar, Ghosh, & McGuckin, 1991). 
Specifically, exogenous factors may be correlated with input choice, thus leading to 
inconsistent parameter estimates and inefficiency scores. In addition, the OLS regression in the 
second stage may not be appropriate since the inefficiency score is a one-sided error. As a 
result, Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed a single-step approach 
in which exogenous factors are incorporated directly into the inefficiency error term. In this 
approach, either the mean or the variance of the inefficiency error term is assumed to be a 
function of exogenous factors. The parameters of the stochastic frontier and the inefficiency 
model are then estimated simultaneously. Because of the widely acknowledged advantages of 
this method, the one-step approach is used in this study.     
5.2.2. Technical efficiency of rice farming and its determinants 
Stochastic production frontier (SPF) approaches have been used in numerous studies to 
investigate rice farming TE and its determinant in developing countries such as India (Coelli 
& Battese, 1996; Kalirajan & Shand, 1999); the Philippines (Kalirajan & Flinn, 1983), Sri 
Lanka (Gedara et al., 2012), Nepal (Sharma et al., 2001), Bangladesh (Asadullah & Rahman, 
2009; Bäckman, Islam, & Sumelius, 2011; Rahman, 2011; Sharif & Dar, 1996), Thailand 
(Srisompun & Isvilanonda, 2012), China (Chang & Wen, 2011; Tan, Heerink, Kuyvenhoven, 
& Qu, 2010; Yao & Liu, 1998) and Vietnam (Dam, Amjath-Babu, Zander, & Müller, 2019; 
Khai & Yabe, 2011; Pedroso et al., 2018; Tu & Trang, 2016; Van Long & Yabe, 2011; Vu, 
2007). Results obtained by these authors indicate that the TE of rice production varies 
considerably between ~50% and ~90%, suggesting that there are often opportunities to attain 
additional outputs or reduce the level of inputs with existing technology and resource 
endowments.  




The inputs that most authors use to develop production frontiers include seed, labour, 
capital, fertiliser, and pesticides. Sherlund et al. (2002) indicate that input usage is partly 
conditional on environmental production conditions (eg. irrigation, weather, plant diseases, 
pest and weed infestation, and heterogeneity of land topography). Given the heterogeneous 
environmental factors across farmer plots, Sherlund et al. (2002) suggested the use of plot-level 
data and the addition of environmental factors in the production frontier. This would make 
parameter estimates of production frontier and technical inefficiency function unbiased. Since 
Sherlund et al. (2002), a handful of studies (Chang & Wen, 2011; Fuwa et al., 2007; Rahman 
& Hasan, 2008; Van Hoang & Yabe, 2012) have managed to control for environmental factors 
while investigating farm production efficiency.  
Researchers have taken different approaches to analyse the effect of irrigation on 
technical efficiency. Irrigation has been treated as either a production input or an environmental 
factor or as an off-farm factor impacting on farming TE. Ideally, the quantity of irrigation water 
applied (or used) should be considered as a production input and included in crop production 
frontiers, especially for water-intensive crops like rice. However, measuring water usage is 
often challenging in developing countries. Only a few studies manage to include used water 
volumes in production frontiers for some crops such as vegetables (Karagiannis, Tzouvelekas, 
& Xepapadeas, 2003), rice (Varghese, Veettil, Speelman, Buysse, & Van Huylenbroeck, 2013; 
Watto & Mugera, 2014b), wheat (Mekonnen et al., 2016; Tang, Folmer, van der Vlist, & Xue, 
2014), and cotton (Watto & Mugera, 2014a). Generally, it appears that crop output is 
significantly responsive to an additional volume of irrigation water. These studies mainly 
examine groundwater irrigation where measurement of water volumes is generally easier. In 
the case of surface irrigation systems, data on the quantity of water used is generally not 
available, so proxy variables such as the number of irrigations applied, irrigation duration or 
simply irrigation availability have been used (Abedullah & Mushtaq, 2007; Gedara et al., 2012; 
Sharma et al., 2001). These studies indicate a significant positive role of irrigation in explaining 




variation in rice output. Nonetheless, Sharma et al. (2001) acknowledge that TE estimates 
would be improved by including input data on water quantity. 
Sherlund et al. (2002), Fuwa et al. (2007) and Van Hoang and Yabe (2012) categorised 
irrigation as an environmental factor and used it to distinguish irrigated versus rain-fed rice 
farming. The linkage between weather and the quantity of water in irrigation canals may be 
their rationale for categorising irrigation as an environmental factor. However, it should be 
pointed out that the existence of irrigation infrastructure and its performance is mainly a 
‘human-made’ factor, not an environmental factor. Other researchers have considered 
irrigation to be an off-farm factor since it is a service provided in government or farmer-
managed irrigation systems. They have investigated the impact of irrigation accessibility, 
irrigation methods, irrigation infrastructures and irrigation management on farming TE.  
The impact of irrigation accessibility, represented by farm location along canals, has 
been investigated by several authors. Yao and Shively (2007) found that large distances 
between a farm and the main canal and the presence of siltation in canals reduce the TE of rice 
farming. Similarly, Gedara et al. (2012) observed that farms located along the middle section 
of canals are more likely to attain higher TE than those at the tail. In contrast, Alam et al. (2012) 
found that farms at a further distance from the main canal have higher TE.  
Irrigation infrastructure may also explain the variation in TE. Alam et al. (2012) showed 
that farmers on the rehabilitated concrete irrigation scheme have a significantly higher TE than 
those relying on traditional canals made from mud and stones. Mekonnen et al. (2016) added 
empirical evidence on the impact of irrigation method on TE. They found that farmers who 
rely solely on surface water achieved higher TE than those using groundwater. Moreover, the 
conjunctive use of ground and surface water leads to higher TE than the use of groundwater 
alone for farmers located in the middle section of canals.  
Irrigation management is another factor associated with production efficiency. 
Gragasin et al. (2005) found that the water user association did not succeed in increasing 




agricultural productivity and equity in water distribution. However, the mean and variance of 
farm TE in irrigation systems with water user associations were higher and more consistent 
than those without associations. Sharma et al. (2001) also found that the TE of farmers using 
farmer-managed irrigation services was higher and more consistent than that of farmers under 
a government irrigation system.  
None of the studies reviewed above directly examine the impact of irrigation quality, 
specifically the adequacy and timeliness of irrigation, on TE. Moreover, Sherlund et al. (2002) 
and Fuwa et al. (2007) note that omission of environmental factors can result in under-
estimation of parameter values in production frontiers and technical inefficiency functions. 
However, no studies have controlled for the impact of exogenous environmental factors when 
examining the impact of irrigation on TE. 
In this study, we aim to fill some of the gaps in the literature. We categorise irrigation 
as an off-farm factor since our focus is on the quality of irrigation services provided by farmer 
organisations. We integrate environmental factors into the stochastic production frontier and 
estimate technical efficiency and its determinants at both plot and household level. Estimates 
with and without environmental factors and at plot level and household level are compared.  
Various other factors, not directly related to irrigation, also drive variations in TE. 
These factors have been divided into three groups, namely agent factors, on-farm factors, and 
off-farm factors. 
(i) Agent factors 
Agent factors refer to household demographics such as the age and educational 
attainment of those who cultivate rice. Many of these factors have been found to significantly 
impact TE although there is little consensus on the direction of impact.  
Some authors (Asadullah & Rahman, 2009; Li & Li, 2011; Sharif & Dar, 1996) find 
that educational attainment has a positive impact on TE while others find that education reduces 
TE or has no significant impact (Bäckman et al., 2011; Coelli & Battese, 1996; Yao & Shively, 




2007). It has been suggested that farmers with a higher level of education have more 
opportunities to do off-farm jobs, and so tend to devote less time and effort to rice farming, 
leading to lower TE. Moreover, Gedara et al. (2012) argue that measures of formal educational 
attainment are not good indicators of farming knowledge since education in school is not likely 
to cover farming of rice and other crops.  
Bäckman et al. (2011) and Coelli and Battese (1996) suggest that farmer age is 
negatively correlated with efficiency since younger farmers are more likely to be willing to 
adopt new practices. On the other hand, farmers can improve their proficiency through 'learning 
by doing', thus their experience may increase TE. Kalirajan and Flinn (1983) and Li and Li 
(2011) found a positive relationship between experience and TE. 
Yao and Shively (2007) reported a positive relationship between the number of 
members of the household who are engaged in farming and TE. In the context of urbanisation 
and modernisation, the agricultural labour force may be reduced as workers move to urban 
areas and/or switch to off-farm jobs. In the absence of surplus labour, availability of farming 
labour has become more important for agricultural production. However other researchers 
(Chang & Wen, 2011; Yang et al., 2016) did not find a significant negative impact of off-farm 
work and/or migration on farming TE. Chang and Wen even found that households engaged in 
off-farm work use inputs more efficiently than those without off-farm work.  
Participation of farmers in collective action is another source of TE variation. Arun et al. 
(2012) showed that the TE of farmers participating in water user organisations is 6% higher than 
that of non-participating farmers. Gedara et al. (2012) and Li and Li (2011) also found that a 
higher level of farmer involvement in water user organisations is positively associated with TE.    
(ii) On-farm factors: 
On-farm factors refer to rice farming practices and paddy field characteristics. Tan et 
al. (2010) found that larger distance between homesteads and plots was associated with lower 
TE in rice production while scholars such as Kompas, Che, Nguyen, and Nguyen (2012), 




Bäckman et al. (2011), Wadud (2003), Coelli and Battese (1996) identified negative impacts 
on TE from land fragmentation.  
Technology adoption also contributes to differences in the level of efficiency between 
farmers. Using hybrid varieties (Fuwa et al., 2007), owning tractors (Yao & Shively, 2007) or 
applying integrated pest management (IPM) are some examples of technology adoption which 
increase TE. However, a counter-intuitive relationship between technology adoption and TE is 
also reported by some researchers. Kalirajan (1982) found that an increase in the proportion of 
modern varieties resulted in a reduction in TE. He suggested that this may have been caused 
by insufficient experience in dealing with these new varieties. Gedara et al. (2012) found that 
herbicides have a positive impact on TE but usage of insecticides is associated with a decline 
in TE.    
(iii) Off-farm factors: 
Off-farm factors refer to services that farmers receive or managerial factors beyond the 
household level. For example, access to microfinance may enable farmers to adopt improved 
technologies such as high yielding variables which may enhance TE. This is particularly true 
for marginal farmers in developing countries such as Bangladesh (Bäckman et al., 2011), 
Cameroon (Binam, Tonye, Nyambi, & Akoa, 2004), and Ethiopia (Gebregziabher et al., 2012). 
These farmers are often stuck in a loop of financial hardship. Access to credit can reduce 
financial difficulties and allow them to purchase and use inputs properly to increase TE.   
Interaction with technical support organisations such as extension agents can also contribute 
to variation in TE amongst farms. More frequent contact (Kalirajan & Flinn, 1983) or closer distance 
to extension services (Gebregziabher et al., 2012) are often correlated with higher TE.    
It seems self-evident that longer distances to markets will be associated with lower 
opportunities to access farming services and information on new technologies, and will be 
related to higher transaction costs to obtain inputs. That is the reason why the study by Fuwa 
et al. (2007) found that distance to market hurts farming efficiency. Contrastly, Gebregziabher 




et al. (2012) found that farmers who are distancing from the road, an indicator of farmer 
capacity to access the market, are more likely to attain higher TE.  
The technical efficiency of rice farming and its determinants has been an important topic 
attracting the attention of numerous scholars worldwide. Different methods have been adopted 
to estimate TE. Choosing between the SFA and DEA depends upon the objective of the research, 
the type of industry, and the availability of data. The value of TE varies across countries and over 
time, which reveals the potential to increase outputs by using inputs more efficiently. The 
education and experience of the household head, plot size, farm fragmentation, access to 
extension services, technologies and access to credit are common determinants of TE.  
Although irrigation is less commonly investigated, it is positively associated with TE 
in most of the literature.  However, research conducted to date does not control for plot specific 
environmental factors. The investigation detailed in this chapter fills this important gap and 
contributes to a more thorough understanding of the relationship between irrigation and 
farming TE.  
5.3. Data and econometric methods 
5.3.1. Data 
The assessment of TE and its determinants in this chapter is based on a sample of 337 
households and 977 plots.  Some households were excluded because of a lack of plot-level 
data, while rain-fed plots were also excluded. The household survey covered a wide range of 
topics including household demographics, rice farming inputs and outputs, irrigation services, 
participation in irrigation management and household income. This paper uses information 
related to rice farming inputs and outputs, household socio-economic characteristics, and plot 
characteristics. While input, output and plot-specific environmental conditions were collected 
at the plot level, most other information was collected at the household level. 




5.3.2. Methods and empirical models  
The technical efficiency of rice farming and its determinants is estimated using the SPF 
single-step approach. Production frontiers are estimated at both plot and household level while 
controlling for environmental factors. Stochastic production functions take the general form: 
ln(Yi) = f ( Xi, Zi; β) + ei = f ( Xi, Zi ; β) + vi - ui,  i=1,..,N      (1) 
where Yi is the total rice output of observation i (either plot-level or household level); 
f(.) defines the production frontier, Xi is a vector of inputs including land, seed, fertiliser and 
labour. Zi is a vector of environmental factors including waterlogging, pest and disease 
infection, rat damage, plot elevation and soil quality. β is a vector of estimated parameters. ei 
is a composed error term comprised of vi and ui. vi is a stochastic error term, including model 
misspecification, measurement error and random shocks. vi is assumed to have a normal 
distribution N(0,v
2) and be independent of ui. ui is a one-side error term (ui  0) representing 
the technical inefficiency of the ith observation and its variance denoted as σ2u.  If ui=0, 
observation i will have the maximum level of output, which means that the observation is 
exactly on the production frontier. If ui>0, the actual output of observation i is lower than its 
attainable maximum output. In other words, observation i lies inside the production frontier. 
Model (1) can be rewritten in the Cobb-Douglas or Translog functional form. The 
Cobb-Douglas model is widely used in the estimation of efficiency since it is fairly straight 
forward to implement and estimate (Xu & Jeffrey, 1998), and does not impact the measurement 
of empirical efficiency (Kopp & Smith, 1980). However, it has some restrictive properties 
including constant input elasticities, constant returns to scales for all production units, and a 
unitary elasticity of substitution. On the other hand, the Translog form does not impose 
restrictions on returns to scale or substitution possibilities. This study initially estimates 
equation (1) using the Translog specification taking the form: 


















+  𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖      (2) 
where βkj=βjk (j, k =1,…,J).  
The likelihood ratio test is used to test model specifications. If we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis, we re-estimate the production frontier using the Cobb-Douglas functional form.  
For inefficiency term (ui), scholars have proposed various distributional form such as the 
truncated-normal, half-normal, exponential and gamma distributions (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen 
& van Den Broeck, 1977; Stevenson, 1980). Up till now, there is no clear prior justification for the 
selection of a particular inefficiency distribution form. In this study, we investigated different 
distributional assumptions and found that models with a truncated normal distribution were 
difficult to identify. The LR test suggested that the half-normal distribution was better than the 
exponential distribution. Therefore, we decide to use the half-normal distribution for ui.  
We can present ui as: 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝛿0 + ∑ 𝛿ℎ𝑊ℎ𝑖
𝐻
ℎ=1 + 𝜖        (3) 
where δ0 is the intercept, Wi is a vector consists of agent factors, on-farm and off-farm 
factors that might affect technical inefficiency, δh are associated inefficiency parameter 
coefficients, and ϵ is error term. The main inefficiency parameters of interest are irrigation-
related variables. Details of variables in equation (2) and (3) are presented in the next section.  
Subsequently, we predict TE  using the estimator developed by Battese and Coelli 
(1988). TE is the ratio of actual outputs over the maximum attainable output. Its value ranges 
from 0 to 1. TE of a specific observation i is expressed as:  
𝑇𝐸𝑖 =
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑢𝑖 > 0, 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖)
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑢𝑖 = 0, 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖)
= exp(−𝑢?̂?)         (4) 
where 𝑢?̂? is the mean E(ui|ε).  
  To justify the appropriateness of our models, we need to test some hypotheses 
before presenting the results.  




 Hypothesis 1: The frontier model specification for the data is the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. That is H0: βkj=0 in equation (2) versus H1: βkj0.  
 Hypothesis 2: Environmental factors do not have a significant effect. That is H0: 
βm=0 versus H1: βm0. 
 Hypothesis 3: There is no inefficiency effect. That is H0: σ2u=0 versus H1: σ2u>0. 
 Hypothesis 4: Inefficiency effects are not a linear function of each inefficiency 
factor. That is H0: h=0 in equation (3) versus H1:h0. 
A generalized log-likelihood ratio (LR) test can be used to test these hypotheses. These 
tests require estimation of the model under the null hypotheses and alternate hypotheses as 
well. The test statistic is calculated as: 
𝐿𝑅 = −2[𝑙𝑛{𝐿(𝐻0)} − 𝑙𝑛{𝐿(𝐻1)}] 
where L(H0) and L(H1) are the values of likelihood functions under the null hypothesis 
(H0) and the alternative hypothesis (H1) respectively. It is assumed that the test statistic has 
approximately a chi-square (2) distribution or mixed 2 distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of restriction involved. The hypothesis will be rejected if LR is greater 
than the critical value.  
We initially estimate parameters for plot-level models, and then for the household-level 
model. For plot-level models, information on inputs, output, and environmental factors were 
originally collected for individual plots while household-level models are generated by 
aggregating information for all rice plots cultivated by each household. Simultaneously, 
environmental variables are added to control for the effect of environmental factors.  




5.4. Results, analysis and discussion 
5.4.1. Descriptive statistics for rice farming at the study site 
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics for all production-related variables including rice 
production output & inputs, environmental factors and all determinants of TE at both plot and 
household level.  The first three groups of variables are used for production frontier models 
while the last group of variables are for technical inefficiency models.  
Table 5. 1. Descriptive statistics for input, output and other production-related factors  
Variables Plot-level data Household-level data 
 Mean SD SK Mean SD SK 
Production (kg) 660.4 435.9 1.63 1914.6 1328.9 1.69 
Land area (sao) 2.92 2.02 1.81 8.46 5.96 1.55 
Seed (kg) 13.04 8.38 1.70 37.82 26.03 1.49 
Fertiliser (kg of active N, P, K ) 95.10 62.94 1.59 275.69 191.8 1.40 
Labour (person-days) 15.26 10.16 1.82 44.23 29.61 1.63 
Waterloggeda  0.17 0.38 NA 0.16 0.32 1.83 
Rat damagea b 0.53 0.50 NA 0.53 0.48 -0.09 
Pest &disease infestationa b 0.64 0.48 NA 0.65 0.43 -0.63 
Poor soila  0.21 0.41 NA 0.10 0.25 2.62 
High-lying plotsa 0.33 0.47 NA 0.30 0.35 0.78 
Irrigation sufficiencya  0.56 0.50 NA 0.53 0.43 -0.15 
Irrigation timelinessa 0.72 0.45 NA 0.70 0.41 -0.88 
Irrigated by pumpa 0.30 0.45 NA 0.28 0.34 0.87 
Main farmer with above average 
educationc (dummy) 
0.22 0.42 NA 0.22 0.42 NA 
Composite participation index -0.01 0.96 0.08 -0.01 0.96 0.08 
Training attendance (dummy) 0.44 0.50 NA 0.44 0.50 NA 
Proportion of rice farming income (%) 0.21 0.19 1.37 0.21 0.19 1.37 
Row seeding (dummy) 0.12 0.33 NA 0.12 0.33 NA 
Ploughing with medium tractors (dummy) 0.18 0.39 NA 0.18 0.39 NA 
PIM (dummy) 0.47 0.50 NA 0.47 0.50 NA 
Hai Lang  district (dummy) 0.39 0.49 NA 0.39 0.49 NA 
Note: 1 sao = 0.05 hectare;  a Coded as dummy variable at plot level and as % of household cultivated area at household 
level; b Plots are coded as suffering rat damage or pest and disease infestation if more than 20% of plot area affected by 
these factors; c main farmers with more than 9 years in school. 
 
Land holdings and plot size. Rice production in NTH irrigation system is still characterised 
by small-scale production. Around 72% of farmers cultivate 0.5 ha or less, and only 6% cultivate 




more than 1 ha. Plot sizes vary greatly (from 0.3 saos to 12.5 saos), and this distribution is skewed to 
the right with a small number of large plots. Given the land area is dramatically skewed to the right, 
it is not surprising that input quantities per plot and household also have right-skewed distribution. 
Seed and Fertiliser. Although the Provincial extension centre recommends that farmers 
use a seed rate of 3.5 to 4.5 kg/sao, the majority of farmers (56%) still apply more than the 
recommended amount. They explain that they take rodent damage into account and hope to avoid 
spending additional labour replanting. Only 8% of households still use cattle manure together 
with chemical fertilisers while the rest apply 100% chemical fertilisers20.  
Rice production. On average, farmers harvested 660kg/plot and 1.9 tonnes/household in 
the 2017 Summer-Autumn (SA) season. These figures are equivalent to 4.6 tonnes per hectare 
which is quite low compared to the average district yields in the previous SA season (5.3 tonnes/ha 
in Trieu Phong district and 6.1 tonnes/ha in Hai Lang district). The fourth storm in the 2017 SA 
season was accompanied by heavy rains causing long-lasting waterlogging (over 6 days) and yield 
reduction for around 2,450 ha of rice land in Quang Tri province (Van Hai, 2017). In our sample, 
17% of plots and 16% of the household cultivated area suffered long-lasting waterlogging. 
Moreover, half of the plots and  53% of the household cultivated area was damaged by rats while 
64% of plots and 65% of the household area suffered pest and disease infestation. 
Irrigation. 56% of plots received sufficient irrigation and 72% received this irrigation 
on time. These figures at the household level are 53% and 70% of the household cultivated 
area respectively. Pumps provide water for 30% of plots (28% of the cultivated area), and the 
remainder is irrigated from canals using furrow irrigation.  
Farming practices. 12% of households adopt row seeding with drum seeders to reduce 
seed usage and enhance yield while the rest use broadcast seeding. The higher labour 
                                                 
20 Farmers use both single fertilisers (urea, phosphate, potassium) and intergrated fertilisers (NPK with different 
ratios). We converted intergrated NPK into single fertilisers and sum up to measure total fertiliser usage.  




requirement for land preparation and seeding constrains a potentially greater uptake of drum 
seeders, even though farmers can obtain a 50% subsidy to buy drum seeders and some ACs 
own drum seeders for the use of their members. 
With the application of machinery in some labour-intensive tasks such as land 
ploughing and harvesting, farmers have reduced the amount of labour input for rice farming. 
Only six sampled farmers still used buffalo to plough land, with the majority hiring small 
tractors for tillage, of which 18% hired medium tractors.  
It may be suggested that our environmental variables are not truly exogenous as farmers 
can influence them to some extent. For example, farmers can use more labour and more 
pesticide to control pests, diseases and rats. However, the correlation matrix between 
environmental factors and input usage in Table 5.2 shows that there is no strong correlation 
between input variables and environmental variables. Therefore, we can consider these 
environmental variables as “partially” exogenous variables. 
Table 5. 2. Correlation matrix between environmental variables and input variables 
Variable Land Seed Fertiliser Labour 
Plot-level data 
Waterlogging  0.054*  0.075**  0.028  0.008 
Rat damage -0.055*  0.003 -0.081*** -0.011 
Pest and disease infestation   0.041  0.057*  0.013  0.091*** 
Poor soil  -0.071** -0.069** -0.055* -0.023 
High-lying plots   0.061**  0.045  0.059*  0.041 
Household-level data 
Waterlogging  0.136***  0.152***  0.099***  0.061** 
Rat damage -0.036  0.025 -0.062**  0.012 
Pest and disease infestation   0.014  0.031 -0.016  0.074** 
Poor soil  -0.049 -0.069** -0.057* -0.017 
High-lying plots   0.189***  0.164***  0.18****  0.178*** 
 Note: Inputs are in the log form; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5.4.2. Production frontier parameters and technical efficiency scores 
Parameter estimates for plot-level and household-level production frontiers without 
environmental factors (restricted models) and with environmental factors (full models) are 
reported in Table 5.3. The likelihood ratio (LR) test indicates that the Cobb-Douglas functional 




form (H0: βkj=0) is rejected in both the plot and household-level models at the 1% and 5% levels 
of significance. Therefore, we use the translog form for all production function models. 
Moreover, the value of lambda (λ), which represents the ratio of technical inefficiency (u) over 
stochastic error (v), is always greater than 1. This implies that there is significant technical 
inefficiency amongst sampled plots and households. Therefore, application of the stochastic 
production frontier approach is appropriate for our data set.




Table 5. 3. Stochastic production frontier estimates 
VARIABLES 
Plot level Household level 
Restricted model  Full model Restricted model  Full model 
Land  -5.26*** -5.45*** -4.85** -3.74 
 (1.57) (1.60) (2.36) (2.32) 
Seed  3.63*** 3.59*** 4.00** 3.36** 
 (1.21) (1.20) (1.67) (1.64) 
Fertiliser  2.23*** 2.75*** 0.99 1.12 
 (0.71) (0.76) (1.04) (1.00) 
Labour  1.06*** 0.99*** 1.52*** 1.09* 
 (0.35) (0.37) (0.53) (0.56) 
Land x Seed 1.32** 1.25** 2.16*** 1.69** 
 (0.59) (0.58) (0.81) (0.79) 
Land x Labour 0.47*** 0.38*** 0.70*** 0.42* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.22) 
Land x Fertiliser 0.90*** 1.00*** 0.26 0.22 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.44) (0.43) 
Seed x Labour -0.10 -0.04 -0.17 -0.00 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.17) 
Seed x Fertiliser -0.75*** -0.69*** -0.21 -0.16 
 (0.27) (0.26) (0.38) (0.36) 
Fertiliser x Labour -0.18** -0.14 -0.23* -0.12 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) 
½ Land2 -2.48*** -2.33*** -2.90*** -2.02** 
 (0.70) (0.69) (1.04) (1.03) 
½ Seed2 -0.54 -0.69 -1.88** -1.67** 
 (0.62) (0.61) (0.81) (0.79) 
½ Fertiliser2 -0.16 -0.35* 0.03 -0.09 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.26) (0.25) 
½ Labour2 -0.16** -0.22*** -0.27** -0.33*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) 
Waterlogged   -0.22***  -0.21*** 
  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Rat damage   -0.04***  -0.05*** 
  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Pest and disease infection  -0.03**  -0.02 
  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Poor soil   -0.01  -0.02 
  (0.01)  (0.03) 
High-lying plots   0.02  0.04** 
  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Constant -2.29 -3.17 -1.10 -0.64 
 (1.87) (1.94) (2.85) (2.75) 
Observations 977 977 337 337 
Log likelihood 286.2 377.3 152.5 186.2 
df_m 14 19 14 19 
chi2 18595 16592 10332 9722 
Lambda (λ=σu/σv) 5.20 2.58 5.37 3.11 
Specification tests Test statistics Test statistics Test statistics Test statistics 
H0: Cobb-Douglas functional form 37.88*** 36.34*** 52.87*** 19.00** 
H0: No environmental factor NA 182.20*** NA 67.39*** 
Note: Standard error in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  




The result from Table 5.3 shows the impact of rice inputs on output. Rice output is 
significantly correlated with all inputs in the models, with the exception of fertiliser input in 
the household-level models. Moreover, environmental factors clearly affect output. Plot 
outputs decrease significantly under unfavourable environmental conditions such as 
waterlogging, pest or disease infestation, and rat damage. Notably, waterlogging is associated 
with an average drop in plot output of around 22% and household output of 21%. However, 
poor soil do not lead to a statistically significant change in plot and household rice output.  
The LR test for the joint significance of environmental factors (H0: βm=0) demonstrates 
the superiority of the full model. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level of significance 
for both plot and household-level models. Accordingly, full models which control for 
environmental factors are better than the restricted models. 
When we omit plot-specific environmental factors, estimates of input-related parameters 
are biased. This pattern is more apparent when we look at Table 5.4 which reports the output 
elasticity at mean input levels. These estimates are generally downward biased in the plot-level 
model and upward biased in the household model. This trend reflects two drivers. First, plot rice 
output in the SA season is strongly impacted by environmental factors. Thus, when we omit 
environmental factors associated with yield loss caused by bad weather and pest, rat and disease 
infestations, we underestimate the influence of input on output. Second, because information on 
environmental factors is collected at plot level, the effect of controlling these factors on parameter 
estimates is consistent at the plot-level model. For the household-level model, the difference in 
the plot-specific characteristics between households may be ambiguous since each household 









Table 5. 4. Output elasticity at mean input levels 
Production input Plot level Household-level 
 Restricted model  Full model Restricted model  Full model 
Land 0.856*** 0.869*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.082) (0.080) 
Seed -0.020 -0.049 -0.082 -0.059 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.069) (0.069) 
Fertiliser 0.085*** 0.080** 0.036 0.031 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.047) (0.048) 
Labour 0.056*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.065** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028) 
Return to scale  0.977 0.973 0.985 0.994 
Note: Standard error in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Once we include environmental factors, the gap in output elasticity between the plot 
and household-level models narrows. Accordingly, this comparison provides initial evidence 
of the similarity of parameter estimates from aggregate household-level data with those 
deriving from plot-level data once environmental factors are controlled. 
Output is most responsive to land area in all models. If other inputs remain constant, 
output increases between 0.86-0.96% if farmers add 1% of land area. A 1% increase in the use 
of fertiliser or labour leads to an increase in output of less than 0.1%. Seeds seem to be overused 
with negative output elasticity but these estimates are not significant in all models. The level 
of output elasticity with respect to inputs is similar to the results of Fuwa et al. (2007) in India, 
and Chang and Wen (2011) in Taiwan. Fuwa et al. (2007) found that rice output is most 
responsive to land at the ratio of 0.62% increase in output for 1% increase in land. Moreover, 
the impact of seed, fertiliser and labour range between 0.07% to 0.14% in a study by Chang 
and Wen (2011) and between 0.03% and 0.33% in a study by Fuwa et al. (2007). 
The estimated returns-to-scale computed as the sum of output elasticities of all inputs 
varies slightly from 0.973 to 0.994 across the models. These estimates suggest that rice farming 
in the study site does not exhibit diseconomies of scale. 
We also find that omitted environmental factors lead to biased TE scores.  Table 5.5 
presents the summary statistics of TE while Figure 5.2 illustrates the cumulative distribution 




functions of TE. In both plot and household-level models, the two-sample t-test shows that there 
is a statistically significant increase in  TE once environmental factors are included in the models. 
Figures 5.2a and 5.2b support this result as the cumulative distribution functions for the full 
models lie completely to the right of the line for the restricted models. This result is consistent 
with the finding of Sherlund et al. (2002).  
Table 5. 5. Technical efficiency summary statistics 
Data level Model specification Mean Std.Dev./Std.Err. Min Max Obs 
Plot level 
Restricted model 0.793 0.149a 0.356 0.981 977 
Full model 0.835 0.113a 0.443 0.976 977 
Difference -0.042*** 0.002b    
Household 
level 
Restricted model 0.814 0.141a 0.369 0.983 337 
Full model 0.847 0.114a 0.458 0.978 337 
Difference -0.033*** 0.003b    
Difference bw. plot full model and 
HH restricted model 0.021** 0.009b    
Difference bw. plot full model and 
HH full model -0.012* 0.007b    
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Envf. Environmental factors; aStandard deviation; bStandard 
error 
When we compare TE scores between the plot and household models using the Welche 
t-test, the mean difference is also statistically significant. This means that the TE achieved from 
the household-level restricted model is downwardly biased compared with the TE estimate for 
the plot-level full model. Figure 5.2c visually illustrates this bias. This result is consistent with 
the argument by Fuwa et al. (2007) that TE at plot level is higher than farm-specific TE because 
aggregated household-level estimates do not take plot-specific environmental conditions into 
account.  
It is interesting to note that the magnitude of difference and confidence level, at which the 
statistical test is significant, narrow down when we control for environmental factors. Specifically, 
when we test for the difference between the plot-level full model TE and the household-level full 
model TE, we still reject the hypothesis that they are equivalent, although only at the 10% level of 
significance. Figure 5.2d clearly shows the partial overlap of the TE cumulative distributions of the 




plot and household-level full models. This suggests that differences in TE are relatively small when 
environmental factors are included in the model. Fuwa et al. (2007) also compared TE at the 
household level with TE at disaggregated plot level separately for different rice varieties and land 
types. This comparison was not as robust as the analysis detailed above since Fuwa et al. use a 
subset of plot-level data to estimate TE and compare it with pooled household-level data. 
Moreover, they did not statistically test the difference in TE. 
Our results suggest that it may be acceptable to use aggregate household-level data for 
total efficiency estimation provided these factors are properly controlled for environmental 
factors. This is a new result that has yet to be reported in the literature and it has strong practical 
implications for situations where plot-specific data is unavailable. Our findings will be very 
useful for future studies which aim to examine rice farming TE at regional or national levels.   
   
(a)      (b) 
   
(c)      (d) 
Figure 5. 2.  Distribution of TE for different models 




5.4.3. Technical inefficiency estimates 
In this section, we consider the determinants of technical inefficiency and the way in 
which technical inefficiency estimates, especially irrigation, can be biased when we fail to 
control for environmental factors. Table 5.6 reports the parameter estimates of the technical 
inefficiency functions. Because they are technical inefficiency functions, negative signs on the 
coefficients mean that these parameters have a positive impact on TE.  
Table 5. 6. Technical inefficiency function estimates 
  
VARIABLES 









(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sufficient irrigation -0.44*** -0.58*** -0.38* -0.53** 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.22) (0.24) 
Timely irrigation 0.06 -0.08 0.22 0.05 
  (0.11) (0.13) (0.22) (0.24) 
Irrigated by pump -0.22* -0.21 -0.29 -0.13 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.29) (0.33) 
Participation index 0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) 
Main farmer with above 
average education 
-0.41*** -0.61*** -0.28 -0.47* 
(0.12) (0.16) (0.22) (0.25) 
Training course attendance 
 
0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.03 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.18) (0.20) 
Share of rice farming income 1.06*** 0.65* 1.27** 1.06* 
 (0.30) (0.34) (0.53) (0.56) 
Row seeding 
 
0.15 0.12 0.12 0.13 
(0.16) (0.18) (0.29) (0.31) 
Ploughing with medium 
tractor 
-1.43*** -1.42*** -1.79*** -1.78*** 
(0.16) (0.20) (0.29) (0.35) 
PIM 0.35*** 0.37** 0.10 0.20 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.23) (0.25) 
Hai Lang District  -0.87*** -1.06*** -1.12*** -1.38*** 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.21) (0.24) 
Constant -1.85*** -2.07*** -2.05*** -2.29*** 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.28) (0.31) 
Specification test Test statistics Test statistics Test statistics Test statistics 
H0: No inefficiency 257.76*** 51.91*** 101.16*** 35.62** 
H0: No explanatory 190.27*** 163.94*** 92.35*** 80.76*** 
Note: Standard error in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We find that irrigation adequacy is significantly associated with higher TE (low 
technical inefficiency) while timeliness of irrigation, pump-based irrigation and farmer 




participation in irrigation management do not significantly explain the variation in inefficiency. 
Main farmers who have above average levels of education (more than 9 years in formal 
education) are associated with higher TE than farmers with less formal education.  
A higher proportion of farmer income from rice farming is associated with lower TE. 
This result is broadly consistent with findings by Chang and Wen (2011) in Taiwan but is 
opposite to what Yao and Shively (2007) found in the Philippines. An improved farming 
practice, such as ploughing with medium tractors, has a significant positive impact on TE while 
row seeding does not significantly explain variation in TE.  
At the plot level, inclusion in the PIM project is correlated with lower TE at the 5% 
significance level, but any correlation is statistically insignificant in household-level models. 
Both plots and farmers in Hai Lang district are consistently more likely to achieve higher TE 
than those from Trieu Phong district.   
The results of LR tests support our argument that variation in technical inefficiency is 
significantly explained by explanatory variables. Specifically, at the 1% and 5% significance 
levels, we reject both the null hypothesis that the standard deviation of technical inefficiency 
is equal to zero (H0: σu=0) and the null hypothesis that all coefficients of explanatory variables 
in the technical inefficiency models are zero (H0: h=0). 
A comparison between the different models shows that failure to control for environmental 
factors leads to downwardly biased estimates. Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 support this argument since 
the gaps between the TE distribution functions for irrigation adequacy are wider for full models 
than for restricted models at both plot (Figure 5.3a vs 5.3b) and household level (Figure 5.4a vs 
5.4b).  
All of these results indicate that including environmental factors in the production 
frontier helps to reveal the true influence of quality of irrigation on technical inefficiency. 
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Figure 5. 3. Distribution of plot TE by the quality of irrigation service 
    
  (a)          (b) 
    
  (c)          (d) 
Figure 5. 4.  Distribution of household TE by the quality of irrigation service  




5.5.  Conclusions 
Over the last few decades, several authors have provided useful insights into the impact 
of irrigation-related factors on rice farming TE using stochastic production frontier approaches 
and household-level data sets. Some have criticised the use of household-level data because of 
the diversity of household plots and have noted that environmental conditions are latent drivers 
in determining variation in input usage and production output. This study is distinct from 
previous work in assessing TE and the impact of irrigation on TE at plot and household level 
while controlling for environmental conditions.   
We find that irrigation sufficiency has a significant positive impact on TE while 
irrigation method and farmer participation in irrigation management are not significantly 
associated with TE. Farmer education, ploughing with medium tractors, and district are other 
important drivers of variation in TE. Using plot-level data, we find that input use is more 
efficient than we would have thought based on the more conventional household-level 
approach.  
The impact of irrigation and other determinants may be underestimated if environmental 
factors are not controlled for. Omitted environmental factors may lead to biased estimates of TE 
score and biased inferences for determinants of technical inefficiency. Interestingly, once 
environmental factors are taken into account, the difference in the TE score generated from the 
plot-level model and the score for the household-level model is relatively small. In other words, 
if we manage to control for aggregate environmental factors, using aggregate household data still 
gives approximately unbiased estimates as with using plot-specific data.   
Some policy implications can be drawn from our findings. First, irrigation sufficiency 
is expected to increase the TE of rice production. This is important given that there is little 
room left for the expansion of irrigated rice areas. Moreover, TE may be increased, by 
enhancing the education level of farmers and supporting the use of medium tractors that enable 




improved land preparation. Second, variation in plot-specific environmental conditions should 
be controlled for, in order to correctly explain differences in inter-plot output and TE between 
farmers. Third, studies using aggregate household-level data should pay attention to collecting 
data on aggregate environmental factors to reduce estimation bias. 
Although our study yields some interesting findings, we recognise its limitations. For a 
start, this study uses cross-sectional data and investigates a small study site with limited 
diversity in terrain and climate conditions. This limits our capacity to investigate more deeply 
into the impact of irrigation and environmental conditions on TE and also prevents us from 
drawing broader inferences. In addition to this, the data on the quality of irrigation was reported 
by farmers, rather than being directly measured, meaning that it will be associated with some 
degree of measurement error. More convincing variables or more accurate measurements 
would be needed for more definitive results although this might be challenging in the context 
of Vietnamese irrigation schemes. 
  




Chapter 6 - Conclusions 
6.1. Overview 
Irrigation plays an important role in supporting agricultural production and ensuring 
food security but it is also one of the greatest sources of pressure on global water resources. 
Moreover, governments across the world have been struggling to maintain deteriorating 
irrigation systems. Participatory irrigation management (PIM) has been promoted as a panacea 
for the poor performance and high cost of many public schemes. However, no clear consensus 
has been reached on the impacts of PIM and the factors associated with its success and failure 
(Araral, 2010; Meinzen-Dick, 1997; Senanayake et al., 2015).   
In Vietnam, many researchers have studied PIM since it was first introduced in the 1990s. 
Low levels of farmer participation and the limited life of water user organisations (WUOs) 
established under the project have been commonly reported (Department of Water Resource, 2008; 
Huynh & Tessier, 2019; Le et al., 2015; Nguyen, 2008b). Researchers seeking to explain the 
success or failure of PIM have mainly focused on institutional and qualitative approaches to analyse 
the establishment of WUOs, their involvement in management, and their interaction with other 
stakeholders (Benedikter & Waibel, 2013; Evers & Benedikter, 2009; Fontenelle, 2001; Nguyen, 
2008a, 2009; T. Pham, 2017; Pham, 2013; Tran, 2019). However, the involvement of farmers in 
operation and maintenance activities within WUOs, and the impact of their collective participation 
on irrigation performance, was little studied before the research detailed in this thesis.  
Building on gaps in the literature with a focus on the Vietnamese context, this thesis 
examines (i) patterns of farmer participation and the factors that influence farmer participation in 
irrigation management within agricultural cooperatives, (ii) the impact of collective action on the 
quality (sufficiency and timeliness) of irrigation that farmers receive, and (iii) the impact of 
irrigation quality on rice farming technical efficiency, while controlling for environmental factors.  




6.2. Main findings 
Factors affecting farmer participation (Chapter 3)  
Farmer perceptions of AC governance and leadership are one of the main drivers of 
participation. Farmers with a higher evaluation of AC information transparency and democracy 
in decision making are more likely to engage in monitoring activities and decision making. 
Similarly, farmers who believe that AC leaders have adequate qualifications are more likely to 
join in all forms of collective action. Sharing of second-level canals seems to be an obstacle to 
cooperation amongst farmers since farmers in ACs with shared canals are less likely to 
participate in all forms of irrigation management activities.  
The relationship between collective action and irrigation quality (Chapter 4) 
Observation of farmer participation in certain major activities in Chapter 3 led to an 
examination of the relationship between collective action and irrigation quality in the Summer-
Autumn season. A higher percentage of farmers contributing labour or money is associated 
with a higher probability of plots receiving sufficient and timely irrigation. In addition, higher 
levels of farmer attendance at meetings are positively associated with more timely irrigation. 
However, the impact of collective action is underestimated if local contextual factors such as 
irrigation infrastructure, irrigation governance, and farming practices are not controlled for.  
Moreover, some managerial and physical factors were found to be significantly 
correlated with irrigation quality. Specifically, more educated AC leaders are associated with 
a higher probability of attaining sufficient and timely irrigation, while AC leaders who have 
been in their posts for longer are associated with a lower probability. An increase in the 
irrigated area managed by each water deliverer, or which is served by third-level canals, 
reduces the probability that plots receive sufficient and timely irrigation.  
 




The impact of irrigation on rice farming technical efficiency (Chapter 5) 
The essential role of irrigation in rice production is strongly supported in this thesis by 
the finding that irrigation sufficiency has a significant positive impact on rice farming technical 
efficiency. Moreover, failure to control for plot-specific environmental factors, such as 
unfavourable physical attributes, and flooding and damage caused by rats, pests and disease, 
results in an underestimation of the impact of irrigation on technical inefficiency. 
Comparing plot and household-level stochastic production frontiers shows that input 
use at plot level was more efficient than has been suggested using conventional household-
level approaches. Interestingly, controlling for environmental factors while using aggregate 
household data still gives approximately unbiased estimates of TE as with plot-specific data. 
Overall findings on the PIM project 
Although the PIM project finished in 2012, it was expected to have a lasting impact on 
irrigation system management and performance. Therefore, the linkages between the PIM 
project and farmer participation and irrigation performance are examined in Chapter 3, 4, and 
5. Farmers from ACs that were included in the PIM project are more likely to participate (in 
general), particularly in decision-making and input contribution. However, plots located in PIM 
ACs receive less timely irrigation than those in non-PIM ACs. This may be because ACs 
selected for inclusion in the PIM project were more likely to suffer from irrigation problems.  
6.3. Policy implications 
The findings detailed above reveal the relationship between participation, irrigation 
quality, and rice farming technical efficiency, by which more farmer participation leads to 
better irrigation quality which in turn enhances farming technical efficiency. Effective 
participation is the key: if it is enhanced, then a series of positive consequences are likely to 
follow. Therefore, policy recommendations should start with measures that can increase farmer 
participation. 




At the scheme level, the integration of PIM into irrigation projects can increase farmer 
engagement in irrigation management which may then lead to improvements in irrigation 
quality through farmer involvement in collective action.  Moreover, given the finding that 
sharing of second-level canals is a hindrance for farmer participation, it is suggested that some 
current aspects of the PIM approach such as (re)-establishing WUGs to avoid sharing of 
second-level canals and improving cooperation between WUGs under WUAs seem to be useful 
practices. Policies/institutions to stimulate the establishment of WUGs and WUAs, based on 
hydraulic boundaries, need to be investigated with the aim of improving farmer participation 
and irrigation performance. 
Local institutions play a key role in supporting effective farmer participation. As such,  
policymakers should support efforts to improve AC governance, to increase information 
transparency and democratic decision-making, which create fertile ground for the involvement 
of farmers in AC irrigation management activities. Moreover, policies to enhance the quality 
of AC staff, especially leaders, should be developed since this has been shown to affect levels 
of farmer participation as well as irrigation quality. 
The thesis also suggests there is a potential for enhancing rice farming technical 
efficiency through improving irrigation sufficiency.  Government and NGOs should work 
towards improving irrigation quality, specifically the sufficiency of water delivery in order to 
increase agricultural production. Measures to support rice production mechanisation (such as 
the use of medium tractors for improved land preparation) should be considered since this 
appears to be a potential approach to increasing TE.  
6.4. Contributions to the literature 
Participatory approaches have been promoted in Vietnam for more than twenty years 
but this is the first empirical study to use econometric models to examine the determinants of 
participation and the effect of collective action in irrigation management, on irrigation quality. 




Moreover, this thesis provides insights into the involvement of farmers in the daily activities 
of local water user organisations in Vietnam, a topic which is understudied in the literature.  
Principle components analysis is used in a new way to generate participation indices 
based on twelve different irrigation management activities. This enabled the creation of multi-
dimensional indices which more correctly represent the diversity in the pattern and level of 
farmer participation. This contrasts with previous studies which mostly defined participation 
based on a small number of activities.  
This thesis explores the impact of the AC institution on farmer participation, using 
farmers’ ‘insider’ perceptions of information transparency and democratic decision-making. 
This is particularly relevant to the study site where WUAs established as part of PIM projects 
normally stop working after the project finishes and where the rules set up in PIM projects are 
no longer followed. 
Collective action by the members of WUOs has a direct impact on irrigation 
performance, but only a handful of studies (Mushtaq et al., 2007; Vandersypen et al., 2009) 
focus on the impact of these actions on irrigation performance. This thesis broadens our 
understanding of this important relationship by providing further empirical evidence on the 
relationship between collective action and irrigation quality in Vietnam. 
This thesis also provides the first analysis of the effect of sufficient and timely irrigation 
on rice farming technical efficiency, while controlling for plot-specific environmental factors. 
Some authors have indirectly evaluated the impact of irrigation quality on farming TE through 
farm location and the quality of irrigation infrastructure (Alam et al., 2012; Gedara et al., 2012; 
Mekonnen et al., 2016; Yao & Shively, 2007),  but they have not analysed the direct influence 
of irrigation quality, specifically sufficient and timely irrigation on TE. This thesis provides 
more insight into the relationship between irrigation and rice production and it highlights the 
importance of controlling for environmental factors to gain more precise estimates. 




An important contribution, detailed in this thesis, is in the comparison of plot and farm 
level TE while controlling for environmental factors. Measurement of farming TE at the 
household level, when heterogeneous production conditions across household are not taken 
into consideration, leads to biased estimates of farming TE, as has been noted in the literature 
(Fuwa et al., 2007; Sherlund et al., 2002). Using aggregate household data gives approximately 
unbiased estimates of TE as with plot-specific data if environmental factors are controlled for. 
This approach challenges previous findings by detailing a practicable method of producing 
unbiased estimates using household-level data. This also suggests that collection of household-
level data on environmental factors can be a good alternative option when information on plot-
specific environmental factors is hard and costly to collect. 
6.5. Recommendations for further research 
One of the limitations of this thesis is that irrigation timeliness and sufficiency had to 
be assessed based on farmer recall and perceptions. Improvements to water use efficiency are 
vital to the future development of the agricultural sector in Vietnam. This will require better 
data, so installation of devices to measure the volume and timing of water distributed to selected 
representative canals and plots is highly desirable. Once this data has been obtained then more 
accurate insights into the efficiency of water usage can be obtained using these plot-level 
measurements. 
Spatial analysis is another area that deserves further work. This should focus on spatial 
aspects of the relationship between participation and irrigation quality and between irrigation 
and agricultural production. Successful (or unsuccessful) irrigation management and farming 
practices may have spillover effects which accelerate or reduce adoption by neighbours. This 
may lead to spatial correlation amongst farmers or ACs in term of participation or rice farming 
technical efficiency. Therefore, further work using spatial econometric models may provide a 
better understanding of these spatial correlations and provide some additional insights. 




Chapter 7 - Limitations 
This thesis mainly concentrates on the relationship between farmer participation in AC 
irrigation management activities and irrigation performance at the household and plot level. It 
does not investigate the interaction between ACs and higher-level entities, such as NTHIME, 
nor does it take account of irrigation performance measured at AC and scheme level. Focusing 
on households and ACs within one irrigation scheme allows for the control of external 
contextual factors, such as state regulations and heterogeneity caused by irrigation 
infrastructure, climate and other factors. 
Some other limitations result from the availability of secondary data and the 
information that it was feasible to collect. Data on the volume of water distributed to individual 
households and plots is not available. Reverse causality between participation and irrigation 
quality could not be controlled because I used cross-sectional data which limited my ability to 
develop lagged instrumental variables. Moreover, the robustness of the relationship between 
collective action at AC level and irrigation quality at plot level was limited by the relatively 
small number of ACs that could be included in this study.  
This study is based on a relatively small study site with limited diversity in terrain and 
climate conditions. This limits our capacity to draw broader inferences on the impact of 
irrigation and environmental conditions on rice farming technical efficiency. 
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Appendix 1: Household questionnaire 
 





















THE UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
Waikato Management School 
Department of Economics 
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
Interviewer:  ……………………………………………… ………………….         
Interviewee ID: ………………………………. .[1] Head of  household 
                                                                             [2] Spouse of head of household 
                                                                             [3] Other household member 
Do you have rice land irrigated by Nam Thach Han irrigation system      □ YES       □ NO   Stop interview 
Date of Interview: Day…….. Month………Year………       Name of the AC………………………………………… 
Start time: …………………    End time:……………….   Address: District………………………………………… 
Data checked by:…………………………………                  Under PIM project:    □ YES       □ NO       □ Don’t know 
Data entry by:……………………………………………       Village: ………………………… Ward No……………… 
                           Survey supervisor                                                                                                   Interviewer 
 
 
                                   (sign)                                                                                                                   (sign) 
Note: Survey supervisor only sign after checking all the sections of the questionnaire and visiting households in order to check that they are 
interviewed on the mentioned day. 




SECTION 1A: HOUSEHOLD ROSTER (GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS BELONGING TO HOUSEHOLD) 
 




















1A1 1A2 1A3 1A4 1A5 1A6 1A7 1A8 1A9 1A10 1A11 1A12 1A13 




Relation to head 
of household 
1. Head  
2. Spouse  
3. Child  
4. Parent 
5. Parent in law  
6. Grandparent  
7. Grandparent  
in law  


























been a migrant 
labourer for 
the last 12 
months? 
(member aged 
 15 only) 
1 = NO 












arable land due 
to farmland 
revocation 
2. to earn 
higher income 
than rural jobs 
3. to diversify 
income 
sources 
4. unable to 




























the last 12 







the last 12 




done as hired 
labour in the 
last 12 




done   
wage 
employment 
in the last 12 









months?                                                   




CODE DAYS DAYS DAYS DAYS DAYS 
1                   
2                   
3                   
4                   
5                   
6                   
7                   
9              









      
      
      
 SECTION 1B: HOUSING     
1B2 How long has the household lived 
in this commune? 
…….. YEAR  1B8 Do you store your perishable food in 
a refrigerator? 
 
1. Yes                             2. No 
3. Don’t have a refrigerator 
1B3 How many m2 does your household 
occupy? 
This excludes area used primarily 
for business activity 
………….M2  1B9 What is the main source of energy for 
cooking in your household? 
1. Firewood                                      2. Electricity  
3. Kerosene                                      4. Coal 
5. Natural gas                                   6. Other 
1B4 What is the main construction 
material of the outside walls? 
1. Leaves/branches/ bamboo       2. Wood 
3. Galvanized iron                       4. Earth 
5. Brick (fired or unfired)             
6. Concrete 
7. Other (specify) 
 1B10 What is the main source of 
cooking/drinking water of your 
household? 
 
1. Private tap water                    2. Public tap water 
3. Bought water      4. Water pump from drill wells 
5. Water from hand-dug wells  6. Water from tank 
7. Springwater                          8. River, lake, pond 
9. Rainwater                                10. Other 
1B5 Flooring material? 1. Earth, lime and ash        2. Cement  
3. Brick                              4. Marble, tile  
5. Other…………                                         
 1B11 What type of toilet does your 
household have? 
 
1. Flush toilet with septic tank     
2. Suilabh (Squat toilet) 
3. Double vault compose latrine       
4. Toilet directly over water            5. No toilet 
1B6 Roof material? 
 
1. Straw, leaves          2.  Canvas, tar paper                
3.  Galvanized iron     4.  Tile  
5. Concrete, cement    6. Other……….       
 1B12 Is your household currently 




3. Don’t know 




    
       
 SECTION 1C: LAND      
1C1 What size is your family’s owned 
farmland in the last 12 month?  
1. Rice land. ……………………… sao 
2. Other cropland.. ……………..… sao 
3. Forest land. …………………..…sao 
4. Aquaculture land. ……………… sao 
 1C4 What size of farmland is cultivated 
by your household in the last 12 
month? 
1. Rice land. ………………………… sao 
2. Other cropland……. .…………..… sao 
3. Forest land. …………………..……sao 
4. Aquaculture land. ………………… sao 
1C2 What size of farmland is rented out  
in the last 12 month? 
 
……………………………………. sao 
 1C5 What size of farmland is irrigated in 
the last 12 month? 
. ……………………………………… sao 
 
1C3 What size of farmland is rented in 
the last 12 month? 
. …………………………  sao 
 
    




SECTION 2. RICE PRODUCTION 





2A1 2A2 2A3 2A4 2A5 2A6 2A7 2A8 2A9 2A10 2A11 







































1. One  
2. Two  
3. Three  




water is mainly 
used on the 
plot?  
 
1. Canal        
2. Pump 
station           
3. Water from 
spring, river              
4. Water from 







1. NTHIMC            
2. Agricultural 
cooperative 
3. Household                 
4. Other 
How does water in 





1. Flows directly 
to drainage canal        
2. Flows through 
other plots            
3. With automatic 
pumps.   













3. Household                 
4. Other 








2. NO  
TEXT M2 CODE 
PLOT USE 
CODE 
M CODE CODE CODE CODE CODE CODE 
P
P1 
      
  
    
P
P2 
      
  
    
P
P3 
      
  
    
P
P4 
      
 
    
P
P5 
      
 
    
P
P6 
      
  
    
P
P7 
      
  
    
P
P8 
      
  
    
P
P9 
      
 
    
 
PLOT USE CODES: 
1.Maize  
2.Peanuts  
3. Sweet potato 
4. Cassava 
5. Soy Bean 
6. Vegetables                 
7. Other crop………….. 
8. Aquaculture. 
9. Left fallow. 
10. Not used. 











1. Dry land          
2. Low-lying 
land                     
3. High-lying 
land                   
4.Sedimentation 
5. Other                




in the village, 
is the capacity 
of this plot 
  
1. Less than 
average               
2. Average       














average               





disease and pest 
infestation 
affected your 
plot (over 20% 







Which rice growth 
stage did the plot 
suffer plant 


















































were the plot 
affected by 
rodents (over 




































a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA 
CODE   CODE  CODE CODE CODE CODE CODE CODE CODE CODE CODE 
 P1                        
P2                        
 P3                        
 P4                        
P5                    
P6                    
 P7                        
 P8                        
P9                    
P10                    
 (WS = winter-spring season; SA = summer – autumn season) 
PLANT DISEASE AND PEST INFECTION CODE 
1. Planthopper 
2. Rice leafroller 
3. Stem borer  
4. Rice caseworm, fall armyworm 
5. Thrips 
6. Yellow rice disease 
7. Blast disease                            
8. Sheath blight  
9. Rice tungro disease 
10. Bacterial bright of rice  
11. Bacterial leaf streak of rice 
12. Damping off 
13. Other……. 
 




2B. PRODUCTION OUTPUT (WS = winter-spring; SA = summer – autumn) 
PLOT 
CODE 
2B1 2B2 2B3 2B4 
Rice varieties 
1. KD         2. HT1     3. TU8 
4. HC95     5. PC6     6. NA2 
7 Nep      8. HN6     9. Other 
Output 





Total output loss 
 
(kg) 
a. WS season b. SA season a. WS season b. SA season a. WS season b. SA season a. WS season b. SA season 
P1     
 
      
P2     
 
      
P3     
 
      
P4         
P5         
P6         
P7         
P8         
P9         
2C. PRODUCTION COST 
2C1. Material input  
 
Plot code: ……………… 
1. Winter-Spring season 2. Summer-Autumn season 
a. How many units of this input did 
you use? 
b. How much did you spend on this 
input? 
a. How many units of this input did 
you use? 
b. How much did you spend on this 
input? 
Kg/Sao 000 VND/ Sao Kg/ Sao 000 VND/ Sao 
2C11. Seeds         
2C12a.Organic fertilizers (self-provided)     
2C12b. Organic fertilizers (bought)     
2C13a. Urea         
2C13b. Phosphate         
2C13c. Potassium         
2C13d. NPK -  Ratio……………         
1C14a. Pesticides          
1C14b. Herbicides     
2C15. Cost for rent/borrow land     
2C16. Fees of AC’s services for rice farming     
 





Plot code: ……………… 
1. Winter-Spring season 2. Summer-Autumn season 
a. How many units of this input did 
you use? 
b. How much did you spend on this 
input? 
a. How many units of this input did 
you use? 
b. How much did you spend on this 
input? 
Kg/Sao 000 VND/ Sao Kg/ Sao 000 VND/ Sao 
2C11. Seeds         
2C12a.Organic fertilizers (self-provided)     
2C12b. Organic fertilizers (bought)     
2C13a. Urea         
2C13b. Phosphate         
2C13c. Potassium         
2C13d. NPK -  Ratio……………         
1C14a. Pesticides          
1C14b. Herbicides     
2C15. Cost for rent/borrow land     
2C16. Fees of AC’s services for rice farming     
 
 
Plot code: ……………… 
1. Winter-Spring season 2. Summer-Autumn season 
a. How many units of this input did 
you use? 
b. How much did you spend on this 
input? 
a. How many units of this input did 
you use? 
b. How much did you spend on this 
input? 
Kg/Sao 000 VND/ Sao Kg/ Sao 000 VND/ Sao 
2C11. Seeds         
2C12a.Organic fertilizers (self-provided)     
2C12b. Organic fertilizers (bought)     
2C13a. Urea         
2C13b. Phosphate         
2C13c. Potassium         
2C13d. NPK -  Ratio……………         
1C14a. Pesticides          
1C14b. Herbicides     
2C15. Cost for rent/borrow land     
2C16. Fees of AC’s services for rice farming     




2C2. Labour input 
Activity 1. Technology 2. Winter-Spring season 3. Summer–Autumn season 
a.Family labour b.Hired labour d.Cost of hiring 
labour/machine 
a.Family labour b.Hired labour d.Cost of hiring 
labour/machine 
Labour/sao Labour/sao 000 VND/sao Labour/sao Labour/sao 000 VND/sao 
2C21 Land preparation  
-ploughing, 
harrowing,  
1. Buffalo or Manual                
2. Small tractor 
3. Medium tractor 
      
 - levelling, repairing 
bunds 
       
2C22 Seed treatment 1. Seed priming 
2.Chemical stimulate germination  
3. None 
      
2C23 Planting and 
replanting  
1. Broadcast seeding   
2. Transplanting 
3. Row seeding with drum seeders 
      
2C24 Weeding 
 
1. Herbicide   
2.  Manual 
      
2C25 Fertilizing        




      
2C27 Water management 
- Water delivery 
- Water conservation  
       
2C28 Harvesting 
 
1. Manual                
2. Mechanical 
      
2C29 Dry and storage        
 
2D. EXTENSION SERVICE 
2D1 Over the last 12 months, how many time did 
members of your household attend training 
courses on rice cultivation techniques? 
…………..  TIMES 
 2D3 How many time did members of your household 
seek advice/assistance from staffs of extension 
agents or plant protection stations? 
…………..  TIMES 
2D2 What was the content of those training courses ………………………
………………………. 
 2D4 How many time did staffs of extension agents, or 
plant protection stations visit your field? 
…………..  TIMES 




2E. IRRIGATION SERVICE 
2E1. WATER ADEQUACY:  





What is the duration between 
2 sequent rotations? 
 
What is the duration that water 
is kept in the plot? 
How many rotations does the plot 
receive insufficient water (water 
depth less than 7 centimetres)? 
Generally, is the quantity of water 
available adequate to meet the needs of 
your particular field 
1. Strongly disagree          2.Disagree                     
3. Agree                            4. Strongly agree 
 a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA 
CODE DAYS DAYS TIMES CODE 
               
         
         
         
 2E16. Over the last 5 years, 
what is the trend of duration 
between 2 sequent rotation? 
2E17. Over the last 5 years, 
what is the trend of duration 
that water is kept in the plot? 
2E18. Over the last 5 years, what 
is the trend of the number of 
rotations with insufficient water?  
2E19. Over the last 5 years, what is the 
trend of overall water adequacy? 
 1 = decrease                 2= unchanged                    3= increase 
     
 
2E2. TIMELINESS:  





Was the water 
delivery schedules 
informed? 
1= YES    2 = NO 
How many rotations does water 
delivery delay? 
How long is a water delivery delay?                    Generally, is timeliness of water delivery 
reliable?   
  1. Strongly disagree          2.Disagree                     
3. Agree                            4. Strongly agree 
 a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA a. WS b. SA 
CODE CODE TIMES DAYS CODE 
              
        
        
        
  E26. Over the last 5 years, what is 
the trend of the frequency of water 
delivery delay? 
E27. Over the last 5 years, what is 
the trend of duration of water 
delivery delay? 
E28. Over the last 5 years, what is the trend 
of overall timeliness of irrigation service? 
  1 = decrease                 2= unchanged                    3= increase 
     





2E31 Does your household involve in any 
water-related dispute over the last 12 
months? 
1.  Yes   
2. No  2E39  
  
 
 2E37 In general, who are the persons 
benefitting most from the system? 
1.Head farmers   2. Middle farmers         
3.Tail farmers     4. Rich farmers        
5. Other…… 
6. All equal2E311 
2E32 Which kind of dispute did you 
involve? 
1. Water theft               2. Stolen turn 
3. Different watering routine 
4. Other……………  
 2E38 If Not All equal, what favour do they 
receive? 
1. More water             2. Take turn earlier 
3. Other………… 
2E33 Has there been a time when your 
neighbours’ plot received better 
treatment than yours? 
1. Never          2. Hardly ever 
3. Sometimes           4. Always 
 2E39 Over the last 5 year, has the equity in 
AC’s irrigation service declined, 
unchanged or increased? 
1. Decrease                    2. Unchanged         
3. Increase                      4. Don’t know 
 
2E4. AWARENESS OF WATER CONSERVATION 
2E41 Which irrigation method is better for 
rice farming?   
1. Continuous flooding 
2. Alternative wetting and drying 
 2E44 What is the sufficient depth of water in 
different growth stages of rice?  
1. Seeding  - 3 leaf seedling…………….cm 
2. 3 leaf seedling - tillering …………….cm 
3. Tillering - Panicle formation…………cm 
4. Panicle formation – Flowering………cm 
2E42 What is sufficient duration for 
irrigation rotation 
1. 2-3 days            3. 4-5 days 
2. 3-4 days            4. 5-6 days 
1. For Spring-Winter season……….. 
2. For Summer-Autumn season…….. 
 2E45 What water conservation practice did 
you apply to your plots? 
Construct bund 
2. Prepare land 
3. Level the field 
4. Construct field canals  
2E5. IRRIGATION FEE 
2E41 How much do you pay for 
irrigation fee annually?   
…………….. 000 VND/sao  
Or 
……………….kg of unhusk rice/sao 
 2E44 How much do you willing to pay more if 
you get a more adequate and reliable 
supply of irrigation water?  
……………….. 000 VND/ sao 
Or 
……………….kg of unhusk rice/ sao 
2E42 Have you ever owed irrigation 
fee over the last 5 years? 
1. Never  2E44    2. Hardly ever 
3. Sometimes                      4. Always 
 2E45 What is your perception about the 
fairness of water charge, you pay in terms 
of receiving water services? 
Totally unfair                2. Not fair                           
3. So- so.                           4. Very well                        
2E43 What is the reason?  1. High irrigation fee  
2. Financial constraint  
3. Unsatisfied with irrigation service 
4. Other……………………………… 
    




SECTION 3: PARTICIPATORY IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT  
3A. Please indicate the extent/level of your participation in the flowing irrigation management activities in the last 5 years  
Code 
 3A1 3A2 3A3 
Irrigation management practices 
How many time does the 
event occur in AC over the 
last 12 months 
How many times does you/your 
family member participation in this 
activity over the last 12 months 
Over the last 5 years, what is your extent/level of 
participation in this activity 
1. Never,      2. Rarely,      3. Sometimes,      4. Always 
TIMES TIMES CODE 
1 Labour contribution for canal cleaning 
   
2 Labour contribution to repair canals and flood protection dike  
   
3 
Fund contribution to construct or lining canals; to operate pump 
station in drought/flood; to repair flood protection dike  
   
4 Attention in General Meeting    
5  Attendance in water-related meeting    
6 Participation in electing AC's Board members 
   
7 
Speak up in the meeting to discuss irrigation-related issue 
proposed by Board members 
   
8 
Speak up in the meeting to propose irrigation-related issue to 
Board members 
   
9 Request responsibility of AC Board members    
10 Request explanation of AC's expenditure and revenue    
11 Report illegal water withdrawal    
12 Report equipment theft 
   
13 Report damage and leaking    
14 Participation in monitoring water delivery 
   
15 Participation in monitoring repair/maintenance    
 
3A4 Did you or any of your household 
members participate in the main activities 
of the PIM component of the CRWR 
project (2010-2013)? 
1. Meeting to inform PIM component 2-6/2010 
2. Meeting to choose WUG model (9/2010) 
3, Meeting to  generate operational rule (9-11/2010) 
4. Training course on enhancing capability of WUG staffs 
5. Design in-field canals 
6. Monitoring and evaluation of canal construction 




SECTION 4: PERCEPTION TOWARD AC 
4A. OPERATIONAL RULE 
4A1 Which allocation rule does AC 
apply   
1. Fixed time slot      2. Fixed order 
3. Other………………..  
4. Don’t’ know 4A3 
 4A5 Which payoff/penalty rule does AC apply 
for not participating or paying irrigation 
fee?                  
1. Loss of appropriation right            
2. Fines           3. Community shunning 
4. Other……………. 
5. Don’t’ know  4B 
4A2 Do you think it is a proper water 
distribution criteria?        
1. Strongly disagree       2. Disagree        
3. Agree                         4. Strong agree   
 a. Not contribute labour/money for 
maintenance 
b. Not pay irrigation fee 
c. Water theft and stealing turn  







4A3 Which input contribution rule (for 
maintenance, repair, construction 
etc.) does AC apply 
1. Equal rule per household                
2. Proportional rule 3. Equal rule per sao 
4. Don’t’ know  4A5 
 
 
4A4 To what extent do you think input 
rule  is fair             
1. Strongly disagree      2. Disagree        
3. Agree                        4. Strong agree   
 4A6 Is there a gradation of penalty rules that 
varies with the severity of rule violations? 
1. Yes                           3. Don’t know 
2. No 
 4A7 Do you think that the penalty rules are 
enforced completely?    
1. Never                        2. Rarely 
3. Sometimes                4. Always 
 
4B. PERSONNEL 
4B1 In general, how would you characterize the quality of 






















 4B3 Do you think that board members of AC 
always keep promises 
1. Never               2. Hardly ever 
3. Sometimes       4. Always 
 4B4 Do you think that board members of AC 
are open and upfront with farmers 
1. Never               2. Hardly ever 
3. Sometimes       4. Always 
a. Education/training 1 2 3 4  4B5 Who do you turn for help if  
 





















































b. Dynamism/vision 1 2 3 4  
c. Honesty/transparency 1 2 3 4  
4B2 In general, how would you characterize the quality of 























 a. Canals are broken 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 b. There is no water in your plots 1 2 3 4 5 6 
a. Capability in irrigation operation and maintenance 1 2 3 4  c. Water dispute in your plots 1 2 3 4 5 6 











 c. Fair in water delivery 1 2 3 4  
 




4C. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
4C1 When there is a decision related to 
irrigation management to be made in 
the AC, how does this usually come 
about? 
1. The leader decides and informs 
to AC’s members 
2. The leader asks AC’s members 
what they think and then decide 
3.The group members hold a 
discussion and decide together 
4. Don’t know/not sure 
 4C3 What is the process for members to 
raise concerns in a meeting? (CAN 
CHOOSE MORE THAN ONE) 
1. Speak out straight away in the 
meeting 
2. Send requests to AC’s office before 
the meeting 
3. Contact with the Board members 
personally 
4. Other………………………………. 
5. Don’t know/not sure 
4C2 What do you think about the influence 
of members’ on AC’s decision?   
1. No                       2. Low 
3. Medium              4. High 
 4C4 How likely are concerns raised by 
members resolved in the meeting?  
1. Never                   2. Hardly ever 
3. Sometimes           4. Always 
4D. TRANSPARENCY: If you want to know the following information, how accessibility is it?  
  1 = Never            2 = Hardly ever            3 = Sometimes            4 = Always 
4D1 Information about irrigation schedule 1 2 3 4 
4D2 Information about maintenance schedule 1 2 3 4 
4D3 Information on individual farmer's financial contribution  1 2 3 4 
4D4 Information about AC revenue and expenditure 1 2 3 4 
4D5 Information on penalty of individual farmers for rule violations 1 2 3 4 
 
4E. SATISFACTION:  Do you satisfy with services provided by AC? 
4E1  1. Strongly        unsatisfied 2. Unsatisfied 3. Satisfied          4. Strongly satisfied 
a. Irrigation and drainage service 
    
b. Input supply     
c. Land preparation     
d. Harvesting     
e. Plant protection     
f. Extension      
g. Veterinary     
 




SECTION 5. HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
During the last 12 months, approximately how much was your household's net income from the following sources - including cash and in-kind payments? 
 
Agricultural income '000 VND  Non-agricultural income '000 VND 
51a Rice crop (plus amount consumed at home)   52a Wage/salary  






























   Specified…………………………………      





    
                     - 
Specify…………………………….. 
 
    
51e Labour (on-farm worker as a hired labour)      
51f Capital rentals       
      machinery rented out      
      land rented out      
 




Appendix 2: Agricultural cooperative questionnaire 




Position in AC of interviewee:………………………………………………………………. 
A - Human capital:  
A1. How many staff in each division of ACs? 
Division Number of staff 
Management board   
Control board  
Accounting unit  
Service unit  
Irrigation unit  
 
A2. Please specify education level, working experience and the number of training 












Director     
Vice – director     
Vice – director      
Irrigator 1     
Irrigator 2     
Irrigator 3     
Irrigator 4     
Irrigator 5     
Irrigator 6     
Irrigator 7     
Irrigator 8     
 
B. Irrigation rule:  
B1. Does the AC have writing rules for irrigation 
□ YES       □ NO   
 




B2. Which content is mentioned in AC irrigation rule 
Content Yes No 
Operation   
Maintenance   
Labour contribution   
Finance (irrigation fee and expenditure)   
Reward and fine   
Other………………………………………….   
Other…………………………………………..   
B3. How water is allocated in AC? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
B4. How often irrigation system within ACs is maintenance? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
B5. How on-farm irrigation fee is estimated for an individual household? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
B6. How on-farm irrigation fee is collected? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 




B8. How does AC penalise members who do not pay irrigation fee, not contribute labour, 
money, withdraw water illegally, damage irrigation canal? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
C.  Rule compliance 
C1. How many members have been penalised for non-compliance of rules in 2017? 
□ None       □ ……………. members   
C2. How many members have evaded penalty for violation of rules in 2017? 
□ None       □ ……………. members   
C3. Is there an unresolved conflict at present? And if yes what is it 
□ YES       □ NO   





D. Institution for farmer participation 
D1. How many meetings have been organised annually? 
Type of meeting Frequency 
General meeting  
Board meeting  
Other meetings with farmer attendance  
 
D2. When there is a decision related to irrigation management to be made in the AC, how does 
this usually come about? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
D3. What is the process for members to raise concerns? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
D4. What collective action that AC organise to involve member in irrigation management? 
Collective action For what activity 
Labour contribution ……………………………....................................................... 





E. Farmer participation  
E1. How many percentages of member participation in collective action in 2017? 
Collective action % participation 
Labour contribution  





E2. How many percentages of members complain about water allocation in 2017? 
Sufficiency ………….. Timeliness ………….  Equity………….. 
E3. How many percent of members report issues in irrigation canals in 2017?  
Water leaking/canal damages………… 
Illegal water withdraw…………..   





F. Accountability mechanism (formal and informal):  
F1. What are the statutory reports prepared by AC for the members? 
Type of report Availability Frequency in year 
Annual report and business plan □ YES       □ NO    
Financial report– revenue and expenditure □ YES       □ NO    
Other………………………………………. □ YES       □ NO    
Other………………………………………. □ YES       □ NO    
 
F2.By what way irrigation operation and maintenance schedules are informed to AC members? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
F3. By what way are violations of rules by members or staffs informed to AC members?  
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 




F5. By what way are members’ complaints and resolution are reported? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
F6. Do members have unrestricted access to all information pertaining to AC? 
□ YES                □ NO 
F7. In what circumstances was the information access refused?  
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
